This thesis explores the constitutionality of compulsory electoral quotas for women imposed by law. The central question this thesis attempts to answer is what makes these quotas constitutional or unconstitutional in a given jurisdiction. A double methodology was employed to answer this question: theoretical and comparative. From a theoretical perspective, it is proposed that the constitutionality of electoral quotas for women depends on the approach that domestic legal orders adopt to four issues: political representation, equality, affirmative action and political rights. An additional crosscutting factor that influences the constitutionality of these quotas is gender, mainly through its effects on the understanding of political representation and equality. From the comparative law perspective, three jurisdictions were analysed: France, Spain and Mexico. After exploring these systems' approaches to political representation, equality, affirmative action and political rights, the process of adoption of electoral quotas for women is discussed, particularly the constitutional litigation about quota laws. Finally, the relationship between the theory and the practice of assessing the constitutionality of electoral quotas for women is analysed, concluding that although courts use a theoretical framework formed by political representation, equality, affirmative action and political rights, they adopt a somewhat simplistic approach to these issues, using only one of these theoretical factors as the primary determinant, often side-stepping the most controversial issues connected with these factors, and almost completly ignoring the particularities of the target group (women). Additionally, in each jurisdiction the decisions of the courts are also influenced by domestic political and legal factors.

The liberal conception of the state is marked by an insistence upon the equal civil and political rights of each inhabitant. Recently, though, a number of writers have argued that this emphasis on uniform rights ignores the fact that the populations of most states are culturally diverse, and that their inhabitants have significant interests qua members of particular cultures. They argue that liberals should recognize special, group-based cultural rights as a necessary part of a theory of justice in multicultural societies. In this thesis I examine the idea of special cultural rights. In the first part (Chapters 1 to 4), I begin by setting out some of the different conceptions of culture and multiculturalism that are involved in the debate over cultural rights. I then discuss three claims made by supporters of special cultural rights: (1) that having culture is an essential part of individual autonomy; (2) that people have morally significant interests qua members of particular cultures; and (3) that these interests are inadequately protected by existing liberal conceptions of human rights. Although I conclude that (1) is correct, I argue that both (2) and (3) are mistaken. Among other things, I suggest that the version of culture relied upon by supporters of special cultural rights is an implausible one and I outline what I take to be a more plausible, cosmopolitan conception of culture. In the second part (Chapters 5 to 9), I begin by looking at specific instances of cultural rights-claims, and analyzing the concept of cultural rights qua rights. I consider the practical and conceptual difficulties with special cultural rights at great length. But the core of my thesis is that our interest in culture lies in its contribution of worthwhile goals and options, and that this interest lies in culture generally rather than in particular cultures. Hence, adopting a special or group-based distribution of any right to culture would seem to be inconsistent with liberal egalitarian principles. If there are such things as cultural rights, I argue, they are general rather than special rights. I conclude by offering a very preliminary account of what a cosmopolitan conception of cultural rights might involve in the case of the right to free association and language rights.

Univ., Diss.--Fribourg, 2005. / Literaturverz. S. XVII - LXXXVIII.

Thesis (doctoral)--Universität, Frankfurt, 2009. / Includes bibliographical references and register.

[pt] O presente trabalho realizou análise acerca do conceito de Grave e Genera-lizada Violação de Direitos Humanos (GGVDH), a fim de investigar quais são as fundações da definição ampliada de refugiado e como se deu a sua construção no Brasil. Através de pesquisa bibliográfica e documental, os dados usados nesta Dissertação de Mestrado foram coletados das seguintes fontes: teses, dissertações, livros e artigos; relatórios do governo, de organizações internacionais e não go-vernamentais; tratados, declarações e legislações. Esta dissertação buscou apre-sentar a arquitetura protetiva internacional da pessoa humana, investigando as conexões com os diversos mecanismos do Direito Internacional dos Direitos Hu-manos, suas complementaridades, seus regimes e aplicações regionais e nacionais para, então, explorar a trajetória do refúgio no Brasil não somente até a construção do conceito de GGVDH pelo governo, mas também no seu reconhecimento. Em um primeiro momento, deu-se a apresentação do arcabouço jurídico internacional, sua interdependência e relevância para a proteção humana, culminando na Decla-ração de Cartagena (1984) e seus processos revisionais. Posteriormente, desen-volveu-se o histórico brasileiro em matéria de refúgio, chegando ao período de redemocratização e incorporação do conceito de GGVDH pela Lei n° 9.474/1997. Por fim, passou-se à breve análise do reconhecimento de refúgio no Brasil por GGVDH, no intento de mapear o posicionamento do governo frente a essa defini-ção, sua aplicação e limitações, apontando algumas nuances e conclusões. / [en] The present study undertook an analysis about the concept of Gross and Generalized Violation of Human Rights (GGVDH), in an attempt to understand what the foundations of the extended definition of refugee are and how it has been constructed in Brazil. Through a bibliographic and documental research, the data used in this Master s Thesis was collected from the following sources: theses, dissertations, books and articles; reports from government, international and non-governmental organizations; treaties, declarations and legislation. This thesis sought to present the international protective architecture of the human person, investigating its connections with the various mechanisms of International Human Rights Law, their complementariness, regimes, regional and national applications to then, explore the refuge trajectory in Brazil, not only until the construction of the GGVDH concept by the government, but also its recognition. Initially, the international legal framework was presented, their interdependence and relevance to the human protection, culminating in the Cartagena Declaration (1984) and its revision processes. Subsequently, it demonstrated the Brazilian history in terms of refuge, up until the period of re-democratization and incorporation of the GGVDH concept by the Law n 9.474/1997. Finally, it presented a brief analysis of the refugee status recognition under GGVDH in Brazil, in an attempt to map the gov-ernment’s position in relation to this definition, its application and limitations, pointing out some nuances and conclusions.

This dissertation deals with court-executive relations in post-authoritarian Argentina (1983-2006). Specifically, I analyse Supreme Court behaviour in highly sensitive cases to determine whether the tribunal has cooperated with or obstructed the government’s policy preferences in three key policy areas: human rights, economic emergency and pensions. This innovative type of approach – i.e., focusing on a small number of highly sensitive decisions – allows me to concentrate on cases that are genuinely important for the government or, more precisely, for the country’s political administration. There are cases that are significant for the State apparatus but irrelevant for the president (thinking of politicians as self-interested actors). My research uses a rational choice approach to courts, underscoring the strategic nature of judicial behaviour. This vision of judges provides a more accurate account of judicial-executive relations by bringing politics into the study of courts. By focusing exclusively on attitudes and apolitical jurisprudence, other visions take for granted the institutional context. Political stability, for example, cannot be assumed in many developing democracies. My findings indicate that the Argentine Supreme Court has consistently avoided obstructing the president’s policy preferences. Such behaviour is motivated by strategic considerations: judges are risk-averse actors that avoid clashing with the executive. For most of the time, the Supreme Court has operated under unified government, which increases the chances of being punished for anti-government decisions. Two other factors also account for the court’s risk-averse behaviour. First, procedural rules grant the Supreme Court wide discretion over its docket. The tribunal has used such discretion to strategically select the timing of its decisions. Second, recurrent democratic breakdowns have repeatedly led to attacks against the court, such as impeachment, irregular dismissals, and/or enlargements. Third, politicians exert broad control of judicial promotions, allowing them to block the careers of independent, courageous judges that act as a check on political power.

In this doctoral thesis, Kant's distinction between perfect and imperfect duties is examined. The thesis begins with an exploration of how the distinction originates and evolves in the writings of three of Kant's most prominent natural law predecessors: Hugo Grotius, Samuel von Pufendorf, and Christian Wolff. The thesis then moves on to Kant's own writings. It is argued that Kant draws the perfect-imperfect distinction in as many as twelve different ways, that these ways are not entirely consistent with one another, and that many of them, even taken by themselves, do not hold up to scrutiny. Furthermore, it is argued that Kant's claim that perfect duties always trump imperfect duties - which can be referred to as "the priority claim" - is not actually supported by any one of the ways in which Kant draws the perfect-imperfect distinction. After this critical reading of Kant's writings, the thesis then switches gears and a more "positive" project is attempted. It is argued that the perfect-imperfect distinction, even though it does not support the priority claim, is not altogether normatively neutral or uninteresting. In particular, for some of the ways in which the distinction is drawn, it is shown that the distinction yields the following normative implication: Sometimes perfect duties override imperfect duties and all other times there is no priority one way or the other. Finally, it is explained that this normative implication - which can be referred to as the "privilege claim" - translates into the following practical directive: When there is a conflict between a perfect duty and an imperfect duty, sometimes one must act in conformity with the former duty and all other times one is free to choose which of the two duties to act in conformity with. This practical directive represents the ultimate finding of this thesis.

This thesis aims to provide a framework for analyzing the moral responsibilities of global agents in what I call the Global Health Crisis (GHC), with special attention devoted to the moral responsibilities of pharmaceutical companies. The main contribution of this thesis is to provide a general account of the moral responsibilities of different global players, mapping the different kinds of duties they have, their content and force, and their relation to the responsibilities of other relevant actors in the GHC. I also apply this account to current debates surrounding the need for reforms to the international legal rules addressing the GHC, notably the TRIPs regime. In doing so, this thesis will discuss the allocation of responsibilities for the GHC among different global players, such as state and non-state actors, the latter including pharmaceutical companies. In order to investigate the allocation of duties, I will first analyze the object of such allocation which constitutes the object of the current GHC (Part A); then the agents responsible for addressing this crisis (Part B); and finally, existing institutional alternatives to reform the international legal rules addressing the GHC, such as the TRIPs regime (Part C).

Internally Displaced Persons ('IDPs') outnumber refugees by two to one and often have the same fears, needs and wants as refugees recognised as such under international law. However, refugee status entails international protection, while IDPs are left to the protection of their own state, which may, but by no means necessarily, be the very entity that has forced them to flee in the first place. In recent years, there have been significant developments in the realm of IDP protection. This includes the conclusion of two regional treaties on the protection of IDPs, the development of relevant soft law instruments, and the reformed 'Cluster Approach' of humanitarian response. Although the increased focus on IDP protection is a welcome development, the UNHCR has expressed the fear that 'activities for the internally displaced may be (mis)interpreted as obviating the need for international protection and asylum.' This thesis represents the first legal analysis of the relationship between the protection of IDPs and International Refugee Law. It will discuss five key challenges in this respect. First, the challenge of drawing the attention of the international community to the plight of IDPs; second, the challenge of developing an appropriate framework for the protection of IDPs; third, the challenge of ensuring that internal protection is not interpreted as a substitute for asylum; fourth; the challenge of determining the relationship between complementary protection and internal displacement; and fifth, the challenge of ensuring that IDP protection in an inter-agency context does not trigger the application of Article 1D of the Refugee Convention, rendering the Convention inapplicable to the recipients of that protection. This thesis will conclude by setting out the future challenges in the relationship between IDP protection and International Refugee Law, by identifying questions left open for further research, and by illustrating the overall impact and importance of this thesis' findings.

[pt] O presente trabalho se concentra no paradoxo da fundamentação do Estado Mínimo contemporâneo a partir da função punitiva, como forma de preservação de direitos humanos, mesmo ciente de que as ferramentas punitivas disponíveis são constantes fontes de violação de direitos humanos. Em um primeiro momento, descreve uma crise de identidade que vem do nascimento mesmo do Direito Penal como iniciativa de contenção do poder punitivo aos limites da garantias fundamentais dos indivíduos. Na sequência, aponta o desenvolvimento de uma lógica punitiva que passa de uma necessidade de disciplinamento da mão de obra fabril na revolução industrial à gestão de excedentes humanos sem qualquer finalidade, como se tornaram as prisões de hoje. Para pontar a ciência desta estrutura, a análise de casos específicos da jurisprudência da Corte Interamericana de Direitos Humanos aparece como base empírica para verificação de que mesmo o Direito Internacional dos Direitos Humanos estando ciente de que o sistemas punitivos são fontes constantes de violações a Direitos Humanos, continuam a demandar a utilização de instrumentos punitivos e repressivos para a proteção dos Direitos Humanos. Ao concluir aponta a necessidade da superação de qualquer lógica punitivas na preservação dos Direitos Humanos. / [en] This paper focuses on the paradox of the grounds of the State Minimum contemporary from the punitive function, in order to protect human rights even aware that the available punitive tools are constant sources of human rights violations. At first, it describes an identity crisis that comes from the same birth of the Criminal Law as containment initiative of the punitive power of the limits of the fundamental guarantees of individuals. Further, says the development of a punitive logic that is only a need for disciplining hand labor factory in the industrial development to the management of human surpluses without any purpose, as became today s prisons. To pontar science of this structure, the analysis of specific cases of the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights appears as empirical basis for finding that even the International Law of Human Rights being aware that the punitive systems are constant sources of violations of Human Rights continue to require the use of punitive and repressive instruments for the protection of Human rights. At the conclusion points to the need of overcoming any punitive logic in the preservation of human rights.