This thesis seeks to justify on moral grounds the existence of tort systems. The argument is that corrective justice is necessary but not sufficient to succeed at this task. Corrective justice is necessary because it is the only principle that can adequately justify the bilateral structure of tort litigation between claimants and defendants, and full compensatory damages as the default remedy in most tort systems. However, it is argued that the critiques to corrective justice lead us to the important lesson that tort law is more than just corrective justice. Three gaps of corrective justice are identified: the equivalence between gains and losses, the definition of what counts as a tort, and the diversity of remedies. The thesis offers a solution to these problems based on the values of restorative and distributive justice. It is argued that restorative justice plays an important role in tort law, providing an apologetic framework for material compensation (the message that money awards communicate), but especially for symbolic remedies, such as apologies, nominal damages, non-pecuniary damages, punitive damages, and gain-based damages, solving the diversity of remedies problem. This restorative framework of tort remedies is compatible with corrective justice. Distributive justice also plays an important role in tort law. Even though corrective and distributive justice are conceptually separate concepts, in the context of tort law they cannot be separated. It is argued that the definition of what counts as a tort involves a distributive task. Following this argument, the thesis argues that there is a distributive uneasiness in tort law, because tort law protects some interests regardless of how they were acquired, and regardless of whether their distribution amounts to an unfair distribution of resources. It is suggested that the distributive mechanism of insurance can solve, or at least ameliorate, this uneasiness.

Thesis (LL. M)--York University, 2002. / "Graduate Programme in Law." Includes bibliographical references (leaves 157-168). Also available on the Internet. MODE OF ACCESS via web browser by entering the following URL: http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/yorku/fullcit?pMQ75397.

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During the 1970s and early 1980s the historic contradiction between Maori and the colonial state publicly resurfaced, with high-profile Maori demands for the recognition of Maori sovereignty. By 1984 those demands became broader-based. They focused on the Crown's affirmation in the Treaty of Waitangi of continued Maori control over economic resources, independent political authority, and the protection of the Maori way of life. In the face of these pressures, the Labour Party, and later the fourth Labour Government, committed itself to a policy of recognising the Treaty of Waitangi. At the same time, New Zealand's under-developed capitalist economy was in crisis. Advocates of market liberalism within the Fourth Labour Government secured a power base from which they launched the New Zealand version of their paradigm, known as Rogernomics. The two policies were logically irreconcilable, and embodied the deeper, real contradiction of the colonial project itself. Once that logical contradiction became apparent, and the electoral implications became too costly, the Treaty policy gave way. The primary focus of this thesis is the role played by colonial law, legal ideology, and the legal intellectuals in mediating those contradictions during the 1980s. They helped to secure a passive revolution, whereby Maori demands were defused, and Maori resistance was subsumed within the political and judicial forums of the colonial state. This development is analysed within the framework of the dual state, whereby metropolitan and colonial social formations co-exist within the one national boundary, both dominated by the capitalist mode of production. In this thesis, that duality comprises Pakeha within New Zealand, and Maori within Aotearoa. The specifically legal dynamics are situated within the complex interactions of the economic, political, juridical, and ideological levels of that dual state during the 1980s. The thesis concludes that the colonial state did secure a passive revolution over Maori between 1984 and 1990. But this was, at best, a temporary reprieve. By the end of the Fourth Labour Government, in October 1990, many Maori remained committed to the anti-colonial struggle. It appeared that the fundamental contradictions of colonial capitalism, and the crisis of constitutional legitimacy for the colonial state, had not been resolved. They had merely been deferred.

In the past ten years, the world has witnessed a transformation in the relationship between governments and the supply of money. A number of countries, including the United Kingdom, New Zealand and the 11 European countries participating in EMU, have made their national central banks 'independent'. Inflation is at a post World War II low, and there a general recognition that inflation cannot, in the long term, create employment or boost economic growth. The economic consensus is that the best monetary policy is the pursuit of price stability. However, these changes to monetary regimes have been a pragmatic response to the problem of high inflation. There has been little recognition of the constitutional implications of the supply of money. I argue that this pragmatic approach is constitutionally dangerous. Upon examining the history of money, it is clear there are fundamental property rights associated with the issue of money. There is a strong need for monetary arrangements to be identified as constitutional issues, and for constitutional rules to be developed and applied in relation to the issue of money. This thesis analyses the appropriate relationship between governments and money from a constitutional perspective. Chapters II-VI examine the following issues: • the constitutional principles which should guide the behaviour of any government in relation to money; • the historical development of money and its theoretical qualities; • the difference between 'commodity' and 'fiat' money and the constitutional implications of their respective monopoly supply by governments; and • the constitutionally ideal monetary regime. Chapters VII, VII and IX then examine the existing monetary regimes in New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and in the European Union, and I compare these regimes to the constitutionally ideal monetary order identified in Chapter VI. The penultimate chapter examines electronic payment systems over the Internet, and assesses the possible impact these will have on governments' monetary monopolies in the future. The fundamental conclusion of the thesis is that adherence to constitutional principles demands that money be supplied on a private competitive basis. Notwithstanding that many central banks are now 'independent', the way money is supplied today - by governments possessing monetary monopolies - is contrary to the principles of constitutionalism.

During the 1970s and early 1980s the historic contradiction between Maori and the colonial state publicly resurfaced, with high-profile Maori demands for the recognition of Maori sovereignty. By 1984 those demands became broader-based. They focused on the Crown's affirmation in the Treaty of Waitangi of continued Maori control over economic resources, independent political authority, and the protection of the Maori way of life. In the face of these pressures, the Labour Party, and later the fourth Labour Government, committed itself to a policy of recognising the Treaty of Waitangi. At the same time, New Zealand's under-developed capitalist economy was in crisis. Advocates of market liberalism within the Fourth Labour Government secured a power base from which they launched the New Zealand version of their paradigm, known as Rogernomics. The two policies were logically irreconcilable, and embodied the deeper, real contradiction of the colonial project itself. Once that logical contradiction became apparent, and the electoral implications became too costly, the Treaty policy gave way. The primary focus of this thesis is the role played by colonial law, legal ideology, and the legal intellectuals in mediating those contradictions during the 1980s. They helped to secure a passive revolution, whereby Maori demands were defused, and Maori resistance was subsumed within the political and judicial forums of the colonial state. This development is analysed within the framework of the dual state, whereby metropolitan and colonial social formations co-exist within the one national boundary, both dominated by the capitalist mode of production. In this thesis, that duality comprises Pakeha within New Zealand, and Maori within Aotearoa. The specifically legal dynamics are situated within the complex interactions of the economic, political, juridical, and ideological levels of that dual state during the 1980s. The thesis concludes that the colonial state did secure a passive revolution over Maori between 1984 and 1990. But this was, at best, a temporary reprieve. By the end of the Fourth Labour Government, in October 1990, many Maori remained committed to the anti-colonial struggle. It appeared that the fundamental contradictions of colonial capitalism, and the crisis of constitutional legitimacy for the colonial state, had not been resolved. They had merely been deferred.

In the past ten years, the world has witnessed a transformation in the relationship between governments and the supply of money. A number of countries, including the United Kingdom, New Zealand and the 11 European countries participating in EMU, have made their national central banks 'independent'. Inflation is at a post World War II low, and there a general recognition that inflation cannot, in the long term, create employment or boost economic growth. The economic consensus is that the best monetary policy is the pursuit of price stability. However, these changes to monetary regimes have been a pragmatic response to the problem of high inflation. There has been little recognition of the constitutional implications of the supply of money. I argue that this pragmatic approach is constitutionally dangerous. Upon examining the history of money, it is clear there are fundamental property rights associated with the issue of money. There is a strong need for monetary arrangements to be identified as constitutional issues, and for constitutional rules to be developed and applied in relation to the issue of money. This thesis analyses the appropriate relationship between governments and money from a constitutional perspective. Chapters II-VI examine the following issues: • the constitutional principles which should guide the behaviour of any government in relation to money; • the historical development of money and its theoretical qualities; • the difference between 'commodity' and 'fiat' money and the constitutional implications of their respective monopoly supply by governments; and • the constitutionally ideal monetary regime. Chapters VII, VII and IX then examine the existing monetary regimes in New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and in the European Union, and I compare these regimes to the constitutionally ideal monetary order identified in Chapter VI. The penultimate chapter examines electronic payment systems over the Internet, and assesses the possible impact these will have on governments' monetary monopolies in the future. The fundamental conclusion of the thesis is that adherence to constitutional principles demands that money be supplied on a private competitive basis. Notwithstanding that many central banks are now 'independent', the way money is supplied today - by governments possessing monetary monopolies - is contrary to the principles of constitutionalism.

During the 1970s and early 1980s the historic contradiction between Maori and the colonial state publicly resurfaced, with high-profile Maori demands for the recognition of Maori sovereignty. By 1984 those demands became broader-based. They focused on the Crown's affirmation in the Treaty of Waitangi of continued Maori control over economic resources, independent political authority, and the protection of the Maori way of life. In the face of these pressures, the Labour Party, and later the fourth Labour Government, committed itself to a policy of recognising the Treaty of Waitangi. At the same time, New Zealand's under-developed capitalist economy was in crisis. Advocates of market liberalism within the Fourth Labour Government secured a power base from which they launched the New Zealand version of their paradigm, known as Rogernomics. The two policies were logically irreconcilable, and embodied the deeper, real contradiction of the colonial project itself. Once that logical contradiction became apparent, and the electoral implications became too costly, the Treaty policy gave way. The primary focus of this thesis is the role played by colonial law, legal ideology, and the legal intellectuals in mediating those contradictions during the 1980s. They helped to secure a passive revolution, whereby Maori demands were defused, and Maori resistance was subsumed within the political and judicial forums of the colonial state. This development is analysed within the framework of the dual state, whereby metropolitan and colonial social formations co-exist within the one national boundary, both dominated by the capitalist mode of production. In this thesis, that duality comprises Pakeha within New Zealand, and Maori within Aotearoa. The specifically legal dynamics are situated within the complex interactions of the economic, political, juridical, and ideological levels of that dual state during the 1980s. The thesis concludes that the colonial state did secure a passive revolution over Maori between 1984 and 1990. But this was, at best, a temporary reprieve. By the end of the Fourth Labour Government, in October 1990, many Maori remained committed to the anti-colonial struggle. It appeared that the fundamental contradictions of colonial capitalism, and the crisis of constitutional legitimacy for the colonial state, had not been resolved. They had merely been deferred.

In the past ten years, the world has witnessed a transformation in the relationship between governments and the supply of money. A number of countries, including the United Kingdom, New Zealand and the 11 European countries participating in EMU, have made their national central banks 'independent'. Inflation is at a post World War II low, and there a general recognition that inflation cannot, in the long term, create employment or boost economic growth. The economic consensus is that the best monetary policy is the pursuit of price stability. However, these changes to monetary regimes have been a pragmatic response to the problem of high inflation. There has been little recognition of the constitutional implications of the supply of money. I argue that this pragmatic approach is constitutionally dangerous. Upon examining the history of money, it is clear there are fundamental property rights associated with the issue of money. There is a strong need for monetary arrangements to be identified as constitutional issues, and for constitutional rules to be developed and applied in relation to the issue of money. This thesis analyses the appropriate relationship between governments and money from a constitutional perspective. Chapters II-VI examine the following issues: • the constitutional principles which should guide the behaviour of any government in relation to money; • the historical development of money and its theoretical qualities; • the difference between 'commodity' and 'fiat' money and the constitutional implications of their respective monopoly supply by governments; and • the constitutionally ideal monetary regime. Chapters VII, VII and IX then examine the existing monetary regimes in New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and in the European Union, and I compare these regimes to the constitutionally ideal monetary order identified in Chapter VI. The penultimate chapter examines electronic payment systems over the Internet, and assesses the possible impact these will have on governments' monetary monopolies in the future. The fundamental conclusion of the thesis is that adherence to constitutional principles demands that money be supplied on a private competitive basis. Notwithstanding that many central banks are now 'independent', the way money is supplied today - by governments possessing monetary monopolies - is contrary to the principles of constitutionalism.

During the 1970s and early 1980s the historic contradiction between Maori and the colonial state publicly resurfaced, with high-profile Maori demands for the recognition of Maori sovereignty. By 1984 those demands became broader-based. They focused on the Crown's affirmation in the Treaty of Waitangi of continued Maori control over economic resources, independent political authority, and the protection of the Maori way of life. In the face of these pressures, the Labour Party, and later the fourth Labour Government, committed itself to a policy of recognising the Treaty of Waitangi. At the same time, New Zealand's under-developed capitalist economy was in crisis. Advocates of market liberalism within the Fourth Labour Government secured a power base from which they launched the New Zealand version of their paradigm, known as Rogernomics. The two policies were logically irreconcilable, and embodied the deeper, real contradiction of the colonial project itself. Once that logical contradiction became apparent, and the electoral implications became too costly, the Treaty policy gave way. The primary focus of this thesis is the role played by colonial law, legal ideology, and the legal intellectuals in mediating those contradictions during the 1980s. They helped to secure a passive revolution, whereby Maori demands were defused, and Maori resistance was subsumed within the political and judicial forums of the colonial state. This development is analysed within the framework of the dual state, whereby metropolitan and colonial social formations co-exist within the one national boundary, both dominated by the capitalist mode of production. In this thesis, that duality comprises Pakeha within New Zealand, and Maori within Aotearoa. The specifically legal dynamics are situated within the complex interactions of the economic, political, juridical, and ideological levels of that dual state during the 1980s. The thesis concludes that the colonial state did secure a passive revolution over Maori between 1984 and 1990. But this was, at best, a temporary reprieve. By the end of the Fourth Labour Government, in October 1990, many Maori remained committed to the anti-colonial struggle. It appeared that the fundamental contradictions of colonial capitalism, and the crisis of constitutional legitimacy for the colonial state, had not been resolved. They had merely been deferred.