Thesis (Ph.D.) - University of St Andrews, May 2008.

Originally presented as the author's Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Cambridge Faculty of Law. / Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (p. [215]-247) and index.

Originally presented as the author's thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Cambridge Faculty of Law. / Includes bibliographical references (p. [215]-247) and index.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Aberdeen University, 2009. / Title from web page (viewed on June 26, 2009). Includes bibliographical references.

This thesis seeks to identify the moral wrong of torture, and to trace the relationship between that wrong and the definition of torture in international law. Because understanding a concept's modern manifestation requires an understanding of its history, the thesis begins by tracing the historical trajectory of legal prohibitions of different forms of ill-treatment beginning with the English Bill of Rights in 1689, subsequently articulated in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, that 'no one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment'. This prohibition, almost universally accepted by States, has come to be interpreted as embodying a hierarchy with torture at the apex. The shift towards a hierarchical interpretation of the prohibition of torture and ill-treatment in international law was remarkable, both for its decisiveness and for its surprisingly recent occurrence. The reasons for that shift are examined, before turning to a consideration of the competing accounts of what it is that makes torture wrong. Two predominant accounts of the moral wrong of torture are identified, described here as the 'dignitarian' and the 'defencelessness' accounts. Although most international instruments and judicial decisions on torture implicitly reflect the dignitarian account, the thesis argues that this account is open to challenge on normative grounds. Instead, it argues that the preferable account of the moral wrong of torture is a modified form of the defencelessness account, according to which torture is the deliberate infliction of severe pain or suffering in the context of a profoundly asymmetric power relation. Finally, the thesis turns to a consideration of the definitions of torture in international law. It contends that there are distinct conceptions of torture operating in the criminal paradigm, and in the human rights paradigm, respectively. While both conceptions of torture at present reflect the dignitarian account, the thesis argues that there is scope in the human rights paradigm for a more expansive 'defencelessness' conception of torture to be adopted.

This study aims to investigate the field where law, sexuality and disability meet, with a particular focus on constitutional law. Through the use of comparative law and an interdisciplinary approach, the study will try to understand whether the law might have a role in overcoming social barriers affecting people with disabilities in the sphere of sexuality, and which are the criteria the State should follow when intervening in this complex field. Drawing on different notions of disability, we will sketch how law itself is slowly enacting a paradigm shift in disability law, while leaving outside some of the ultimate inquiries elaborated by disability theorists. It is the case of the issue of sexuality, which still remains a "silenced discourse" both on the international and domestic level. In spite of its relevant legal implications (e.g. forced sterilization and legal denial of sexual agency) and recent efforts to secure its negative aspects, the right to sexuality for people with disabilities has not been the object of positive measures, with few exceptions (e.g. Denmark). One of the most debated instruments in this field is currently sexual assistance: a controversial praxis, even in its definition and boundaries. It was observed, both at the domestic level and by comparative analysis, that the legal status and the factual development of this tool is strictly linked to the regulation on sex working. An alternative solution, namely framing sexual assistance as a form of personal assistance in Italy, will be theorized. Sexual assistance, however, is condemned to be ineffective if not surrounded by other tools (such as inclusive sexual education, sexual counselling etc.) aimed at fostering self-determination in the sexual sphere for people with disabilities. These policies need to be developed down the constitutional path already traced by the jurisprudence, starting from the experience and questions of people with disabilities and using flexible sources of law rather than hard law. In this way law could contribute to the social change needed to dismantle social barriers and discrimination experienced by people with disabilities in the field of sexuality and grant them full participation in all areas of life

No description available.

The issue of divergence in human rights protection (adjudication) between the law of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and European Community/Union (EC/EU) law has been in the centre of academic attention for decades. The position that there are instances of divergence and there is a risk of divergence between the two legal orders has gained authority in academic discourse despite the fact that its premises were subject to challenges on numerous occasions. The claim that human rights protection in EC law is divergent from that under the ECHR appears to suffer from certain shortcomings. First, it is not clear how the divergence claim addresses the question of incommensurability that unavoidably emerges in a comparison of judgments originating from different jurisdictions. Second, the divergence claim has largely eluded to address the quality of flexibility possessed by ECHR and EC human rights law. Both legal orders operate mechanisms of flexibility that enable a treatment of differing human rights solutions other than rejection. In reaction to these problems the present thesis advances the arguments of flexibility and similarity. The flexibility argument holds that the issue of divergence is largely neutralised by the ability of ECHR law (and to a lesser extent of EC law) to react to the problem of divergence flexibly. This entails that the human rights solutions of Community courts could often be accommodated within the flexible framework of ECHR law. The similarity argument provides that the style of human rights protection in ECHR and EC law is similar. The comparison of styles is based on a general system of analysis that aims to avoid the problem of incommensurability. The two arguments are not independent - the success of each argument depends on the availability of the other. The limits of flexibility are found in the requirement of similarity and the impreciseness of the similarity argument is corrected by the potentials inherent in the flexibility argument. On this basis, the relationship between ECHR and EC law could be described as a flexible status of non-divergence.

Journalists reporting from conflict zones are increasingly at risk of injury or death. Not only are they at risk of becoming a casualty in the crossfire, they are now often directly targeted and killed because of their profession. The legal framework protecting journalists in conflict zones consists predominantly of International Humanitarian Law, supplemented by International Human Rights Law and International Criminal Law. The main body of law providing protection to journalists consists of the Geneva Conventions and their additional Protocols, which are now several decades old. Since their drafting, there have been significant changes in the way we conduct wars, as well as in the way journalists operate and report from conflict zones. This raises the question whether this legal framework is still suitable for the protection of journalists in contemporary conflicts. This thesis confirms that the legal framework contains, at least in theory, a significant number of provisions that continue to provide protection for journalists in conflict zones. What is clear, however, is that there are significant differences in the protection awarded to journalists based on the type of journalist, for example whether they are embedded or function independently in conflict zones, the type of conflict they are covering and even their nationality. The result is a rather complicated legal framework that is not always easy to apply in practice. It has been argued by the International Committee of the Red Cross, a view also reflected in most of the academic literature, that the protection offered by the current legal framework is adequate, but that the enforcement of it is lacking. This is considered the predominant reason why journalists reporting on conflicts currently face such significant risks to their safety. While this is clearly part of the problem, this thesis challenges the notion that the legal framework provides all necessary protection and that only through stronger enforcement can protection be increased. In particular, it suggests that this ignores the effect that clarity and the comprehensiveness of the framework can have on enforcement. Having explored the gaps and limitations in the existing law, this thesis sets out the case for introducing a dedicated convention for the protection of journalists in conflict zones in order to clarify and streamline the current legal framework.

This thesis examines the intersection between authors' moral rights and conflict-of-laws. The research question has been triggered by two important, interlinked factors. The first is that the currently applicable choice-of-law rules to moral rights are the same as those applicable to copyright. The second concerns the fact that moral rights are different from copyright - both in their nature and in the interest they aim to protect. Since these two factors coincide, it is questionable whether it ought to be the case that moral rights are subjected to the same choice-of-law rules as are applicable to copyright. The thesis therefore aims to discover whether the currently applicable choice-oflaw rules available in the context of moral rights are suitable for achieving the goals and objectives of conflict-of-laws. In the course of this thesis, I evaluate the potential validity of detaching moral rights from copyright in conflict-oflaws and instead attaching it to the characterization model of general personality rights. The research question is mainly addressed from the perspective of Rome I and Rome II Regulations. However, as there is no EU harmonization concerning general personality rights in conflict-of-laws, the examination will be directed towards France and England as examples of civil and common law traditions. Moreover, reference will also be made to CLIP and ALI principles by reason of comparison.