The central tenet of tracing theory is that in certain circumstances it is possible to show that one asset stands in the place of another, such that any claims in relation to the original asset can be transmitted to its substitute. Since at least 2001 academic and judicial orthodoxy has been that this is done by following the path of value from one asset to the other, and can be aided in more complex cases by the application of evidential rules or presumptions. These ideas are at the heart of existing accounts of proprietary claims against trustees who deal with trust assets without authority, and personal and proprietary claims against strangers to the trust. They are also at the heart of calls to 'unify' the rules of tracing at law and in equity, removing existing distinctions drawn between claimants who are owed fiduciary duties and those who are not. In this thesis it is argued that there are no independent processes of following and identifying value, and that the language of 'tracing value' has lent the appearance of neutrality and conceptual unity to disparate heads of fiduciary and non-fiduciary liability. Most importantly, it has led to the assumption that in any case in which a claimant can demonstrate that a series of transactions links some right in the defendant’s hands with a right previously held by or for the claimant, the claimant can claim that right. In this thesis it is argued that far from creating an arbitrary practical obstacle for claimants seeking to trace and locate value, the fiduciary relationship is at the heart of the justification for any claim that exists to a new right in the hands of someone else.

Competition between trade rivals in a marketplace operating within a common law-based legal system is regulated primarily by two fairly distinct branches of the law: the prohibitions against anti-competitive conduct imposed by the competition law framework, and the common law restraints against acts of “unfair competition” that attract liability under the economic torts. This dissertation aims to critically examine both these legal frameworks and provide an integrated account of how these branches of the law distinguish between lawful and unlawful modes of competitive conduct. By scrutinising the doctrinal and policy foundations that underlie each of these legal frameworks, common thematic strands that may not be immediately apparent to lawyers working exclusively in either field will be exposed, while fundamental differences between their respective inner workings will also be uncovered in the process. Engaging in such a comparative exercise will facilitate a deeper understanding of the contrasting objectives and jurisprudential approaches associated with each legal framework which, in turn, sheds some light on the nature of their relationship with each other and the extent to which legal developments in one field ought to influence, or be influenced by, the other. Besides evaluating how and why the common law economic torts operate differently from the competition law prohibitions in circumscribing the liberty of individual competitors to inflict economic harm upon their trade rivals, this dissertation will also analyse selected types of commercial conduct which are regarded as lawful under one framework but unlawful by the other, and contrast them with scenarios which could attract overlapping legal liability under both legal frameworks. In addition, this dissertation will explore a selection of legal issues arising from the doctrinal interaction between these areas of the law that may confront the courts as these two legal frameworks continue to develop in tandem with each other.

Legal systems around the world vary widely in how they deal with the assignment of receivables. This legal variety makes it difficult for financiers to conduct their international receivables financing business. This thesis suggests an International Registration System for the Assignment and Security Interest of Receivables (‘IRSAR’) and proposes a model international convention for the IRSAR (‘proposed IRSAR Convention’), which could help financiers to overcome the obstacles they currently encounter. Under the proposed IRSAR Convention, the international assignment of receivables would be regulated by a unified legal system with respect to priority and perfection. The IRSAR would facilitate international project financing. Furthermore, the IRSAR would enable companies to raise finance from greater ranges of investors around the world through international receivables financing and to dispose of non-performing loans more easily. The proposed IRSAR Convention would succeed the UN Convention on the Assignment of Receivables in International Trade in the attempt of establishing a registration system for international assignments of receivables. The proposed IRSAR Convention confines its scope of application by defining the assignor (or the security provider), inventing the concept of ‘Vehicle for the International Registration System’ (‘VIRS’). The proposed IRSAR Convention applies where the assignor or security provider is a VIRS. An assignment of a receivable where the assignor is a VIRS and a security interest in a receivable where the security provider is a VIRS could be registered in the IRSAR. Under the proposed IRSAR Convention, priority of assignments of and security interests in receivables is determined by the order of registration in the IRSAR. The proposed IRSAR Convention would be a receivables version of the Cape Town Convention. With respect to the contents and effect of registration, it would prescribe a notice-filing system along the lines of that adopted in the UCC Article 9. With respect to the operation of the registration, it would adopt an automatic online registration system operating 24 hours a day, 365 days a year like the International Registry under the Cape Town Convention.

O objetivo da dissertação é investigar os Pressupostos da Obrigação de Restituir o Enriquecimento sem Causa no Código Civil Brasileiro. O enriquecimento sem causa, que tem antecedentes romanos, é reconhecido no Brasil independente desde os tempos do Império, passou por uma rejeição quando do advento do Código Civil de 1916, que não o previu expressamente, porém retomou sua força ao longo do século XX, ao fim do qual já era corrente a opinião de que se tratava de fonte de obrigações autônoma. Na vigência do Código Civil de 1916 não havia unanimidade quanto à enumeração e ao preenchimento de sentido dos pressupostos da obrigação restituitória. Uma minoria dispensava os requisitos do empobrecimento e da correlação entre o enriquecimento e o empobrecimento em favor de um novo pressuposto, qual seja, o de que o enriquecimento se dê à custa de outrem. O Código Civil de 2002, nos arts. 884 a 886, regulou expressamente o enriquecimento sem causa como fonte de obrigação, sendo que os autores atuais têm em geral indicado como seus pressupostos a existência de um (i) enriquecimento que ocorra (ii) à custa de outrem sem (iii) justa causa e que (iv) não concorra com outro remédio jurídico (i.e., subsidiariedade), não sendo essenciais os requisitos do empobrecimento e da correlação. O estudo dos principais paradigmas cristalizados na doutrina estrangeira, especialmente na portuguesa e na alemã, permitiu a conclusão de que deve ser adotado o paradigma da divisão do instituto do enriquecimento sem causa, pelo qual se investigam os pressupostos da obrigação de acordo com as suas diversas categorias, a saber, no Brasil, o enriquecimento por prestação, o enriquecimento por intervenção e o enriquecimento por despesas efetuadas por outrem. O enriquecimento por prestação tem por pressupostos o (i) enriquecimento em sentido real que (ii) ocorre por prestação (iii) sem justa causa, entendida esta última como a frustração do fim da prestação. O enriquecimento por intervenção tem por pressupostos (i) o enriquecimento (ii) obtido à custa de outrem (iii) sem causa jurídica ou, mais analiticamente, o (i) enriquecimento em sentido patrimonial (ii) obtido pela intromissão em direitos de outrem, quando na verdade (iii) é reservado pela ordem jurídica ao titular da posição jurídica afetada. Já o enriquecimento por despesas efetuadas por outrem tem por pressupostos o (i) enriquecimento em sentido patrimonial cuja (ii) conservação seja vedada pelo ordenamento jurídico e que decorra de uma (iii) despesa efetuada por outrem, sendo a restituição limitada, na circunstância de o beneficio ser imposto, ao que resultar de dispêndios de necessários. A regra da subsidiariedade não consubstancia um pressuposto propriamente dito, pois não integra o suporte fático da obrigação restituitória, funcionando mais como uma norma de sobredireito que fixa o caráter especialíssimo dos arts. 884 e 885 do Código Civil, e tem um sentido concreto, ou seja, somente obsta a pretensão restituitória o meio jurídico alternativo que concretamente forneça a mesma solução que é garantida pelo instituto do enriquecimento sem causa. Por fim, pela análise de dois grupos de casos comuns na jurisprudência, concluiu-se que, por falta de familiaridade com a lei, os tribunais brasileiros, ao menos quanto aos casos pesquisados, ainda não deram efetividade ao enriquecimento sem causa como fonte de obrigação. / The purpose of the present thesis is to unveil the requisites of the obligation based on the law of restitution according to the Brazilian Civil Code. The law of restitution, which has its roots in the Roman law, has been acknowledged in independent Brazil since the 19th century. In spite of the fact that it has not been expressly stated in the Brazilian Civil Code of 1916, the authors throughout the 20th century have recognized the unjust enrichment as an obligation-creating event. Nevertheless, the doctrine under the Civil Code of 1916 was not unanimous regarding the enumeration and the content of the requirements of the restitutionary obligation. In fact, there was a minority that downplayed the requisites of both impoverishment and correlation between the enrichment and the impoverishment in favor of others, i.e., that the enrichment occurs at the plaintiffs expense. The rise of the unjust enrichment as an obligation-creating event had its climax with the publication of the 2002 Brazilian Civil Code. Specifically, its articles 884, 885 and 886 included the phenomenon amidst the source of obligations. Under the new Code, it has been generally assumed that the requisites underlying the unjust enrichment are the presence of an (i) unjust (ii) enrichment (iii) at the plaintiffs expense that (iv) does not compete with an alternative legal remedy (i.e., rule of subsidiarity). The requirements of impoverishment and correlation aforementioned were abandoned by most authors. An adequate answer to the questions regarding the requisites of the restitutionary obligation, however, demands the analysis of the paradigms crystallized in the foreign doctrine, especially of the German and Portuguese legislation. It has been concluded that the paradigm of the categorization of the unjust enrichment has to be adopted. In compliance with this perspective, the requisites underlying the restitutionary obligation have to be investigated pursuant to the different categories, namely the enrichment through transfers, the enrichment through interference and the enrichment through expenditures made by the plaintiff. The requisites of the restitution based on enrichment through transfers are (i) the enrichment in its objective sense that (ii) occurs through the performance of a conscious and goal oriented patrimonial increment in which it is evident (iii) the failure of this particular goal. Importantly, this goal is sought to be assessed objectively from the unilateral manifestation of the performer, in conformity to the good-faith principle. The restitution based on enrichment through interference has as requirements (i) the enrichment in its subjective sense (ii) obtained through the interference with the rights (iii) legally reserved to the plaintiff. Finally, the requirements of the restitution based on enrichment through expenditures made by the plaintiff are (i) the subjective enrichment (ii) that the law forbids and that is originated from (iii) an expense effectuated by the plaintiff. In the particular case of an imposed enrichment, the restitution is constrained to the incontrovertible benefits resulting from the act of the plaintiff. Because the subsidiarity rule does not integrate the fattispecie of the restitutionary obligation, it does not substantiate a requisite by itself. The subsidiarity rule functions rather as a secondary norm that determines the character of lex specialis of the articles 884 and 885 of the Civil Code. Additionally, the subsidiarity rule has a concrete character, i.e., the restitutionary pretensions are only prevented by an alternative legal remedy that offers an effective solution that is identical to the one ensured by the law of restitution.

O objetivo da dissertação é investigar os Pressupostos da Obrigação de Restituir o Enriquecimento sem Causa no Código Civil Brasileiro. O enriquecimento sem causa, que tem antecedentes romanos, é reconhecido no Brasil independente desde os tempos do Império, passou por uma rejeição quando do advento do Código Civil de 1916, que não o previu expressamente, porém retomou sua força ao longo do século XX, ao fim do qual já era corrente a opinião de que se tratava de fonte de obrigações autônoma. Na vigência do Código Civil de 1916 não havia unanimidade quanto à enumeração e ao preenchimento de sentido dos pressupostos da obrigação restituitória. Uma minoria dispensava os requisitos do empobrecimento e da correlação entre o enriquecimento e o empobrecimento em favor de um novo pressuposto, qual seja, o de que o enriquecimento se dê à custa de outrem. O Código Civil de 2002, nos arts. 884 a 886, regulou expressamente o enriquecimento sem causa como fonte de obrigação, sendo que os autores atuais têm em geral indicado como seus pressupostos a existência de um (i) enriquecimento que ocorra (ii) à custa de outrem sem (iii) justa causa e que (iv) não concorra com outro remédio jurídico (i.e., subsidiariedade), não sendo essenciais os requisitos do empobrecimento e da correlação. O estudo dos principais paradigmas cristalizados na doutrina estrangeira, especialmente na portuguesa e na alemã, permitiu a conclusão de que deve ser adotado o paradigma da divisão do instituto do enriquecimento sem causa, pelo qual se investigam os pressupostos da obrigação de acordo com as suas diversas categorias, a saber, no Brasil, o enriquecimento por prestação, o enriquecimento por intervenção e o enriquecimento por despesas efetuadas por outrem. O enriquecimento por prestação tem por pressupostos o (i) enriquecimento em sentido real que (ii) ocorre por prestação (iii) sem justa causa, entendida esta última como a frustração do fim da prestação. O enriquecimento por intervenção tem por pressupostos (i) o enriquecimento (ii) obtido à custa de outrem (iii) sem causa jurídica ou, mais analiticamente, o (i) enriquecimento em sentido patrimonial (ii) obtido pela intromissão em direitos de outrem, quando na verdade (iii) é reservado pela ordem jurídica ao titular da posição jurídica afetada. Já o enriquecimento por despesas efetuadas por outrem tem por pressupostos o (i) enriquecimento em sentido patrimonial cuja (ii) conservação seja vedada pelo ordenamento jurídico e que decorra de uma (iii) despesa efetuada por outrem, sendo a restituição limitada, na circunstância de o beneficio ser imposto, ao que resultar de dispêndios de necessários. A regra da subsidiariedade não consubstancia um pressuposto propriamente dito, pois não integra o suporte fático da obrigação restituitória, funcionando mais como uma norma de sobredireito que fixa o caráter especialíssimo dos arts. 884 e 885 do Código Civil, e tem um sentido concreto, ou seja, somente obsta a pretensão restituitória o meio jurídico alternativo que concretamente forneça a mesma solução que é garantida pelo instituto do enriquecimento sem causa. Por fim, pela análise de dois grupos de casos comuns na jurisprudência, concluiu-se que, por falta de familiaridade com a lei, os tribunais brasileiros, ao menos quanto aos casos pesquisados, ainda não deram efetividade ao enriquecimento sem causa como fonte de obrigação. / The purpose of the present thesis is to unveil the requisites of the obligation based on the law of restitution according to the Brazilian Civil Code. The law of restitution, which has its roots in the Roman law, has been acknowledged in independent Brazil since the 19th century. In spite of the fact that it has not been expressly stated in the Brazilian Civil Code of 1916, the authors throughout the 20th century have recognized the unjust enrichment as an obligation-creating event. Nevertheless, the doctrine under the Civil Code of 1916 was not unanimous regarding the enumeration and the content of the requirements of the restitutionary obligation. In fact, there was a minority that downplayed the requisites of both impoverishment and correlation between the enrichment and the impoverishment in favor of others, i.e., that the enrichment occurs at the plaintiffs expense. The rise of the unjust enrichment as an obligation-creating event had its climax with the publication of the 2002 Brazilian Civil Code. Specifically, its articles 884, 885 and 886 included the phenomenon amidst the source of obligations. Under the new Code, it has been generally assumed that the requisites underlying the unjust enrichment are the presence of an (i) unjust (ii) enrichment (iii) at the plaintiffs expense that (iv) does not compete with an alternative legal remedy (i.e., rule of subsidiarity). The requirements of impoverishment and correlation aforementioned were abandoned by most authors. An adequate answer to the questions regarding the requisites of the restitutionary obligation, however, demands the analysis of the paradigms crystallized in the foreign doctrine, especially of the German and Portuguese legislation. It has been concluded that the paradigm of the categorization of the unjust enrichment has to be adopted. In compliance with this perspective, the requisites underlying the restitutionary obligation have to be investigated pursuant to the different categories, namely the enrichment through transfers, the enrichment through interference and the enrichment through expenditures made by the plaintiff. The requisites of the restitution based on enrichment through transfers are (i) the enrichment in its objective sense that (ii) occurs through the performance of a conscious and goal oriented patrimonial increment in which it is evident (iii) the failure of this particular goal. Importantly, this goal is sought to be assessed objectively from the unilateral manifestation of the performer, in conformity to the good-faith principle. The restitution based on enrichment through interference has as requirements (i) the enrichment in its subjective sense (ii) obtained through the interference with the rights (iii) legally reserved to the plaintiff. Finally, the requirements of the restitution based on enrichment through expenditures made by the plaintiff are (i) the subjective enrichment (ii) that the law forbids and that is originated from (iii) an expense effectuated by the plaintiff. In the particular case of an imposed enrichment, the restitution is constrained to the incontrovertible benefits resulting from the act of the plaintiff. Because the subsidiarity rule does not integrate the fattispecie of the restitutionary obligation, it does not substantiate a requisite by itself. The subsidiarity rule functions rather as a secondary norm that determines the character of lex specialis of the articles 884 and 885 of the Civil Code. Additionally, the subsidiarity rule has a concrete character, i.e., the restitutionary pretensions are only prevented by an alternative legal remedy that offers an effective solution that is identical to the one ensured by the law of restitution.

When and why can parties escape from a contract on the ground that the price is unfair? This question is considered in a comparative and historical perspective in English and French law. The general rule in both systems is that the parties are free to determine the price and they are then bound by their contract. One well known exception in French law, which derives from Roman law, is Article 1674 of the Code civil which allows a vendor to rescind a contract for the sale of land if the price agreed in the contract is less than five-twelfths of the fair price. It is generally thought that there are no analogous rules in English law. However, the law on this subject is in fact considerably more complex and more colourful than this simple contrast would suggest. Numerous rules on unfair prices in contracts were created in French law by the legislature and the courts since the promulgation of the Code civil in 1804. In English law, courts intervened in contracts on the ground of an unfair price in a few instances in the nineteenth century. However, only the rule on unfair prices in salvage contracts has survived until today. In both systems, the policies of preserving family wealth, protecting weak parties and giving special treatment to certain parties for economic, political, social or cultural reasons underpin these rules. There are two principal conclusions. First, freedom of contract is much less extensive in French law than in English law. This is evident in the numerous rules on unfair prices in contracts in French law and in the primacy of the remedy of altering the price rather than rescission. Secondly, while in theory, French courts play a much less significant role than English courts in the development of law, the creation and abolition of certain rules on unfair prices in contracts by French courts shows that judicial creativity in French law can be much less constrained in practice than in English law.

The thesis answers the following research question: what is the extent of the influence of international law on the construction and application of corporate codes of conduct, what factors determine this influence and through which processes does it occur? The thesis uses a mix of methods: a content analysis study, used to measure the extent to which codes of conduct incorporate international labour standards and the degree to which they have changed over time in this respect; legal research on whether corporations can be liable for violating their codes and how this risk factors in the drafting of codes; and case studies of fifteen retailer corporations, which examine how their codes were created and how they are being applied. The study's findings show there is an influence of international law on the construction and, to a far smaller degree, on the application of codes. The creation and application of codes is a politicised and contested process and codes are based on international law principally due to the pressure exerted by trade unions and NGOs, but also due to reputational risk, commercial pressure and mimicry by corporations. This influence has been selective, with corporations applying provisions in their codes that protect the rights carrying the biggest reputational risks. These findings show the flaws in the current international framework for corporate accountability, which is based on self-regulation through codes and audits. They also raise issue of whether changes, such as a binding international treaty or the creation of more collaborative and inclusive programmes to oversee the application of codes, may be required in order to ensure wider respect for labour rights of workers.

This thesis presents an account of attribution in unjust enrichment. Attribution refers to how and when two parties – a claimant and a defendant – are relevantly connected to each other for unjust enrichment purposes. It is reflected in the familiar expression that a defendant be 'enriched at the claimant's expense'. This thesis presents a structured account of attribution, consisting of two requirements: first, the identification of an enrichment to the defendant and a loss to the claimant; and, secondly, the identification of a connection between that enrichment and that loss. These two requirements must be kept separate from other considerations often subsumed within the expression 'enrichment at the claimant's expense' which in truth have nothing to do with attribution, and which instead qualify unjust enrichment liability for reasons that should be analysed in their own terms. The structure of attribution so presented fits a normative account of unjust enrichment based upon each party's exchange capacities. A defendant is enriched when he receives something that he has not paid for under prevailing market conditions, while a claimant suffers a loss when he loses the opportunity to charge for something under the same conditions. A counterfactual test – asking whether enrichment and loss arise 'but for' each other – provides the best generalisation for testing whether enrichment and loss are connected, thereby satisfying the requirements of attribution in unjust enrichment. The law is stated as at 15 March 2014.

Univ., Diss.--Freiburg (Breisgau), 2001.

In this doctoral thesis, Kant's distinction between perfect and imperfect duties is examined. The thesis begins with an exploration of how the distinction originates and evolves in the writings of three of Kant's most prominent natural law predecessors: Hugo Grotius, Samuel von Pufendorf, and Christian Wolff. The thesis then moves on to Kant's own writings. It is argued that Kant draws the perfect-imperfect distinction in as many as twelve different ways, that these ways are not entirely consistent with one another, and that many of them, even taken by themselves, do not hold up to scrutiny. Furthermore, it is argued that Kant's claim that perfect duties always trump imperfect duties - which can be referred to as "the priority claim" - is not actually supported by any one of the ways in which Kant draws the perfect-imperfect distinction. After this critical reading of Kant's writings, the thesis then switches gears and a more "positive" project is attempted. It is argued that the perfect-imperfect distinction, even though it does not support the priority claim, is not altogether normatively neutral or uninteresting. In particular, for some of the ways in which the distinction is drawn, it is shown that the distinction yields the following normative implication: Sometimes perfect duties override imperfect duties and all other times there is no priority one way or the other. Finally, it is explained that this normative implication - which can be referred to as the "privilege claim" - translates into the following practical directive: When there is a conflict between a perfect duty and an imperfect duty, sometimes one must act in conformity with the former duty and all other times one is free to choose which of the two duties to act in conformity with. This practical directive represents the ultimate finding of this thesis.