published_or_final_version / English / Master / Master of Philosophy

No description available.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Florida State University, 2005. / Advisor: Dr. Alfred Mele, Florida State University, College of Arts and Sciences, Dept. of Philosophy. Title and description from dissertation home page (viewed Sept. 15, 2005). Document formatted into pages; contains vi, 174 pages. Includes bibliographical references.

Children are often required to testify viva voce in criminal trials. The question arises whether children understand what is communicated to them during their testimony in court. In the courtroom, the witness serves as a source of information. In child abuse cases in particular, the meaningful participation of the child in court proceedings is crucial due to the fact that the child is often the key witness, or the only witness, for the prosecution. The proper evaluation of the child’s evidence, however, requires that all role-players involved in the judicial process have a sound knowledge of those aspects which deal with child psychology, especially the cognitive and language abilities of children who testify. The procedure that is followed in court is not understood by the ordinary lay person, even less by children, and the language used is formalistic and very specialized. Legal language in general often contains cognitively and linguistically inappropriate questions which prevent children from relating their stories. Furthermore their responses do not sufficiently reflect their knowledge and experience of the incident of alleged sexual assault. Court language creates serious problems for children and accordingly prevents them from being effective witnesses and taking part in the judicial process in a meaningful way. The researcher, in her capacity as a Regional Court Magistrate, realized that children have limited understanding of the criminal trial process and often become secondary victims as a result of a system that does not acknowledge their cognitive and linguistic developmental levels. The purpose of this research was therefore to test the validity of the following hypotheses: • During the examination of children in a criminal trial developmentally and linguistically inappropriate questions are posed to them; and This results in ineffective communication. Eight court transcripts of criminal cases heard in the regional courts of the Eastern Cape and Mpumalanga by different presiding officers were chosen at random. These transcripts were analyzed and evaluated in order to determine whether questions posed to children when they testify are cognitively and linguistically appropriate. Each question in each of the eight transcripts was numbered and analyzed. The findings of the analysis were categorized in terms of whether they were cognitively and linguistically inappropriate questions. It was clear that the majority of questions put to the child witnesses were cognitively and linguistically inappropriate. It is evident from the evaluation that the manner in which the children’s evidence in court was presented and the way in which they were questioned created a communication barrier which placed a distorted version of events before the court. It is therefore recommended that full account be taken of the cognitive and language capabilities of each particular child in order to elicit reliable information during the child’s testimony. It is of the utmost importance that questioning be conducted in such a fashion so as to ensure that the child witness understands not only the content of the questions, but also what answers or responses are expected from them. At present, acknowledgement of linguistic and cognitive developmental appropriateness, concern and comprehension for the psychology of the child witness are ignored at best, and totally exploited at worst. This lack of knowledge about child development impacts adversely upon the child’s credibility in court. To elevate and enhance the credibility of children, it is of the utmost importance for society in general and court role-players in particular to appreciate the various stages and faces of child development. The main recommendation is that court role-players should make a paradigm shift and children, including victims of sexual assault, should be given the opportunity to tell their own stories in their own language supported by other methods of communication. In evaluating any possible changes, it is necessary to adopt and develop a holistic and multi-disciplinary approach based on scientific principles. A specialized system is required to deal with children in the criminal justice system and innovative methods to achieve this are necessary. There is a strong need to change or adjust the present manner in which the criminal justice system accommodates child witnesses. Such a change or adjustment will be in the best interests of children as envisaged in section 28 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act.

No description available.

published_or_final_version / English / Master / Master of Philosophy

LL.M.

Thesis (LLD (Mercantile Law))--University of Stellenbosch, 2006. / The objective of this study is to examine the significance of postmodern insights regarding interpretation (especially the rejection of intentionalism) and subjectivity for contractual interpretation theory. In Part One (consisting of chapters 2-5), the leading postmodern insights on interpretation, individual autonomy, texts and intentionalism are discussed. This is done by analysing the present interpretive practice in four chapters: 1) Different theories of interpretation ranging from objectivism and natural law theories to post-structuralism are discussed in chapter 2. 2) In chapter 3 individual autonomy (as advocated by liberal theorists) is contrasted with communitarianism in order to problematize the notion of contracting parties as autonomous, self-regulating beings. By highlighting criticism against liberalism and communitarianism, and also by suggesting critical self-rule as an alternative, the assertion that contracting parties are autonomous and self-regulating is contested. 3) The process of textual definition is critically analysed with emphasis on the position reflected by the application of the parol-evidence rule and also post-structuralist ideas on the definition of texts in chapter 4. It is shown that textual definition consists of interpretation rather than identification. 4) The nature of intention and the process of intention “discovery” are analysed in chapter 5. Because of the centrality of intention in contractual practice, alternative theories on intention (and its role during interpretation) are postulated and it is suggested that post-structuralism can provide a critically reflective theory of intention. It is clear (from the critical analysis of intentionalism) that the way intention is presently approached is theoretically flawed. It is also apparent from the critique of liberal beliefs held regarding the nature of interpretation, subjectivity and the definition of texts that the theoretical foundations of these beliefs are fundamentally flawed. A critical re-imagination of contractual interpretation is necessary. In Part Two, questions about the justifiability of the present interpretive theories are posed. In chapter 6 the practical implications of a new theoretical basis for contractual interpretation are considered by examining the way various rules of interpretation are influenced by the new theoretical basis of interpretation. Three “rules” are examined: 1) The golden rule of interpretation is examined because of its reliance on intentionalist assumptions; 2) the parol-evidence rule is examined because of its relation to positivist assumptions about the definition of texts; 3) the relevance of bona fides as a substantial remedy during the interpretation of the contract is analysed to reveal assumptions about the nature of legal subjectivity in which the present consideration of the bona fides is grounded. It is shown that rules depend not on their content for operation, but rather on the assumptions upon which they are grounded. In short, we do not have to do away with our rules of contractual interpretation, but we have to re-evaluate how we apply those rules. The final part of this dissertation consists of a summary of the conclusions drawn during the course of this study.

Over the course of the 20th and 21st Centuries the judiciary have increasingly made decisions that have affected the substantive content and the procedural implementation of public policy. The aim of this thesis is to provide an explanation for this political behaviour in judges by introducing the Legislative Politicisation of the Judiciary Theory to the debate. The theory proposes that the key independent causal variable is the language of Parliamentary legislation. The argument is that as legislation has been increasingly used to delegate power from Parliament to its various agents, the language used has become more indeterminate in order to enable discretion. Such indeterminacy creates an institutional problem where the orders of the sovereign Parliament are not clear, and to resolve this uncertainty in the Rule of Law the judges must intervene. The political behaviour of judges is therefore stimulated by a change in the legislative supply-side rather than a change in the behavioural demand-side, and the judges are acting as professional technocrats charged with ensuring the efficacious implementation of Parliamentary legislation. A new discourse analysis methodology has been created for this thesis that provides evidence of change in the language of legislation between 1920 and 2010. A total of 8,328 sections of primary and secondary legislation have been hand-coded, with results showing that 3% of sections in 1920 (21 sections in real terms) were “Henry VIIIth clauses”, where power to make new law was delegated by Parliament; by 2010 this had increased to 16% (400 sections in real terms).

There is an absence of any significant written material applying standard rhetorical principles to the communication of the results of basic legal research. This study attempts to fill that void. It proceeds from a discussion on the nature of legal precedents (stare decisis) to a chapter on legal research tools and techniques which enable one to discover these precedents. It continues with an explanation of what a "legal issue" is and how one discovers it among various facts relevant to a case, but not necessarily vital to it. The balance of this thesis concisely details the adaptability of traditional rhetorical techniques to legal writing, then pragmatically concludes by suggesting how one can prepare an appellate brief by combining this two-fold principle, which is both academic and legal.