In this thesis, I will discuss the influence of education on the identity formation of African American students. Based on the scholarly literature in education theory, I will argue in Bourdieuan theory education, formal education, fails to accommodate the specific needs of African American students because education influences African American students to develop constructions of whiteness" that education reinforces. As education attempts to uphold the status quo of American society, education simultaneously forces African American students to question the relevance of education. In questioning the relevance of education through high-achieving African American students use of language and pursuit of academic achievement, low-achieving African American students offer a critique of education that characterizes education as a white-dominated system where individuals must embody whiteness in order to achieve social acceptance. As a result, African American students choose to disidentify with education rather than to assimilate into White culture to avoid being identified as white− speaking Standard English, following rules and regulations, and maintaining a high grade point average. This critique of education− though not an anti-intellectual response to education because most African Americans still view education as a means to social mobility− signifies education does not educate African American students but instead produces white African American students in order to reproduce societal norms. I will also propose the incorporation of self-knowledge into critical education will facilitate an awareness of personal history and self-worth among African American students not only to disrupt an educational structure of inequality but also to foster a positive self-concept within these students.

The institutions that comprise the United States intelligence community have organizational cultures that are unique from other government agencies. These cultures encourage the development and retention of traits that are necessary to mission accomplishment, yet these exclusivities also hamstring organizations and may contribute to significant security failures. This thesis isolates elements of organizational culture that are specific to the United States intelligence community and explores the extent to which the culture is responsible for security and/or counterintelligence shortcomings. The author selected three governmental organizations with intelligence collection and analysis functions; they include the Naval Investigative Service (NIS), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). These agencies demonstrate the intelligence community includes military (NIS), intelligence (CIA) and law enforcement (FBI) components with shared organizational traits. The author subsequently identified a significant security failure case encountered by each agency and employed a case study approach to determine the extent to which the agencies organizational cultures contributed to the security failures. Internal agency investigations and external assessments of espionage activities reveal cultural factors impede the early detection of security compromises and thwart law enforcement efforts to investigate suspicious behavior. Despite the deleterious effects of national security collapses, the intelligence communitys personnel increasingly recognize the complicity of organizational culture in such security failures. The intelligence community increasingly analyzes the negative aspects of its organizational traits, and there have been substantive strides within the intelligence establishment to minimize the security obstacles that organizational culture imposes on its constituent adherents. The intelligence apparatus must maintain an organizational culture that distinguishes it from other government agencies. Unfortunately, the communitys cultural characteristics also convey increased risks of security compromises. It is possible, however, for the United States intelligence community to maintain its unique organizational culture and simultaneously minimize the possibility of operational or security failure.

On June 6, 1944, Allied soldiers assaulted the beaches of Normandy in France. In preparation for that one day, the Allies assembled millions of tons of supplies, hundreds of thousands of men, and thousands of ships in Great Britain. Allied leaders spent three years preparing plans and training troops. American and British intelligence agencies scoured Europe for information about German troops and fortifications and launched massive deception campaigns designed to keep their German counterparts in the dark about where and when the blow would fall. In the air, bombers rained destruction upon German factories and French railways while their escorts engaged the German defenders. By the end of May 1944, the Allies were ready to invade. Beginning in 1942, the Germans prepared defenses to stop the invasion. The fortifications, named the Atlantic Wall, consisted of massive amounts of concrete, steel and barbed wire and contained millions of mines. The strategy that German leaders pursued to defeat the invasion, a product of rival views within the German High Command, resulted in chaos and ultimately defeat for their armed forces. The commander of Army Group B, defending the likeliest invasion sites, Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, planned to meet the invasion at the water line and defeat the Allies before they could gain a foothold. Rommel's immediate superior and commander in the West, Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt, wanted to defeat the invasion further inland; outside of the range of Allied naval guns. Adolf Hitler compromised between the two commanders and created a plan that depended upon his own appreciation of the battle for the release of critical reserves. Added to the problems of strategy were German manpower shortages caused by years of fighting a multi-front war and equipment and supply shortages due to bombing and attrition. By May 1944, the Germans knew the invasion was coming but could not foresee when or where. On D-Day, the Allies dropped three airborne and landed six divisions in the initial assault on the Atlantic Wall. By the end of the day, they had carved a narrow beachhead and were in France to stay.

I like simple things. More precisely I like taking complex things and distilling them to their simplest elements, those things that define their nature. Art and technology are two very different subjects. Simple and complex. Intuitive and analytical. Combining art and technology to deliver educational material with simple navigation, a child-friendly environment and playful, imaginative sounds that enhance rather than complicate the learning process, is the objective of my project. An interactive, educational CD for young children is the product of this thesis. Art has always been used to communicate ideas, thoughts and emotions; it expedites the delivery of the message. The visual language is a universal one. Seeing is believing. Believing is understanding. Understanding is learning. Blending art and technology for a practical purpose intrigues me. I enjoy childrens books and have collected them for many years. Childrens picture books rely heavily on images to support the story and ultimately to teach. Because a child uses all of the senses to learn, interactive multimedia is the perfect vehicle to deliver educational content to young children. Technology allows us to depart from traditional methods of delivering educational content, like books, and produce materials enriched with images, sounds and interactivity. The possibilities for creating unique educational experiences have greatly increased. The goal of this project is to create a fun, learning environment, encouraging interactivity by the target audience, young children ages three to six. The product of this thesis, the Character Critters Storytime CD, includes three animated stories about Cindy the Citizen Crab, Fran the Fair Frog and Roy the Responsible Rabbit, written by LSU AgCenter Family and Consumer Sciences specialists Dr. Rebecca White and Leslie Cooper Parsons. The copyrighted stories are used with permission from the LSU AgCenter. Through sight, sound and touch, with parent/teacher participation, children are invited to hear stories and play games that teach positive character traits. Each story includes an interactive game that reinforces the character concepts taught in the stories. Macromedia Flash, an interactive multimedia software, is used to develop the CD.

The process of professionalization initiated by the Peruvian army in 1896 under French influence did not withdraw the military from political involvement. On the contrary, as the process of professionalization advanced, the army developed a professional militarism, that is, military political participation for reasons based on the institutions professional ethos. The Peruvian army had traditionally claimed a broad military jurisdiction including extra-military roles. French instructors reinforced such claimed incorporating a broad military jurisdiction into the armys professional ethos, which justified military coups during the twentieth-century as well as the Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces (1968-1980). Historians Frederick M. Nunn and Daniel M. Masterson do not take sufficiently into account the impact of nineteenth-century militarism on Peruvian military thought. These scholars argued that Peruvian officers were aping their French mentors when twentieth-century military magazines claimed nation building as a defense prerequisite or when Francophile officers declared a civilizing and social mission for the army. However, in 1888, over 120 Peruvian officers established the Centro Militar del Perú and published the Revista Militar y Naval, which systematized the military mind born from the centurys military experience. The articles in the Revista demonstrate that before the process of professionalization initiated in 1896, the Peruvian military mind consisted of attitudes and perspectives stressing the necessity of a strong military, the supremacy of society over the individual, the destructiveness of civilian partisan politics, and a broad military jurisdiction, which included administrative, nation-building, civilizing, and constitutional guardian functions. Consequently, this thesis focuses on nineteenth-century militarism and political culture arguing that by late 1880s the essential elements of the Peruvian military mind behind twentieth-century professional militarism had already come together.

Counterinsurgency is one of the most difficult forms of conflict an army can face. After defeating Spanish forces in Manila during the Spanish-American War, a well-developed insurrection, led by Emilio Aguinaldo, challenged the United States Army for nearly four years. Although the army in 1898 was unprepared for a large-scale, two-front war, it conducted an extremely effective counterinsurgency campaign 7000 miles from home in inhospitable terrain. Despite lacking a formal, written counterinsurgency doctrine, the frontier experiences of the army, orally passed on from one generation of soldiers to the next, provided invaluable lessons that could be applied in the Philippines. This was only of limited benefit, however, since the vast majority of soldiers who fought in the Philippines were volunteers, with limited military experience. The army's senior leaders, many veterans of the Civil War and Indian campaigns, were able to apply their experiences and develop effective strategies to counter the insurrection. General Elwell S. Otis immediately realized that a military solution alone would not end the insurgency. By implementing President William McKinley's policy of benevolent assimilation, Otis attempted drive a wedge between the Philippine people and the guerrillas. The insurgents countered this tactic by resorting to a campaign of terror to insure continued support from the people. Otis' subordinates, realizing policy of attraction had failed, then developed and implemented a strategy designed to isolate the guerillas from their base of support, the village, and then defeat the guerrillas militarily. This strategy, belatedly endorsed by General Arthur MacArthur, eventually caused the collapse of the insurrection in many areas of the Philippines. In the final stages of the conflict, the army adopted more repressive measures, which stiffened resistance. Only when the Americans employed the policies of conciliation and repression in the correct proportion were they able to end the insurrection.

This thesis provides a comprehensive approach to launching a successful parent membership-based fundraising program, an exploration of best practices in the United States, and a complete development plan for parent fundraising for a large public university. The research discussed is applicable to many different organizations who wish to start a parent fundraising program, with the strongest relevance on parent fundraising within large public universities. This thesis is intended for an audience familiar with the intricacies of fundraising; however, primary, secondary, and other higher education markets may be strongly interested in the research discussed.

Given the nature of the current political, social, and economic climates in the United States with home foreclosures, jobless rates, and high-school dropout rates hovering around record numbers, those who are indigenous to the plight of the people must play a role in securing policies and actions that will support better opportunities for better living. The faith community, especially the Black Church, can play a role by engaging in the development and maintenance of social policy and a responsibility to engage in social action that will energize and empower people in order to improve the quality of living. While there has been much time and effort dedicated to connecting the Black Church with social action, there is not a particularly large body of work encouraging the engagement of the Black Church in social policy. In order to address the need to have a relevant and substantial voice that will direct policies that will eradicate problems rather than always addressing consequences; the Black Church must allow the space for critical, analytical, and strategic treatment of the issues.

Adolf Hitler and Saddam Hussein were the only national leaders ever to use large-scale missile launches against American forces and their wartime allies. In both cases, the missiles were too few in number and lacked the accuracy and warhead size to be militarily effective. Use of the V-2 and SCUD missiles showed that conventionally armed ballistic missiles have minimal tactical military value and are more suitable as terrorist weapons. Indeed, the goal of those two meglomaniacal dictators was to terrorize enemy civilians and achieve a political settlement of a hopeless military situation. Each leader hoped to split the Allied coalitions arrayed against him. Hitler turned his missile against London in 1944 hoping to crush British morale and compel public opinion to demand that Prime Minister Winston Churchill seek an end to the conflict short of total victory. Hussein launched his SCUDs to exploit Arab animosity toward Israel, calculating that terror attacks would trigger Israeli military intervention, provoking a defection of Arab coalition members and forcing the United States and its European allies into a political settlement that would avert military disaster for Iraq. The Allied forces in both cases learned lessons about the limitations of air power as a means of neutralizing a mobile target. Despite massive aerial bombing in both wars, the Allies stopped the mobile launchers only when ground troops overran the launching areas. In the Gulf War, satellites, air supremacy, and Patriot interceptor missiles failed to eliminate the SCUD threat, a task completed by the ground offensive, but such technological advances may prevent future terroristic uses of ballistic missiles. The employment of ballistic missiles has new strategic implications because of the events of September 11, 2001. The global war on terrorism involves the newly defined axis of evil, composed of states capable of producing ballistic missiles. Missile technology transfers to third world countries threaten world stability, in view especially of the possible use of nuclear, chemical or biological warheads. If rogue states judge previous missile attacks to be successful, such success could motivate other leaders or terrorists to use their missiles as instruments of terror.

In late October 1950, the People's Republic of China (PRC) committed approximately 260,000 troops to combat in North Korea. The initial Chinese decision to intervene in the Korean conflict was based on a misperception of American commitment to halt communist expansion. American actions seemed to communicate the desire to avoid confrontation. The withdrawal of U.S. troops and the limited equipping and training of the South Korean army implied Washington's lack of interest in the fate of Korea. Therefore, Mao endorsed North Korea's proposal for the military reunification of Korea. China stood to gain international prestige and access to Soviet equipment and training at little cost. But the North Korean attack collapsed following the commitment of American and United Nations forces. Chinese troops attacked and surprised the UN forces, inflicting heavy losses while driving them down the peninsula in disarray. Mao desired the quick expulsion of UN forces from Korea. To this end, the Chinese launched five brutal offensives between October 1950 and April 1951, but failed to realize their goal of imposing a communist government on an unified Korea. Following the commencement of hostilities, the Chinese exaggerated their own military capabilities and underestimated the firepower and general effectiveness of American forces. But the Chinese army was unable to assimilate modern weaponry and tactics and, facing immense logistical difficulties, could not use its superior numbers to overwhelm United Nations forces. Inaccurate political and military assessments by Chinese leaders served to deny the PRC its goal of a unified Korea while ensuring it would be embroiled in a long and costly war.