No description available.

This study has investigated the emergence of an international criminal justice order from its inception to its current status. It has investigated the emergence of an international criminal justice order by referring to: (1) the early attempts by nations to control the waging of war; (2) the influence and impact of the Nuremberg and Tokyo International Criminal Tribunals; (3) the emergence and rooting of international human rights and humanitarian law in coexistence with international criminal law, particularly since the adoption of the 1949 Geneva Conventions; (4) the influence and impact of the international criminal ad hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda; (5) recent attempts by states to exercise universal jurisdiction such as in the Pinochet and Congo cases; (6) the establishment of the International Criminal Court and numerous aspects of international criminal law that have been established by the Rome Treaty creating the Court; (7) the obstacles that are faced by the court; (8) other transitional justice mechanisms in an ongoing attempt to provide accountability and redress where serious infringements of international human rights and humanitarian law have occurred; and (9) a South African perspective of the past and current status of international law in domestic law. It has established that although the sovereignty and equality of states remains a cornerstone of international law, inroads have been made into the doctrine of absolute state sovereignty to the extent that it is now universally recognised that certain crimes are so reprehensible in their nature, that they warrant prosecution wherever they are committed, no matter by whom they are committed. It has further established that international criminal law and justice did not evolve overnight and most of its current status is ascribable to unfortunate and indescribable human suffering. It has provided a historical perspective of the early attempts to regulate the waging of war, and showed the impact of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg and Tokyo, most significantly establishing individual accountability as opposed to only state accountability. The latter development led to an introduction, resurgence and development of human rights and particularly humanitarian law subsequent to World War II, to the extent that the destiny of international criminal law is unavoidably interwoven with the former two branches of international law. It proceeded to record and demonstrate the impact on international law generally and international criminal law in particular, with the establishment of the ICTY and the ICTR. It has demonstrated that the establishment of these two ad hoc tribunals provided impetus to renewed calls for the establishment of a permanent International Criminal Court and has greatly contributed to the recording and further development of international criminal law. Lastly, it has provided much impetus for states to exercise universal jurisdiction over prosecution of core crimes. The latter impetus provided the background to a chapter in this work indicating positive steps by states to exercise universal jurisdiction. It proceeded to provide the historical background for the eventual establishment of the International Criminal Court and concurrently demonstrated its impact on the development of an international order of justice. The research provided a brief analysis of transitional justice models in recent times, contributing to an analysis of what lessons may be learned from these attempts of various transitional societies. It then proceeded to provide a South African perspective, particularly the evolution of the status of international law in South African domestic law. The thesis concluded that the need for a consistent international criminal justice order is validated and although the international community is continually shocked by ongoing atrocities around the globe, significant progress has been made in recent decades to extend the international rule of law.

The issue of human rights violations in criminal investigation emerges as one of the much debated subjects amongst academics since the inception of the idea of the fundamental human rights all over the world. Human rights remain a center pillar and a pivot around which criminal justice system revolves. In Lesotho, for example, the question of human rights has been critical in the light of the fact that, since independence on the 4th of October 1966, there was never a real and tangible instrument which guaranteed human rights. The 1966 Constitution which contained entrenched Bill of Rights was suspended in 1970. From 1970 until 1993, Lesotho was governed undemocratically. There were no periodic elections as prescribed by the 1966 Constitution. The 1970 interim authority introduced orders which administered the country. Around that time, besides interim orders, the country was governed through military dictates, 90 days detention without trial and state of emergency laws and regulations. Citizens were arrested, searched and charged arbitrarily by the governments of the day. The study, firstly, commences with a thorough investigation of the violation of the fundamental human rights. It gives a historical background of Lesotho political landscape, legal system, Lesotho mounted police service evolution, and practical human rights violations. The study, secondly, draws a comparative scenario between Lesotho, the Republic of South Africa, the United States of America and the United Kingdom as far as human rights violations are concerned. The question of police use of force, whether deadly or moderate, while conducting arrest, search or seizure, has been thoroughly investigated and discussed. Human rights material, documents and instruments internationally or locally have been identified, analyzed and discussed. Based on the findings of the research, lessons and recommendations for Lesotho have been drawn. The study argues that generally speaking, there are no adequate control mechanisms put in place to regulate police powers in Lesotho compared to other jurisdictions. It further argues that, some jurisdictions, such as the United Kingdom, the Republic of South Africa and the United States of America have some advanced police intervention programmes aimed at improving and constantly checking police work. The Republic of South Africa in particular, has moved away from the apartheid past tendencies and legacy which saw the police use repressive means in dealing with the public unrest. For example, the principle of Parliamentary Sovereignty encouraged them to abuse their power as illustrated in the decision of Sachs v Minister of Justice1 where the Judge had this to say: âArguments are sometimes advanced which do seem to me to ignore the plain principle that Parliament may make any encroachment it chooses upon life, liberty and property of any individual subject to its sway, and that it is the function of the courts of law to enforce (Parliamentâs will).â However, this scenario changed with the introduction of the interim Constitution of 1993 which ushered in a democratic majority rule in 1994. The introduction of the 1993 interim Constitution brought with it a Constitutional State founded on the supremacy of the Constitution and the rule of law as opposed to a long practiced Parliamentary rule.2

The study demonstrates that mental health professionals, more specifically psychiatrists and psychologists, conducting psycho-legal assessments in South Africa, play a pivotal role in assisting the courts in ensuring that justice is done. Mental health professionals are involved in numerous matters, ranging from criminal cases, such as conducting psycho-legal assessments regarding criminal capacity, civil proceedings concerning care and contact evaluations, personal injury claims, and many more. In reviewing case law and the complaints lodged with, and rulings made by, the Health Professions Council of South Africa, it is evident that psycho-legal assessments are often problematic. The problems relate to an inadequate level of performance in evaluations and testimony and unethical behaviour. It is argued that the lack of regulation of psycho-legal assessments is one of the main contributing factors in the increasing challenges experienced. The study examines the current regulatory framework regarding psycho-legal assessments in South Africa by first examining the procedural and evidentiary rules that control the admissibility and evaluation of expert testimony, and secondly, the self-regulation by the mental health professions. To address the shortcomings, the regulatory mechanisms in the international context is analysed by turning to the United Kingdom as well as the United States of America. Both jurisdictions have strong ties to South Africa and a rich history concerning regulating psycho-legal assessments and psychological and psychiatric evidence in general. Drawing from the regulatory frameworks in the comparator countries recommendations for the South African context is made. The recommendations take a multi-level approach, focusing on the rules of evidence and other procedural rules within the legal system and self-regulation of mental health professions. / Thesis (LLD)--University of Pretoria, 2020. / Public Law / LLD / Unrestricted

This doctoral thesis aims to explore the underlying rationale of the (by modern standards) wide use of character evidence in the courts of classical Athens. Linking divergent areas of social sciences such as law, history, psychology and social anthropology, this interdisciplinary quest examines under a socio-political prism the question of legal relevance in Athenian forensic rhetoric. Specifically, I am concerned with an in-depth analysis of the surviving court speeches placed in their context in order to reveal the function of the Athenian courts and the fundamental nature of Athenian law. I explore the utmost aims of the first democratic system of justice and give a verdict as to its orientation towards the attainment of key notions such as the rule of law, equity and fairness, or social stability through utilitarian dispute resolution. My claim is that, although ancient and modern definitions of such ideals are in essence incomparable, the Athenians achieved the rule of law in their own terms through the strict application of legal justice in their courts. In such a legal system, no ‘aberrations’ or irrelevant ‘extra-legal’ arguments may carry significant weight. Central for my argument is the homogeneous approach to (legal and quasi-legal) argumentation from Homer to the orators, in a period covering more than four centuries. Close analysis of the dispute-resolution passages in ancient Greek literature exposes the striking similarities with the rhetoric of litigants in the Athenian courts. Therefore, instead of isolating (in time and space) the sphere of the Athenian courts of the mid-5th to the late-4th centuries, my holistic approach discloses the need for an all-embracing interpretation of the wide use of character evidence in every aspect of argumentation. I argue that the explanation for this practice is to be found (on a subjective level) in the Greek ideas of ‘character’ and ‘personality’, the inductive method of reasoning, and (on an objective level) in the social, political and institutional structures of the ancient Greek polis. Thus, a new exegesis to the question of legal relevance for the Greeks emerges.

Le droit de la preuve résulte nécessairement d’un certain postulat philosophique. Le modèle qui prédomine en France, qui doit beaucoup aux travaux de Motulsky, adopte ainsi une approche légaliste faisant découler le droit de la preuve de la notion de droit subjectif. Il appartiendrait, dans cette perspective, à la partie qui se prévaut d’un droit d’analyser l’antécédent de la règle afin d’identifier les faits devant faire l’objet d’une preuve. En matière délictuelle par exemple, il incomberait à la victime de faire la preuve d’une faute, d’un dommage et d’un lien de causalité entre la faute et le dommage pour obtenir réparation. Or, tous les systèmes juridiques, et plus particulièrement celui de droit anglais, ne reconnaissent pas l’existence des droits subjectifs. Par ailleurs, pour de nombreux auteurs, tel Michel Villey, le droit ne peut se réduire à la règle de droit, par essence générale et abstraite : tout cas d’espèce doit recevoir des solutions adaptées. Autrement dit, par sa généralité, la règle laisserait place à des espaces qu’il faudrait combler par la référence à des éléments extrajuridiques, contrairement à ce que postule la thèse de Motulsky. Un tel dilemme ne pouvait être résolu qu’en procédant à une reconceptualisation de la preuve. C’est à ce travail que cette thèse s’est attaquée en vue de proposer des solutions théoriques rigoureuses, sur la base desquelles des conséquences concrètes pourront être inférées. Indéniablement, le fait de se focaliser sur une matière spécifique, le droit des transports maritimes en l’occurrence, constituait le moyen le plus sûr pour ne pas perdre de vue les aspects éminemment pratiques du droit de la preuve. / The law of evidence results necessarily from a philosophical postulate. Thus, the predominant model of evidence law in France, which owes much to the work of Motulsky, has adopted a legalistic approach of the concept of subjective rights. In this perspective, it is incumbent on the claimant to analyze the antecedent of the rule in order to identify the facts to be proven. For instance, in tort law, the onus it is on the victim to prove a fault, a damage and a causal link between the fault and the damage for redress. However, all legal systems, and more particularly the English one do not recognize the existence of subjective rights. Moreover, for many authors, such as Villey, the law cannot be reduced to the rule of law, by general and abstract nature: every case requires adapted solutions. In other words, by its generality, the rule would create spaces that should be addressed by reference to extra-legal factors, contrary to what postulate the Motulsky’s thesis. Such a dilemma could only be solved by making a reconceptualization of the evidence. It is this task that this thesis tackles in view to provide rigorous theoretical solutions, based on which concrete consequences will be inferred. Undeniably, the fact of focusing on a specific topic, the law of maritime transport in this case, was the surest way not to lose sight of the very practical aspects of the law of evidence.

Law of evidence is a legal-based procedure for collecting and presenting proof. The aim of the process is to follow the basic principle of legal administrative proceedings, the principle of material truth. My thesis is based on the Administrative Code regulations, although I was also pointing to the fact that there are specific regulations that restrict or exclude the use of the Administrative Code. Despite the above-mentioned, the general and theoretical ideas of the law of evidence are applicable for all administrative proceedings. Except the principle of material truth there are other basic principles of vital importance to administrative proceedings, particularly the principle of legality and the principle of working out the case without undue delay. The core of law of evidence, however, is contained in provisions of the Administrative Code dealing with the bases for a decision in the administrative proceedings at first instance. For the law of evidence in administrative proceedings it is also often applicable doctrinal and judicial knowledge of civil and criminal law, as a connecting element between these different areas of law is the principle of material truth. The decision-making practice of the administrative courts respects the similarities between criminal and administrative punishment,...

Thesis (LL. M.)--Judge Advocate General's School, United States Army, 1990. / "April 1990." Typescript. Includes bibliographical references (24 leaves at end). Also issued in microfiche.

Thesis (LL. M.)--Judge Advocate General's School, United States Army, 1993. / "April 1993." Typescript. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 72-97). Also issued in microfiche.

Même si elle n’est pas une preuve per se, il est admis de longue date que la présomption peut, provisoirement, faire office de preuve lorsqu’une preuve directe d’un fait est indisponible ou difficile à produire. En l’absence d’un droit de la preuve codifié de l’Union européenne, il n’est pas aisé d’affirmer que les critères de classification des présomptions en droit interne (l’admissibilité de la preuve et l’auteur de la présomption) sont transposables au droit de l’Union. Cela ne signifie pas que la présomption est irrévocablement bannie du vocabulaire juridique de celle-ci ; l’examen de la jurisprudence de la Cour de justice et du droit en vigueur permet d’identifier un certain nombre de circonstances dans lesquelles le législateur et le juge sont amenés à former des présomptions. La pratique en droit de l’Union confirme ainsi un aspect fondamental de la théorie générale de la présomption relatif à la genèse de celle-ci : elle apparaît là où il y a un doute qu’il convient d’éliminer, au moins jusqu’à la production d’une preuve contraire. La nécessité qu’un tel doute soit écarté peut être identifiée a priori (ce qui doit être présumé) ou a posteriori (ce qu’il est permis de présumer), à l’issue des recherches des preuves de certains faits. En ce sens, le droit de l’Union européenne connaît des présomptions qui font office de preuves aprioriques ou prima facie telles que les présomptions tirées du droit international des traités et des organisations internationales, la légalité, la validité, la conformité et l’équivalence des législations, au sens du principe de reconnaissance mutuelle. En revanche, l’on trouve des faits qui peuvent être présumés dans le droit de la concurrence et les relations extérieures de l’Union, dans l’examen des entraves aux libertés de circulation ainsi que dans l’interprétation des traités. Il peut ainsi être soutenu que le droit de l’Union européenne dispose, matériellement, d’un droit des présomptions qui contient ses propres critères liés à la classification et aux effets probatoires de ces dernières. / It is traditionally held that even though it cannot be qualified as evidence per se, presumption can provisionally produce the effect of evidence, when direct evidence is not available, or even possible, of a fact for which such evidence is required. Considering that the EU does not have a codified law on evidence, the criteria known in national law by virtue of which presumptions are either refutable or irrefutable cannot, prima facie, apply in EU law. This does not mean that the notion of presumption has no place in EU legal vocabulary. The analysis of the case law of the EU Courts, as well as of EU secondary law, allows the discerning of the circumstance in which the legislator, or the judge, use presumptions as techniques that provide good, although temporary, solutions to situations characterized by doubt. The practice in EU law thus confirms a crucial point that has been raised in legal theory on evidence: presumption appears where there is a need to eliminate a doubt, through accepting something to be true until the contrary is established. The need that a doubt be removed can arise a priori (what should be presumed) or a posteriori (what can be presumed), when a search for evidence fails to meet a legal standard. There are, indeed, certain facts that should prima facie be held as true in EU law, such as those given by the presumptions taken over from International law of treaties and of International Organizations, the presumptions of legality and validity, of compliance or compatibility and of equivalence within the meaning of the principle of mutual recognition. The facts that can be presumed in EU law are usually facts for which evidence is required in Competition law, the EU external relations, the restrictions on the freedoms of movement and the interpretation of the Treaties. It can thus be held that there is, in the EU, a law on presumptions, which contains its own criteria related to the division of presumptions, as well as to their evidentiary effects.