Akademisk afhandling--Upsala. / "Använda förkortningar": p. [xi]-xv.

Thesis (Ed. D.)--Temple University, 1942. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 229-235).

Thesis (M.A.)--University of Delaware, 2007. / Principal faculty advisor: Gerald M. Turkel, Dept. of Sociology. Includes bibliographical references.

Magister Legum - LLM / South Africa

LL.M. (Commercial Law) / In order to promote sound corporate conduct, it is essential that shareholders actively participate in the governance of the company. The primary mechanism to achieve this lies in the shareholder’s right to vote at meetings. However, an analysis of the nature of shares, and the history surrounding the introduction and development of uncertificated shares in particular, reveals a structure that often interposes multiple nominees between the issuing company and the underlying investor. Such a structure has the potential to dispossess the underlying investor of his rights, which may have concomitant negative effects on the corporate governance of the company. A comparative study of the legal framework for uncertificated shares in the United States, the United Kingdom and South Africa reveals varying degrees of protection for the underlying investor. Unfortunately, none of these countries has resolved the problem completely, and it is suggested that a move to a direct, transparent holding model, where the underlying investor, rather than an intermediary, is recorded in a company’s share register, is a better solution.

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Another facet of this case concerns the restriction of the applicants' choice as regards the trade unions which they could form of their own volition. An individual does not enjoy the right to freedom of association if in reality the freedom of action or choice which remains available to him is either non-existent or so reduced as to be of no practical value. Jayawickrama The principal objective for this study is to investigate the prohibition and/or the effectiveness of freedom of association in the disciplined forces in Botswana as contrasted with the laws and practices in South Africa. The study aims to explore whether freedom of association exists in the disciplined forces of the Republic of Botswana; and if it does, how effective it is, and if it does not exist, whether such non-existence infringes the human rights of the disciplined forces to enjoy the fundamental rights to form and join trade unions of their choice as provided for in section 13(1) of the Constitution of Botswana. The study finds that the right to form or belong to a trade union 1s an absolute right in terms of section 13(1) of the Constitution. The study therefore surmises that the exclusion of trade unions in the disciplined forces of Botswana is not reasonably justified in a democratic society, thereby rendering section 24 of the Police Act, section 35 of the Prisons Act and Regulation 75 of the Botswana Defense Force unconstitutional. / Thesis (LLM) North-West University, Mafikeng Campus, 2013

Norwegian practice has largely permeated virtually every aspect of Ghana's oil industry. Extrapolation from Norway has been a step in the right direction as Norway is largely credited with adopting best industry practices in the management of its oil industry. Ghana's regulatory framework has evolved to resemble Norway's. Whilst not all this similarity is by design, that which is not has been reinforced by Norwegian practice. Norway's transparent and effective control of the industry by the Executive affords subordination of the industry's regulatory body to a powerful Ministry, which arrangement is counter-balanced by effective Parliamentary oversight. I posit that in the case of Ghana, the absence of transparency, effective checks and balances in the governmental framework coupled with the potential for rampant abuse of discretionary power, necessitates that real regulatory power is vested not in the Ministry but in a strong, independent regulatory body that exerts proper control over the operations of the oil companies. Though the Executive should naturally be the driving force behind policy and ordering of developments in the industry, the regulatory body must be vested with the necessary independence and powers to effectively regulate operations in the industry devoid of Executive interference and control.