This study investigates the surrender of the conventional forces of the Orange Free State (OFS) to the British forces on the 30th July 1900. The surrender might signify the end of the existence of the OFS as a state, and implied that the British forces had successfully conquered the OFS. The study provides a legal historical perspective on the events that led to the surrender, the surrender itself and its consequences. The study further explores allegations of high treason, as well as other crimes committed, and allegations of illegal acts with regard to the surrender.

Thesis (LLD)--Stellenbosch University, 2004 / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: An overview of the historical development of contract law and its underlying theory, spanning from Roman times to the present day, and in Western European and Anglo American systems, shows that the gradually developing will theory dominated in the early nineteenth century. It was, however, also in the nineteenth century that the first cracks in this theory were observed. First, sociological, political and economic factors, brought about by the Industrial Revolution, the rise of socialism and of labour, required a new, more humane approach. Secondly, with the emergence of a new economic system, new technical problems came to the fore: how were problems of mistake, interpretation, implied terms and derogation to be solved, unless reliance was placed, in each case, on untenable fictions? Thus, towards the last quarter of the nineteenth century, an intense and unparalleled juristic debate ensued, mainly in Europe, but later also in England and the United States of America. New approaches, e.g. that a strict and uncompromising declaration be followed, was proposed. The outcome of this debate was the emergence of the so-called confidence theory. The basis of this approach is that, whatever a person's real intention may have been, he so conducts himself as to lead the other party, as a reasonable person, to believe that the first party has assented to the contract as proposed or understood by the second party, the first party is bound by the impression he created. The principle was clearly stated by Blackburn J in Smith v Hughes (1871) LR 6 OB 597, which has since become one of the famous dicta in the law of contract, and forms part of the English law. It should be stressed that the Blackburn approach was not alien to Europe, where the gradual and natural development of the common law was overtaken by codification The French Codification retained the pure will theory. Under the Dutch code, the so-called will-reliance system was developed, akin to the Blackburn approach. In German law, however, the De Groot view was followed: the mistaken party was permitted to 'resile' from the 'contract' but under obligation to compensate the 'innocent' party's negative interest. In South Africa, the basic point of departure is the will theory but supplemented by the confidence theory This system is made possible by our law of procedure, where two remedies, the justus error approach and the contractual consent approach are available. As both these remedies have the same objective, viz. to protect the legitimate interests of the party that was misled, they require the same substantive law requirements. The confidence theory has imbedded itself so deeply in South African, European and English law, that it is now recognized by some as the key, not only to the solution of the dissensus problem, but also in cases of interpretation, supplementation and derogation. The combination of will and reliance are the foundation stones of contractual liability. These two principles have developed (and are still developing) from society's pre-positive, moral, ethical, political, economic, religious and other values, which have been and are still being absorbed in the body of legal rules. This process of development is informed by the norms and rules relating to public policy, public interest, the bani mores and good faith. These norms and rules are recognized and applied in the legal systems of the United States of America, England and Europe. They form part of our law, but unfortunately our courts are extremely conservative in recognizing and applying them. If we wish to obtain and sustain social and contractual justice, more weight should be accorded to these values. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: 'n Oorsig van die geskiedkundige ontwikkeling van die kontraktereg en die onderliggende teorie daarvan vanaf die Romeinse tyd tot vandag in sowel Wes-Europese as die Anglo-Amerikaanse stelsels, toon aan dat die geleidelik-ontwikkelende wilsteorie in die negentiende eeu die botoon gevoer het. Dis egter ook gedurende die negentiende eeu dat die eerste krake in hierdie teorie waargeneem is. Eerstens het sosiologiese, politieke en ekonomiese faktore, veroorsaak deur die Industriële Revolusie, 'n nuwe, meer menslike benadering geverg. Tweedens het nuwe, tegniese probleme ontstaan met die opkoms van 'n nuwe ekonomiese sisteem: hoe moes probleme soos dwaling, uitleg, stilswyende bepalings en derogasie opgelos word, tensy die oplossing in elke geval op onhoudbare fiksies moes berus? In die laaste kwart van die negentiende eeu het derhalwe 'n intense en ongeëwenaarde juridiese debat ontstaan, hoofsaaklik in Europa, maar later ook in Engeland en die VSA Nuwe benaderings, bv. dat slegs gelet word op die eksterne verklaring ter uitsluiting van enige subjektiewe bedoeling, is voorgestel. Die resultaat van hierdie debat was die ontwikkeling van die vertrouensteorie. Die basis van hierdie benadering is dat wat ookal 'n mens se werklike bedoeling mag gewees het, hy so opgetree het dat die ander party, redelikerwys, oortuig was dat die eerste party toegestem het tot die kontrak soos voorgestelof verstaan deur die tweede party die eerste party dan gebonde is aan die indruk wat hy geskep het. Die beginsel is duidelik gestel deur Blackburn R in Smith v Hughes (1871) LR 6 OB 597. Dit moet benadruk word dat die Blackburn benadering nie vreemd aan Europa was nie, waar die geleidelike en natuurlike ontwikkeling van die gemene reg deur kodifikasie kortgeknip is. Die Franse Kodifikasie het die suiwer wilsteorie behou. Die sogenaamde wils-vertrouens stelsel, soortgelyk aan die Blackburnbenadering, het onder die Nederlandse Kode ontwikkel, maar in Duitsland is die De Groot-benadering gevolg: die party wat homself vergis het, is toegelaat om uit die 'kontrak' terug te tree, maar onder die verpligting om die 'onskuldige' party se negatiewe interesse te vergoed. In Suid-Afrika is die basiese vertrekpunt die wilsteorie, maar aangevul deur die vertrouensteorie. Dit word moontlik gemaak deur ons prosesreg, waar twee remedies, die Justus error-benadering en die wilsooreenstemmings-benadering beskikbaar is. Aangesien beide hierdie remedies dieselfde mikpunt het, naamlik om die regmatige belange van die misleide party te beskerm, verg hulle dieselfde materiële regsvereistes. Die vertrouensteorie is so diep in die Suid-Afrikaanse, Europese en Engelse reg ingebed dat dit nou deur sommige mense erken word as die sleutel, nie alleen tot die oplossing van die dissensus probleem nie, maar ook in gevalle van uitleg, aanvulling en derogasie. Die kombinasie van wil en vertroue is die hoekstene van kontraktuele aanspreeklikheid. Hierdie twee begrippe het ontwikkel (en ontwikkel nog steeds) uit die gemeenskap se voor-positiewe, morele, etiese, staatkundige, ekonomiese, godsdiens- en ander waardes, wat in die regstelselopgeneem en beliggaam is en word. Hierdie ontwikkelingsproses berus op die norme en reëls betreffende openbare beleid, openbare belang, die boni mores en goeie trou en word erken en toegepas in die regstelsels van die VSA, Engeland en Europa. Dit maak deel uit van ons reg, maar ongelukkig is ons howe aartskonserwatief in die erkenning en toepassing daarvan. As ons maatskaplike en kontraktuele geregtigheid wil bekom en volhou, moet groter gewig aan hierdie waardes vergun word.

This thesis is a cross-disciplinary study of legal history and customary law. Respect for, and accommodation of local customary law has been a constant and integral feature of law in Britain since Anglo-Saxon times. It guided the emergence of the common law, and continues as a rule of law to the present day. Such respect and accommodation was an essential principle that permitted the peaceful consolidation of the British realms from its constituent parts. Continuity of law is a legal presumption whether territories have been added by conquest, cession or annexation. The principle respect for local legal custom was one of two schools of thought carried to Britain's overseas colonies; the other was a theory that local customary law could be extinguished by non-recognition on the part of the British sovereign or his/her delegates. Nevertheless, customary laws and institutions were explicitly and implicitly recognized in the colonial period. The doctrine has modern application with respect to the customary law ways of indigenous peoples wherever the common law has been extended overseas. Rights under customary law are distinguished from Aboriginal rights, though there is some overlap between the two. Customary law can only be extinguished by an express statute, or by clearly unavoidable implication. Legal customs are not invalid merely for being contrary to the common law. Common law defers to valid customary law as a matter of constitutional common law. But the common law provides tests by which courts can identify valid legal custom. Where a valid, unextinguished legal custom is found, courts are bound by the common law to apply it. Where customary law can be identified, it binds the servants and agents of the Crown, except when it is inconsistent with Crown sovereignty itself.

This thesis is a cross-disciplinary study of legal history and customary law. Respect for, and accommodation of local customary law has been a constant and integral feature of law in Britain since Anglo-Saxon times. It guided the emergence of the common law, and continues as a rule of law to the present day. Such respect and accommodation was an essential principle that permitted the peaceful consolidation of the British realms from its constituent parts. Continuity of law is a legal presumption whether territories have been added by conquest, cession or annexation. The principle respect for local legal custom was one of two schools of thought carried to Britain's overseas colonies; the other was a theory that local customary law could be extinguished by non-recognition on the part of the British sovereign or his/her delegates. Nevertheless, customary laws and institutions were explicitly and implicitly recognized in the colonial period. The doctrine has modern application with respect to the customary law ways of indigenous peoples wherever the common law has been extended overseas. Rights under customary law are distinguished from Aboriginal rights, though there is some overlap between the two. Customary law can only be extinguished by an express statute, or by clearly unavoidable implication. Legal customs are not invalid merely for being contrary to the common law. Common law defers to valid customary law as a matter of constitutional common law. But the common law provides tests by which courts can identify valid legal custom. Where a valid, unextinguished legal custom is found, courts are bound by the common law to apply it. Where customary law can be identified, it binds the servants and agents of the Crown, except when it is inconsistent with Crown sovereignty itself. / Law, Peter A. Allard School of / Graduate

Lee Wai Kim. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1999. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 154-162). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Abstract --- p.I-V / Introduction --- p.1-9 / Chapter Chapter I: --- The Structure of Land Tenure in English Customary Law: The Origins of the Common Law Property --- p.10-52 / Chapter Chapter II: --- The Institutional Foundations of English Law: The Administration of Justice under Henry I --- p.53-95 / Chapter Chapter III: --- The Royal Jurisdiction and the Transformation of Legal Procedure from Leges Henrici Primi to Glanvill --- p.96-142 / Conclusion --- p.143-153 / Bibliography --- p.154-162

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The Role of the Court of Appeal from 1548 to 1783 The purpose of this thesis is to analyse the development of the Court of Appeal in Prague between the years 1548 and 1783. The thesis describes the role of one the most important tribunals in the Czech Lands during the Early Modern Age. The reason for my research is that this issue has not been elaborated complexly by modern historians. The aim of the thesis is to complete and revise results of former researches in this area. The thesis is composed of an introductory, ten chapters and conclusions. Some chapters are subdivided into parts. The introduction defines the topic, describes existing literature and other materials. The investigation is based both on published and archival documents. The last ones were examined in the National Archives and chosen regional archives. Chapter One examines why the Court of Appeal was established, specifies its legal framwork and describes members of the Court. The Court was established in January 1548 by Czech King Ferdinand I Habsburg (1526-1564) in order to restrict the power of royal towns in the Czech Lands after the sovereign suppressed the revolt of the Estates in 1547. The judges of the Court of Appeal were representatives of all Estates in Bohemia (high nobility, gentry, burgesses) and four erudite...

This diploma thesis deals with an eagle owl as a model species for environmental education. The first part focuses on this species and how it was perceived in the past and the possible reasons for its pursuit. The second part focuses on the progressive return of this owl to Czech nature and legal measures to protect it. In the third part the thesis focuses on the presence of eagle owl in neighbouring countries of the Czech Republic and their latest states and legal measures. The last and practical part is focused on the perception of secondary forestry students and grammar school students on the return of selected vertebrates to Czech nature. This part focuses mainly on comparing the perception of eagle owl to other vertebrates in Czech nature.

During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the inhabitants of some parts of Europe and the North American colonies were confronted with proto-state institutional arrangements. In certain cases, they responded ambivalently. That ambivalence is at the heart of what I will call the 'limited government tradition'. The tradition's adherents thought that long historical experience, not to mention the events of their own times, provided ample evidence of the corrupting effects of power on those who wield it. Power-holders, left to their own devices, are likely to succumb to the temptations of power by exercising it arbitrarily. Where they are able to do so comprehensively and systematically, the upshot is tyranny. How, then, to ensure that state power is constituted in a manner that is inhospitable to tyranny? The tradition envisaged a range of measures, including a distinctive vision of 'the Rule of Law'. The Rule of Law would both define and enforce certain limits on state power. This study argues that the tradition's hostility to political absolutism is based on moral foundations which apply with equal force to economic power. The tradition ought to examine the modern constitution of economic power to determine whether it is hospitable to arbitrariness and tyranny. If such an examination is undertaken, we learn that modern economic power poses the kind of moral dangers that the tradition's Rule of Law project is designed to combat. However, the tradition assumes that it need not treat economic power as even a potential target of the Rule of Law. I will call that assumption the 'Consensus'. This study's first major aim is to explain the origins and stubbornness of the Consensus. Its second major aim is to persuade readers that the Consensus is mistaken: the tradition must regard economic power as, at least, a potential target of the Rule of Law.