Norwegian practice has largely permeated virtually every aspect of Ghana's oil industry. Extrapolation from Norway has been a step in the right direction as Norway is largely credited with adopting best industry practices in the management of its oil industry. Ghana's regulatory framework has evolved to resemble Norway's. Whilst not all this similarity is by design, that which is not has been reinforced by Norwegian practice. Norway's transparent and effective control of the industry by the Executive affords subordination of the industry's regulatory body to a powerful Ministry, which arrangement is counter-balanced by effective Parliamentary oversight. I posit that in the case of Ghana, the absence of transparency, effective checks and balances in the governmental framework coupled with the potential for rampant abuse of discretionary power, necessitates that real regulatory power is vested not in the Ministry but in a strong, independent regulatory body that exerts proper control over the operations of the oil companies. Though the Executive should naturally be the driving force behind policy and ordering of developments in the industry, the regulatory body must be vested with the necessary independence and powers to effectively regulate operations in the industry devoid of Executive interference and control.

No description available.

Risālat al-Duktūrāh: Jāmiʻat al-Qāhirah. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 929-965) and index.

Thesis (M.S.)--Wisconsin. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 83-88).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1983. / Typescript. Vita. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 292-297).

Thesis (M. Sc.)--University of the West Indies, Trinidad, 1975. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 207-210).

No description available.

This interdisciplinary thesis combines economics and law disciplines in examining the current fiscal regime applicable to upstream petroleum activities in the UK with an overarching objective of developing a policy framework for a new fiscal regime that is not only stable enough to avoid future alterations but also sufficiently fair to balance the unaligned imperatives of the investors and the government. Since the initial days of hydrocarbon exploitation in the UK Continental Shelf the fiscal regime was subject to numerous changes in reaction to the dynamics of the time. Most of these changes were brought about in order to incentivise the investors to explore for and get petroleum while attempting to ensure an appropriate share, or fair return, were accruing to the UK economy. The frequency of these changes however increased fiscal instability, making investment into the UK's upstream sector a riskier proposition. In order to develop a stable regime that can also ensure a fair return, therefore, this thesis begins with a brief overview of the fiscal instability and the government's most recent attempt at ensuring an appropriate share. This most recent attempt, the Treasury's Fiscal Review, is a consequence of the review of the entire upstream industry in the UK by Sir Ian Wood. The resultant report of the review, the Wood Report, provides the government's rationale for reform. Using the government position as a guidance, the work then analyses the conditions under which investors are incentivised and ascertains what exactly is meant by an appropriate share, or fair return, for the state. This analysis is carried out using the relevant investment and fiscal theories which, in turn, yields a set of criteria to evaluate the fiscal instruments. Once the criteria are established they are utilised against the fiscal regime that was in place prior to the government's most recent attempt at receiving a fair return. This is not only to assess the extent of the need for reforming the then existing regime but also to understand what was being reformed. The criteria are then employed subsequently in assessing the same for the most recent reforms of the government.

Congressional reform is the focus of my study. Congress (but primarily the House of Representatives) attempted to reform its workings from 1968 through 1975, so it might be more effective in developing comprehensive policies on national issues, and more independent of the executive branch. Reform raised expectations that the legislature would reassert its policy-making role, which had diminished during the preceding thirty years. My study examines the influence of these changes on the congressional decision-making process, including their impact on the important role played by external actors, interest groups and especially the President, who reacted to these changes. The study examines the process through an analysis of the development and passage of the most controversial provision, dealing with oil-price controls (Title IV), of Congress' major energy bill of 1975, the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (H.R. 7014). On 15 December 1975, Congress passed the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA) which President Gerald R. Ford signed into law on 22 December. The EPCA (Public Law 94-163) extended oil-price controls until 1979. The oilpricing provision had significant national and international economic and political implications. Merely to trace the tortuous chronicle of oil-pricing policy would be informative. But this study will go further by using this account to analyze congressional decision-making in the period immediately following Congress' attempts at reform. My study shows that although reforms eroded old norms and power centres, significantly altering some aspects of congressional decision-making (again primarily in the House), they did not create institutional mechanisms or distribute internal powers in such a way that Congress could independently initiate and develop comprehensive national policies. Congress remained more dependent on the President than many of its members understood. The final substance of the oil-pricing policy reflected the characteristic congressional decision-making process, which had become even more dispersed as it was democratized by reform. The committee system, without a strong executive or party control, divides issues in a way that limits decision-makers' options.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Aberdeen University, 2009. / Title from web page (viewed on July 14, 2009). Includes bibliographical references.