Bangladesh reformed its corporate governance by adopting Bangladesh Corporate Governance Guidelines-2006 (the BCGG-2006 hereafter) due to pressures from international financial institutions (IFIs). However, there is huge controversy in prior literature regarding the IFIs’ suggested reform initiatives. The thesis asks specific research questions: RQ1. Do institutional investors and bankers in Bangladesh perceive that the level of compliance with the BCGG-2006 by the investee or borrowing company influences the investment and lending decisions respectively? RQ2.1. To what extent is the BCGG-2006 implemented in form rather than in substance? RQ2.2 Is there a relationship between the nature of compliance with the BCGC-2006 and firm performance? RQ3.1. To what extent does reported compliance with the BCGG-2006, as reported in annual reports, overstate underlying compliance with the BCGC-2006? RQ3.2 Does the overstatement of compliance reported in annual reports lead to a different relative ranking of a firm’s corporate governance structure? RQ3.3 What factors influence the overstatement of compliance with the BCG-2006 in annual reports? To investigate RQ1, an inductive approach is taken and data are collected by using semi-structured interviews of investment managers and credit rating analysts. In order to examine the remaining RQs, a deductive approach is taken and data are collected: (1) by using a structured survey questionnaire addressed to company secretaries or CFOs; and (2) from annual reports and stock exchanges. With respect to RQ1, this study finds (1) strong evidence that institutional investors and bankers perceive limited impact of corporate governance mechanisms recommended by the BCGG-2006 on investment and lending decisions respectively. In order to theorise the above findings, two theories: agency theory and the theory of path dependence are contrasted. Using a grounded theory coding, this study finds that (1) companies are locked in the path of control by sponsor families and sponsor families then impede the implementation of the BCGG-2006 and (2) institutional investors and bankers lock themselves in the path of name-based and relationship-based investment and lending practices which deters consideration of corporate governance mechanisms introduced by the BCGG-2006. Very few interviewees provide an explanation consistent with the agency theory. This evidence thus points more to the theory of path dependence than to agency theory. In relation to RQ2.1, this study finds that local privately-owned companies and government-owned companies either do not comply or comply in form but not in substance with the BCGG-2006, while subsidiaries of foreign multinational companies comply in form and in substance with the BCGG-2006. The relative strength of path dependence in local privately-owned companies and government-owned companies and subsidiaries of foreign multinational companies explains these results better than agency theory. The evidence with respect to RQ2.2 provides an indication that the nature of compliance with separation of the chairman and CEO, board independence and audit committee does not have an association with firm performance in case of local privately-owned companies. However, the evidence in relation to RQ2.2 provides an indication that the nature of compliance with the corporate governance mechanisms introduced by the BCGG-2006 makes a difference in firm performance in subsidiaries of foreign multinational companies. With respect to RQ3.1, it is found that companies overstate compliance with the BCGG-2006 in annual reports. With respect to RQ3.2, this study finds that the rank of a firm’s corporate governance is different when comparing compliance with the BCGG-2006 as reported in annual reports with compliance with the BCGG-2006 as stated in the survey. With respect to RQ3.3, it is found that overstatement of compliance is more pronounced with respect to less-observable provisions of the BCGG-2006, is positively associated with control by sponsor families and is negatively associated with control by institutional investors. This evidence is again more consistent with the theory of path dependence and institutional logic than agency theory. The findings of this thesis suggest that corporate governance researchers in developing countries should consider the role of path dependence rather than agency theory exclusively. This thesis also makes a methodological contribution by investigating overstatement of compliance with the BCGG-2006. The findings of this study may also assist regulators in developing countries and the IFIs in formulating future governance guidelines for developing countries.

L’étude des effets des informations qualitatives sur la constitution de la confiance dans la relation Banque-PME est l’objet principal de cette thèse. Il s’agit de mettre en évidence la manière dont la collecte des informations « Soft » et les interactions sociales qui permettent l’échange de ce type d’information mitige les problèmes d’asymétries d’information caractéristiques de ces structures. Bien que les banques soient de plus en plus équipées d’outils informatisés d’aide à la décision, la nature qualitative de l’information collectée reste un déterminant de la filtration des dossiers de crédits aux PME. L’auteur de ce travail propose une modélisation de la relation Banque-PME au Liban en mettant en évidence les éléments déterminants de la confiance entre le chargé de clientèle et l’emprunteur. Ce modèle met en exergue quatre éléments influant la relation, à savoir le contexte général de la relation et, plus particulièrement, la pression de la banque ainsi que sa structure organisationnelle sur le chargé de clientèle ; des éléments personnels et interpersonnels comme la motivation de l’entrepreneur, l’expérience des deux parties ainsi que la durée de la relation ; des éléments relationnels basés surtout sur la proximité, les réseaux et interactions ainsi que sur l’intervention des tiers et, enfin, des éléments passionnels qui donnent une large place à l’intuition du banquier dans sa prise de décision. Ces résultats ont été obtenus à partir d’hypothèses éclairés par la littérature relative aux théories de l’encastrement social, des conventions et de la confiance. Ils sont soutenus par une double enquête de terrain, exploratoire et confirmatoire, menée auprès des chargés de clientèles libanais. Ils suggèrent une apparente singularité de la relation Banque-PME au Liban avec une hypertrophie de la dimension relationnelle dans la prise de décision. / This research is concerned with how « Soft » information affects small and medium-sized enterprise financing. We particularly focus on the effect of their collect and the Social interactions that allow the exchange of such information on the specific asymmetric information problems. Although banks are more and more equipped with computerized decision tools, the qualitative nature of the information collected remains decisive in filtering the records of credit to SMEs. The author of this research offers a relationship Bank-SME conceptual framework by putting in obvious place elements determining the Trust between Credit officer and borrower. This model puts in an obvious place four elements having an influence: the general context of relation and more particularly pressure of the bank and organizational structure on the Credit officer ; personal and interpersonal elements as entrepreneur’s motivation and both experiences and duration of the relationship ; Relational elements based primarily on proximity, networks and interactions as well as third party intervention and finally, the determinants of trust can encompass several elements of passion specifically banker’s intuition about the project. The author supports that the trust is built on « Soft » information which are itemized. These results were acquired from assumptions based on the literature about conventions, trust and embededness. They were supported by a double field investigation, exploratory and confirmatory conducted with Lebanese Credit officers.