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The airline industry has been the subject of numerous studies both before and after deregulation. None of these, however have explicitly modelled the cost savings due to deregulation. This thesis develops a number of testable hypotheses about technological and managerial choice as they pertain to regulatory reform. The results of the tests show that the production technology the airlines developed post-deregulation is not unambiguously more efficient than the pre-deregulatoin technology. The unregulated output and network structure, however, appear to be more efficient than those utilized during regulation. A model is developed to decompose the change in cost due to deregulation. It is found that approximately 5% of the reduction in cost is the result of the new technology while 95% of the savings stems from the new output and network structures.

Convergence has blurred the artificial limits that traditionally existed between separated sectors and services. In particular, technological convergence united cable and telephone networks as convenient platforms for the provision of numerous new telecommunications services. The advent of the Internet and the development of other services started a race for the acquisition of broadband transmission that has, in part, prompted a number of corporate mergers between the major telephone, cable, and Internet service providers. / This thesis analyzes the legal implications of the convergence of cable operators and telephone carriers in the United States of America (U.S.). The analysis was conducted in light of the 1996 Telecommunications Act's provisions, the Federal Communications Commission's reports and orders, and under the critical approaches of the cable and telephone industries. This thesis presents recommendations addressed to promote an equal regulatory treatment for all telecommunications competitors in the U.S.

The following thesis describes and analyzes the development of the U.S. slot allocation system from 1968 until today, in order to draw relevant conclusions for a new European Slot Regulation. The European Commission is currently drafting a new Slot Regulation purporting to introduce market mechanisms. A similar approach was espoused in the United States from 1986 onward, but was ultimately supplanted by overriding legislation in 2000. The analysis of the U.S. slot allocation system reveals the reasons underlying its abolition and queries whether this experience can be successfully transposed in Europe. The thesis commences by providing general information on the definition of slots, slot allocation, and airport capacity. A brief review of the European Commission's current consultation process on the implementation of market mechanisms for slot allocation follows. The main part of the thesis discusses the U.S. High Density Rule and the Rules for the Allocation and Transfer of High Density Airport Slots in historical order. Some criticisms frequently voiced assert that the Rules artificially limited access to airports, constituted barriers to market entry, restricted airline competition, generated higher fares, and yielded adverse effects on smaller communities which, in turn, lost access to key markets. Through a favorable assessment of the Rules, the thesis analyses these concerns and concludes that the suppression of the Rules was rather prompted by local political motivations than by other rationalities. However, experiences drawn from the U.S. Rules demonstrate that a future European secondary market for slots, if implemented under a grand fathering system, will likely have a positive impact on the efficiency of airport capacity, but not on access to the market and competition.