The primary objective of this work is to develop the (rationalist) thesis of integrity or the integral view in the realm of legal-political thought. This view consists in the elaboration of the essential-conceptual interdependency of law, the political authority (i.e. the state) and the universal moral standpoint of justice (i.e. the standpoint encapsulated by the idea of human rights in our age) in a way avoiding the shortfalls of legal-moralism illustrated by the natural-law-theories. The rationalist thesis of integrity suggests that the elements within the complex nexus of the law, the state, and justice can neither be divorced from nor be assimilated into each other. This evidently refutes the (positivist) thesis of separation which breaks off the cord between law and the state, on the one hand, and the moral standpoint of justice, on the other hand. However, the thesis of integrity equally opposes the theses of assimilation whereby either law and political authority are assimilated into morality (&ldquo / the moralist-naivety&rdquo / ) or law and justice are assimilated into brute political force (&ldquo / the realist-cynicism&rdquo / ). In brief, the integral view gives each element its due in the nexus of law, the state and the universal moral idea of justice (i.e. human rights). In this work, this view is strived to be deduced from a comparative critical-examination of three legal-political theories, each of which is taken as representing a particular approach beyond legal-moralism. These are Hans Kelsen&rsquo / s Pure-Theory-of-Law representing the positivist approach, Carl Schmitt&rsquo / s Concrete-Order-Thinking representing the realist approach, and Otfried H&ouml / ffe&rsquo / s Ethical-Philosophy-of-Law-and-the-State representing the rationalist approach.

This thesis investigated the power of framing practices in the context of Australian refugee policies between 1999 and 2003. The analysis identified legal rationalism as an ideological projection by which the Howard government justified its refugee policies to the electorate. That is, legal rationalism manifested itself as an overriding concern with the rules and procedures of the law, without necessarily having concern for consistency or continuity. In its first form, legal rationalism emerged as a