This doctoral thesis deals with one of the key institutions of Czech and French family law, divorce. Divorce is not merely a concept from some legal textbook. The specific fate of spouses, and even entire families, are tied up with it. This comparative study of Czech and French divorce law is divided into five main chapters and a statistical excursus. This thesis first discusses the historical and legal developments for ending a marriage, i.e. divorce, in both countries. This is followed by an analysis of the current substantive and procedural aspects of divorce in the Czech Republic. The focus of the work is an analysis of both procedural and substantive reform of divorce law in France and its fundamental differences from Czech divorce. Subsequently, it examines the consequences of divorce, possible future Czech legislation dealing with divorce and the innovations included in the French divorce law. The work ends with a presentation of relevant statistical data. The theoretical analysis of the institute of divorce is accompanied by practical examples of legal cases, current case law, conceptual solutions from specialists in the field of family law, as well as assessments from the author of this thesis.

Poverty is an event in time. Only dynamic thinking can fully capture its reality. This thesis contends that human rights case law is based on a static perception of poverty inconsistent with the dynamic perception of poverty in economics. Failing to notice its temporal aspects, the examined courts consequently produce judgments that overlook essential aspects of this socio-economic phenomenon. This is puzzling, since in other contexts of constitutional human rights adjudication the passage of time bears a significant role. This means that for courts to switch from a static perspective to a dynamic perspective of poverty does not require new legal tools. The duration of poverty and change in poverty can be incorporated into judicial thinking using familiar norms and doctrines. The extent of poverty, whether it is transitory or a long-term situation, the chances of escaping it in the near future, the fluctuations in depth of poverty over the years, the probability that upon emerging from poverty one will be caught up in it again, the inheritance of poverty from parents to children: these are all time-related concerns that bear profound significance on the lives of poor people. A static examination not only overlooks these issues, but also neglects the essence of long-term poverty. Viewing poverty through the lens of time would reveal a broader and more complex human rights picture, producing a richer legal analysis, and, finally, leading to a more suitable remedy. This study examines cases that consider claims relating to the economic situation of poor people, concentrating on examples from France, Canada and Israel. The analysis reveals the temporal approach of each judgment and suggests an alternative, dynamic reading of poverty.

En France et dans l’espace OHADA, la cession de droits sociaux est une opération économique considérablement pratiquée par des milliers de sociétés commerciales. Pourtant, la loi ne prévoit pas un cadre formellement dédié à son régime juridique. Face à ce vide juridique, la jurisprudence, la doctrine et les praticiens tentent de lui appliquer des régimes juridiques préexistants, mais forcément inadaptés. C’est ainsi que l’on assiste tout naturellement à une appropriation civiliste de l’opération qui est considérée aujourd’hui comme un acte civil. Or, elle a tout le caractère d’un acte fondamentalement commercial. C’est pourquoi la présente étude propose une approche qui priorise sa commercialité. / In France and in the OHADA area, the transfer of social rights is an economic operation considerably practiced by thousands of commercial companies. However, the law does not provide a framework formally dedicated to its legal regime. Faced to this legal vacuum, jurisprudence, doctrine and practitioners try to apply pre-existing but really inadequate legal regimes. We are thus, naturally witnessing a civil appropriation of the operation, considered as a civil act. But it presents some characteristics of a fundamentally commercial act. This study proposes an approach that prioritizes its commerciality.

For a variety of historical, cultural and political reasons, the Islamic headscarf has become an increasingly controversial matter in Europe. This is particularly the case in France, where the Parliament passed, in March 2004, a piece of legislation that prohibits students from wearing the Muslim veil—together with any other ‘conspicuous’ religious sign—in the classroom. Although Statute 228/2004 proved highly controversial and attracted unprecedented media attention, it was overwhelmingly supported by French MPs as a response to popular opposition towards religious insignia at school and was heralded as a ‘liberating’ piece of legislation that faithfully reasserted the beloved French principle of laïcité. Overseas, the new law was less favourably perceived and was often accused of being discriminatory and of violating the students’ freedom of religious expression. This thesis compares the French and American attitudes towards religious symbolism in general and the Islamic veil in particular. As in other matters, at first sight these two countries seem to adopt a very different—if not opposite—approach to religion and the Muslim veil, and so much so that their positions are often described as ‘irreconcilable’. This thesis will argue that this is hardly the case. Indeed, it will show that, at least before the passage of Statute 228-2004, the French and American legal systems adopted a substantially similar approach that appeared respectful of a veiled student’s right to wear religious insignia. This, the work will also suggest, is not surprising, for contrary to popular belief, the American conception of secularism is in many respects stricter than the French idea of laïcité, with the result that French ‘exceptionalism’ on matters of religion is hardly a convincing ground for justifying the new piece of legislation. The fundamental value of a Franco-American comparison, this work will suggest, ultimately lies with the fact that such a comparison demolishes a good portion of the popular myths surrounding the affaire des foulards: that the French legal system is fiercely secular; that the American one is strongly ‘religious’; and that France was, in 2004, confronted with a veritable ‘veil emergency’ that rendered the passage of the new statute all but inevitable.

For a variety of historical, cultural and political reasons, the Islamic headscarf has become an increasingly controversial matter in Europe. This is particularly the case in France, where the Parliament passed, in March 2004, a piece of legislation that prohibits students from wearing the Muslim veil—together with any other ‘conspicuous’ religious sign—in the classroom. Although Statute 228/2004 proved highly controversial and attracted unprecedented media attention, it was overwhelmingly supported by French MPs as a response to popular opposition towards religious insignia at school and was heralded as a ‘liberating’ piece of legislation that faithfully reasserted the beloved French principle of laïcité. Overseas, the new law was less favourably perceived and was often accused of being discriminatory and of violating the students’ freedom of religious expression. This thesis compares the French and American attitudes towards religious symbolism in general and the Islamic veil in particular. As in other matters, at first sight these two countries seem to adopt a very different—if not opposite—approach to religion and the Muslim veil, and so much so that their positions are often described as ‘irreconcilable’. This thesis will argue that this is hardly the case. Indeed, it will show that, at least before the passage of Statute 228-2004, the French and American legal systems adopted a substantially similar approach that appeared respectful of a veiled student’s right to wear religious insignia. This, the work will also suggest, is not surprising, for contrary to popular belief, the American conception of secularism is in many respects stricter than the French idea of laïcité, with the result that French ‘exceptionalism’ on matters of religion is hardly a convincing ground for justifying the new piece of legislation. The fundamental value of a Franco-American comparison, this work will suggest, ultimately lies with the fact that such a comparison demolishes a good portion of the popular myths surrounding the affaire des foulards: that the French legal system is fiercely secular; that the American one is strongly ‘religious’; and that France was, in 2004, confronted with a veritable ‘veil emergency’ that rendered the passage of the new statute all but inevitable.

For a variety of historical, cultural and political reasons, the Islamic headscarf has become an increasingly controversial matter in Europe. This is particularly the case in France, where the Parliament passed, in March 2004, a piece of legislation that prohibits students from wearing the Muslim veil—together with any other ‘conspicuous’ religious sign—in the classroom. Although Statute 228/2004 proved highly controversial and attracted unprecedented media attention, it was overwhelmingly supported by French MPs as a response to popular opposition towards religious insignia at school and was heralded as a ‘liberating’ piece of legislation that faithfully reasserted the beloved French principle of laïcité. Overseas, the new law was less favourably perceived and was often accused of being discriminatory and of violating the students’ freedom of religious expression. This thesis compares the French and American attitudes towards religious symbolism in general and the Islamic veil in particular. As in other matters, at first sight these two countries seem to adopt a very different—if not opposite—approach to religion and the Muslim veil, and so much so that their positions are often described as ‘irreconcilable’. This thesis will argue that this is hardly the case. Indeed, it will show that, at least before the passage of Statute 228-2004, the French and American legal systems adopted a substantially similar approach that appeared respectful of a veiled student’s right to wear religious insignia. This, the work will also suggest, is not surprising, for contrary to popular belief, the American conception of secularism is in many respects stricter than the French idea of laïcité, with the result that French ‘exceptionalism’ on matters of religion is hardly a convincing ground for justifying the new piece of legislation. The fundamental value of a Franco-American comparison, this work will suggest, ultimately lies with the fact that such a comparison demolishes a good portion of the popular myths surrounding the affaire des foulards: that the French legal system is fiercely secular; that the American one is strongly ‘religious’; and that France was, in 2004, confronted with a veritable ‘veil emergency’ that rendered the passage of the new statute all but inevitable.

For a variety of historical, cultural and political reasons, the Islamic headscarf has become an increasingly controversial matter in Europe. This is particularly the case in France, where the Parliament passed, in March 2004, a piece of legislation that prohibits students from wearing the Muslim veil—together with any other ‘conspicuous’ religious sign—in the classroom. Although Statute 228/2004 proved highly controversial and attracted unprecedented media attention, it was overwhelmingly supported by French MPs as a response to popular opposition towards religious insignia at school and was heralded as a ‘liberating’ piece of legislation that faithfully reasserted the beloved French principle of laïcité. Overseas, the new law was less favourably perceived and was often accused of being discriminatory and of violating the students’ freedom of religious expression. This thesis compares the French and American attitudes towards religious symbolism in general and the Islamic veil in particular. As in other matters, at first sight these two countries seem to adopt a very different—if not opposite—approach to religion and the Muslim veil, and so much so that their positions are often described as ‘irreconcilable’. This thesis will argue that this is hardly the case. Indeed, it will show that, at least before the passage of Statute 228-2004, the French and American legal systems adopted a substantially similar approach that appeared respectful of a veiled student’s right to wear religious insignia. This, the work will also suggest, is not surprising, for contrary to popular belief, the American conception of secularism is in many respects stricter than the French idea of laïcité, with the result that French ‘exceptionalism’ on matters of religion is hardly a convincing ground for justifying the new piece of legislation. The fundamental value of a Franco-American comparison, this work will suggest, ultimately lies with the fact that such a comparison demolishes a good portion of the popular myths surrounding the affaire des foulards: that the French legal system is fiercely secular; that the American one is strongly ‘religious’; and that France was, in 2004, confronted with a veritable ‘veil emergency’ that rendered the passage of the new statute all but inevitable.