Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1996. / Typescript. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 308-317).

Thesis (doctoral)--Universiẗat, Münster (Westfalen), 2005/2006.

In recent decades, international courts have proliferated the international system - a trend often referred to as the "judicialization" of international law and politics. States create international courts to promote greater compliance with international law, and have increasingly embedded these actors within various international regimes. Scholars have primarily analyzed the consequences of the judicialization trend based on international judges' authority for interpreting and applying international law, adjudicating international disputes, and rendering binding rulings. However, international courts, especially when conceptualized as international organizations, also perform a variety of activities beyond adjudication. This study theorizes international courts' agency, in both its judicial and non-judicial dimensions, to explain how international courts aim to influence actors' behaviour and promote greater compliance within their international legal regimes. As a foundation, it conceptualizes the various approaches through which international courts can promote compliance with international law, showing how international courts can appeal to actors' logics of consequences and appropriateness, either through their own agency or through using intermediary actors. An original dataset on the prevalence of these approaches across all twenty-three permanent international courts reveals significant variation in whether and how international courts have expanded their approaches for promoting compliance. International courts' level of autonomy influences their capacity for entrepreneurship and developing their approaches. Furthermore, their levels of acceptance and accessibility affect their adoption of particular approaches. Drawing on archival and interview research, ten case studies of a range of global and regional international courts, operating in a variety of issue areas and contexts, elucidate international courts' variable expansion of approaches based on these core variables. The study shows that international courts are dynamic and strategic actors, which address challenges and exploit opportunities to increase their influence and promote compliance within their international regimes.

A major objective of the Human Rights Act (HRA) was to bring about a culture of rights in the UK. Its introduction fore-grounded questions about the use of rights to advance social justice issues and was the impetus for this research. At about the same as the Act came into effect another law, Section 55, an antithesis of what the HRA promised, was passed which forced thousands of asylum-seekers into destitution. Section 55 became a major battleground pitting non-governmental organisations (NGOs) against the Home Office in a three-year long campaign, characterised by rancour and viciousness, unlike any in recent memory. The NGOs, with the new HRA as a key part of their strategy, defeated the legislation. This thesis, a bottom-up case study of rights at work, examines the role of rights in the campaign to assess (1) if rights brought about social changes and (2) is a culture of rights developing in the UK? The paper first considers the various theoretical frameworks on rights and social change and analyses various case studies of rights at work. Context is important; therefore, it also examines how asylum has come to be framed in present-day discourse, with an overview on the evolution of welfare as a coercive measure. The study, framed against current events of the day, concludes that while test-case challenges eventually defeated Section 55 welfare as a coercive measure continues. In short, the HRA has proven to be ineffective against illiberal policies and the development of a culture of rights, insofar as asylum is concerned, has stalled. And it has happened with deliberation by a government determined to be tough on asylum irrespective of the HRA.

This thesis assesses the UK Terrorism Act 2000’s stop and search and pre-charge detention powers against liberty and security rights. It proposes that criminalizing ‘terrorism’, and legitimacy of counter-terrorism laws, depends on moral and legal norms defining legitimate sovereign power. External norms of territorial sovereignty and non-intervention define and legitimize external defensive actions by the state to protect nation state security. Individual liberty and security rights, specifically pursuant to article 9, ICCPR and article 5 ECHR, have a special moral and legal status externally, but are not universally determinative of sovereign legitimacy. The thesis argues that these external norms accommodate contrasting paradigms of internal legitimacy, the ‘security state’ and the ‘liberal state’. Conceptually, sovereign legitimacy in the former is grounded on heteronymous collective or ideological values, grounding fundamental obligations legitimizing ‘balancing’ of individual liberty and security against security of those ultimate norms. The ‘balancing metaphor’ and exceptionalist theories are conceptually located within the security state paradigm. Conversely, political and individual autonomy (liberty and security of the person) circumscribe legitimacy of liberal state action, grounding fundamental obligations to prevent and punish harms, and to refrain from violating individual autonomy unless justified by those obligations. Liberal rule of law standards, including due process rights, are legitimized by the instrumental role of law as the primary source of justification in the liberal state. Evaluating the policy justifications, enactment, and scope of the TA provisions against those norms, the thesis concludes they contradict liberal norms, violate international norms and individual legal rights to liberty and security, and undermine the rule of law and due process rights. The pre-emptive counter-terrorism policy, balancing national security against individual liberty, and degradation of due process rights, belies a security state approach.

This thesis considers interpretive provisions in human rights legislation in the United Kingdom (UK), New Zealand and two Australian jurisdictions: the Australian Capital Territory and the State of Victoria. It deals with the relationship between certain common law interpretive principles which protect human rights and the rules under the interpretive provisions. It also considers what effect the interpretive provisions have on the overall approach to statutory interpretation, particularly in terms of their impact on the roles of intention and purpose. One of the themes of the thesis is that it is possible to identify a common methodology for the application of the various interpretive provisions. This is facilitated by an emphasis on the concept of purpose, which is flexible and capable of being identified and applied at higher levels of abstraction than the concept of intention as commonly applied by the courts. Despite this common methodology, the results of attempts at legislative rights-consistent interpretation in the relevant jurisdictions differ. We shall see that the UK courts have taken a broader interpretive approach than have their New Zealand and Australian counterparts. This will be explained by reference to the respective contexts of the human rights legislation in each jurisdiction, particularly in terms of legislative history. It will be argued that the purpose of the UK legislation to provide remedies in domestic courts for breaches of the European Convention on Human Rights provides the basis for the UK courts’ approach. The absence of this factor is the primary point of distinction between the UK on the one hand, and New Zealand and Australia on the other, though other issues will be explored. Finally, while as a matter of the interpretation of the UK legislation, and especially of the relevant interpretive provision, the approach of the UK courts is defensible, the significant risk to the principle of legal certainty which it poses will be highlighted.

Over the last decade, the effects of an unprecedented rise in global temperature due to climate change, on the enjoyment of human rights, especially the right to life, have been subjects of intensive scholarly attention. Gallons of juristic ink have been spilled on the need for States to adopt policy measures aimed at combating climate change. However, recent findings show that policy measures and projects aimed at mitigating climate change are in turn producing even more serious human rights concerns, especially in developing countries. These human rights issues include: mass displacement of citizens from their homes to allow for climate change mitigation projects; lack of participation by citizens in project planning and implementation; citing and concentration of projects in poor and vulnerable communities; lack of governmental accountability on projects and the absence of review and complaint mechanisms for victims to obtain redress for these problems. These secondary human rights impacts of policy measures and projects aimed at mitigating climate change have not received sufficient attention in existing literature. The aim of this research is to examine and analyse the effects of climate change mitigation projects, specifically Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects, on the enjoyment of fundamental human rights. It considers how lessons from the approval and execution of CDM projects could inform thoughts on the value and requirements for mainstreaming human rights safeguards into international climate change regimes in general. It analyses the legal and theoretical prospects and paradoxes of adopting the United Nations Human Rights Based Approach (HRBA) as a framework through which human rights standards may be systemically integrated and mainstreamed into extant and emerging international legal regimes on climate change.

Deference in international human rights law has provoked animated discussion, particularly the margin of appreciation doctrine of the European Court of Human Rights. Many commentators describe the practice of deference but do not explain how it affects judicial reasoning. Some approve characteristics of deference but do not provide a justification to defend the practice against criticism. Others regard deference as a danger to human rights because it betrays the universality of human rights or involves tribunals either failing to consider a case properly or missing an opportunity to set human rights standards. This thesis employs a different approach by focussing on deference as the practice of assigning weight to reasons for a decision on the basis of external factors. This approach draws on theories of second-order reasoning from the philosophy of practical reasoning. The thesis offers a conceptual account of deference that accords with the practice not only of the European Court of Human Rights, but also the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the UN Human Rights Committee. Additionally the thesis presents a normative account of deference, that the role of these tribunals entails permitting a measure of diversity as states implement international human rights standards. Deference in international human rights law then is the judicial practice of assigning weight to the respondent states’ reasoning in a case on the basis of three factors: democratic legitimacy, the common practice of states and expertise. This affects judicial reasoning by impacting the balance of reasons in the proportionality assessment. The account defended in this thesis dispels concerns that deference is a danger to human rights, whilst providing a theory that justifies the practice of the tribunals. The thesis thus provides the contours of a doctrine of deference in each of the three international human rights systems.

My hypothesis is that social contract theory does not satisfactorily explain why we owe a serious concern or respect to profoundly mentally disabled individuals (PMD). This is a problem for social contract theories if we assume, like I do in this dissertation, that the PMD possess a robust moral status (RMS). My dissertation will explore the main strategies deployed by contractarian and contractualist theorists to bring the PMD within the purview of the social contract, in order to clarify why some aspects of their claims are promising but why they nonetheless fail to fully explain the robust moral status of the PMD. I notably find that they leave morally important dimensions of human relations out of the contractual frame, which means that they exclude the PMD from the scope of justice and morality when they claim that this contractual frame offers the only valid explanation to be a subject of justice and a moral patient. I do not conclude that this requires us to reject social contract theory altogether, nor do I count it as a reason to question whether the PMD have a robust moral status. In my concluding chapter, I will rather suggest a theoretical frame that has the potential of incorporating both contractual and non-contractual relations within the spheres of morality and justice, because both kinds of relation vehicle important intuitions about what is of value in human life. This dissertation will contribute to orientate future research on the moral and political grounds for the rights of profoundly mentally disabled people, as well as question or curtail the breadth of certain key assumptions of social contract theories.

While the United Kingdom has a general commitment to religious freedom, there is currently very little written on what this commitment ought to mean for religious organizations. This thesis contributes to religious freedom literature by considering when United Kingdom law ought to apply to religious organizations. It answers this question by exploring certain potential conflicts between United Kingdom law and religious organizations paying particular attention to those that are under-examined and where the possibility of differential treatment is strongest. The thesis is divided into three parts. Part One consists of Chapter One and sets out the doctrinal and theoretical foundations of religious freedom. Here the thesis accepts that autonomy is the liberal normative justification for religious freedom. Part Two consists of Chapters Two to Chapter Seven and examines the interaction between United Kingdom law and religious organizations in six contexts: employment; the provision of goods and services; membership admission; internal discipline, internal property disputes; and family matters. Each chapter in Part Two is divided into two parts. The first part considers the legal doctrine that applies to religious organizations in that context. It then considers whether that approach can be justified in light of the commitment to religious freedom and autonomy identified in Part One. Part Three consists of the final chapter, Chapter Eight. This chapter uses the conclusions from the preceding doctrinal chapters to suggest a general approach for determining when law should apply to religious organizations. The thesis concludes that a contextual approach, that considers the often competing interests involved, is the best way of determining when law should apply to religious organizations. Such consideration ought to pay special attention to the importance of the particular activity to ensuring that the option of a religious way of life is available.