This paper looks at the effects of professional basketball on white culture. Traditional scholarship focuses on the impact this has on the African-American community. Very little attention is given to its effects on white America. The focus of this paper is to examine whiteness and to understand how it is socially constructed. In addition, this paper will examine how some elements of black style have been appropriated by white America and changed the definition of whiteness in America. White America's appropriation of limited aspects of black style has been facilitated by the culture that is associated with professional basketball. The economic and social contributions of these athletes have expanded the boundaries of traditional whiteness. This paper presents the argument that the parameters of historical whiteness has expanded to include certain elements of blackness, but this pattern does not alter traditional racist ideology.

Increasing urbanization in a global setting of political and economic instability indicates that urban warfare may well be the major conflict scenario of the 21st century. The United States armed forces are not currently prepared to meet that challenge. The last major urban conflict involving the American military was the Battle of Hue during the Vietnam War. As part of the Tet Offensive in 1968, Communist forces seized control of Hue and held it for nearly a month. Having undergone intensive tactical training for their mission, the enemy, solidly entrenched in buildings of various kinds, offered fierce resistance to the American and South Vietnamese troops who tried to reconquer the city. U.S. Marines bore the brunt of the fighting. Untrained and unequipped for street-fighting, they encountered immense difficulties in clearing Hue. Faulty intelligence, command and control problems, and a lack of proper equipment made the experience a nightmarish one and the human cost was considerable: 147 Marines and seventy-four soldiers lost their lives, while a combined total of 1,364 were wounded. Only through raw determination, superior firepower, and adaptive leadership were the Marines able to prevail. The Battle of Hue offered critical lessons for subsequent military planners. Later conflicts in places such as Somalia and Afghanistan suggested that Hue might be more relevant than expected for contemporary warfare. As a result, the U.S. armed forces have made significant strides toward correcting deficiencies in the areas of doctrine, training, and equipment. However, they remain under-prepared for urban warfare because they are still not training as a joint and combined arms team across the full spectrum of operations. This is in large part due to continued shortfalls in training infrastructure and lack of equipment. U.S. armed forces must continue to maximize urban operations training at every level in order to validate doctrine, learn how to fight, and develop specialized equipment for urban operations.

The battle of Kursk in the summer of 1943 was a pivotal battle of World War II. The defeat at Kursk placed the Wehrmacht on the permanent strategic defensive on the Eastern Front. The opening of the Soviet archives after 1989 has permitted more thorough analysis of that battle and produced greater appreciation of the Red Armys performance, while casting doubt on the notion that the Germans were close to an operational victory. Preceding the clash, both sides prepared feverishly, attempting to bring the units involved to their maximum capability by replacing personnel, upgrading equipment, and conducting training. The Germans delayed the attack several times to deploy the new armored vehicles. Soviet leaders gathered intelligence from their own sources as well as from ULTRA, which was the codename for British intelligence gained from the German Enigma machine. The Soviets, in anticipation of the onslaught, built a massive and intricate defense. Kursk began on July 4, 1943 with a German attack in the south to gain observation for artillery. The main battle began on July 5 when the Germans attacked both shoulders of the Kursk salient. The fighting was furious. In the north the frontlines quickly stabilized, but in the south German forces made progress. The critical moment occurred when they reached the village of Prokhorovka on July 12. The II SS Panzer Corps and the Soviet Fifth Guards Tank and Fifth Guards Armies fought to a tactical draw with hundreds of tanks lost on both sides. However, the Allied invasion of Sicily prompted Hitler to transfer panzer divisions from Kursk to the Mediterranean Theater, thus seriously reducing the assets available to Field Marshal Erich von Manstein, the commander of the German units in the south. This decision essentially ended the Battle of Kursk. Had Hitler given his subordinates more freedom to destroy the Soviet armored reserves, they might have mitigated the catastrophe. But the Germans at Kursk could not have achieved victory. It was a simple matter of the Soviets outnumbering the Germans in all categories, and the Red Army had improved its capabilities to the point it could execute devastating deep, combined arms operations against the Wehrmacht.

This study examines five films of Steven Soderbergh: <em>sex, lies, and videotape</em> (1989), <em>The Underneath</em> (1995), <em>Out of Sight</em> (1998), <em>The Limey</em> (1999), and <em>Traffic</em> (2000). For each film, themes and cinematic form and technique are analyzed with the intent of demonstrating a consistent authorial voice of the director. The investigation reveals that common themes include the protagonist at odds with the world about him, journey, ambiguities and uncertainties in the characters' worlds, and the nondichotomous nature of reality, especially in regard to morality. The study also argues that Soderbergh has evolved a style that favors a nonlinear narrative and parallel editing, frequent use of a hand-held camera, and systematic uses of color. It is concluded that such commonalities in theme and style provide evidence for an evolving artistic vision.

The 317th Infantry Regiment was reactivated on July 15, 1942 as a subordinate element of the 80th Infantry Division. The regiment trained for two years in Tennessee, Kansas, Arizona, California, and finally New Jersey before departing for England in June 1944. Entering the European continent after D-Day, the regiment experienced its first combat in August 1944 when it assisted in closing the gap at Falaise and spearheaded Third Army's attack on Nancy. The 317th sat through the logistics shortfall that stopped the Third Army's advance during the "October Pause" in the fall of 1944. But then in November the regiment moved through the Maginot Line and prepared to attack Hitler's West Wall. In mid-December, German forces launched the famous Battle of the Bulge with a surprise attack in the Ardennes forest with twenty-five divisions. The 317th was one of the first units to begin the movement north to relieve the beleaguered American troops in the Ardennes. The regiment continued fighting through January 1945 until some units were exhausted. When Third Army resumed the offensive in February, so did the regiment. On Valentine's Day, 1945, it entered the Reich, moved rapidly through the Eifel and Palatinate regions, and crossed the Rhine River. During this time, the 317th overran some of the concentration camps that were Hitler's answer to the "Jewish question." The regiment moved through Nuremberg and into Austria, where, as it prepared for what loomed as a ferocious battle, the war ended. After serving as an occupation force, the unit officially deactivated in January 1946, after three and a half yearsof valiant service. The 317th had fought its way from Evron, France to Kirchdorf, Austria,participants in the horror and glory of war. It left behind on the battlefields of Europe 312 officers and 7392 enlisted men - fallen comrades in the struggle to free Europe from Nazi tyranny.

The German blitzkrieg across France during May 1940 was the culmination of three years of daring political and military moves that had brought most of Europe under German control. It was the German dictator Adolf Hitler who had outguessed his advisors. Yet, Hitler's bold moves in Western Europe ended with his army's dash across France, and the failure to strike Great Britain that summer when the British were at one of the weakest points in their entire history. After Germany defeated France, Hitler began a fruitless period of waiting for Great Britain to sue for peace. Unlike Hitler, some in the German High Command believed that Great Britain would fight and that a coherent strategy was needed to defeat that island nation. During late June 1940, two strategies emerged for defeating Great Britain. The first, code-named Operation SEA LION, called for an invasion of southern England. This plan was the surest way to bring about a decisive outcome, but also the riskiest. Hitler nonetheless ordered that planning and training for the operation go forward, a process halted by the Luftwaffe's inability to defeat the RAF as the necessary prelude to the invasion. The strategic option less risky than an invasion of the British Isles called for an attack on the important colony of Gibraltar. German planners believed that seizure of "the Rock" would place immense stress on the British Empire and possibly force a negotiated peace. In November, German military units were task-organized and trained for the operation, now code-named Operation FELIX. Hitler understood the importance of Gibraltar, but wanted the approval of Francisco Franco, the Spanish dictator, before ordering an attack. Hitler waited. By the spring of 1941, Hitler had failed to act and had lost his opportunity to strike Great Britain when it was most vulnerable. He did not have the will to make the difficult decision and implement either strategy. After December 1940, Great Britain would never again be in danger of an invasion of either the island home or of its valuable colony.

The America intelligence community in 1950, unprepared to perform its missions, failed to provide adequate indications and warning to U.S. national leaders and to the Commander, Far East Command (FEC), about the North Korean invasion of South Korea and Red Chinese intervention in the Korean War. Post-World War II policies that reduced the size of the military, cut systems and training, and reorganized intelligence services are responsible for that failure. Training deficiencies meant that intelligence soldiers deployed to Korea without required skills. The military trained analysts to assess enemy capabilities rather than intentions, contributing to poor predictive analysis. Shortages of analysts, photo interpreters, and linguists further plagued the intelligence community and degraded intelligence collection and production. The post-war political climate focused on the Soviet threat. American estimates saw the Soviet Union as the center of control for other communist states, such as Red China and that paradigm framed analysis of Chinese intentions. Assessments by General MacArthur, head of the FEC and Supreme Commander of United Nations Forces in Korea, of Chinese intentions proved decisive in shaping the course of the war in the fall of 1950. The Far Eastern Command (FEC) G-2 shared MacArthur's view that the Chinese would not intervene and spread that appraisal throughout the FEC intelligence community. In MacArthur opinion, the Chinese would not attack late in 1950 because the opportune time to do so had passed; furthermore, he thought since the Red Chinese lacked an Air Force, they would be annihilated by U.S. airpower. Analysts at all levels underestimated the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) and failed to understand Chinese operational art and tactics. Consequently, they did not recognize the Chinese first phase offensive in North Korea, and erroneously concluded that the Chinese would withdraw and defend its border. The intelligence community's poor readiness and lack of capability to provide indications and warning resulted in the enemy's achieving surprise. The first surprise led to the deployment, and near defeat, of Task Force Smith at Pusan. The second surprise led to the withdrawal and rout of U.N. forces, which led to a prolonged war of attrition.

The U.S. Army in 1940 was in the early stages of developing an airborne capability to exploit the vertical envelopment concept. That concept became reality in 1942 with the first airborne operation in North Africa. Although the first parachute drop contributed virtually nothing to the overall success of the mission, it was the beginning of an important capability. In 1943, the War Department authorized five airborne divisions despite a lack of experience and doctrine to direct the new organizational structure. The airborne initiative expanded much more quickly than did the doctrine, training, or employment principles. The first attempts of conducting large-scale airborne operations in combat during the Sicilian Campaign that year proved to be disastrous. Because of these failures, the airborne division, as well as the vertical envelopment concept itself, were in jeopardy. Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall appointed a special board to investigate the causes of the disasters and make recommendations as to the soundness of the airborne division. While the board was meeting, half-way around the world in the South West Pacific Area, a successful airborne operation occurred when the 503d Parachute Infantry Regiment executed a drop at the Nadzab Emergency Landing Strip that allowed the capture of the essential port of Lae, New Guinea. This operation had a broader impact than just the tactical objectives that it achieved. This was the first unqualified successful American airborne operation of World War II and it allowed the airborne advocates to make a case for the soundness of the vertical envelopment concept, as well as that of the airborne division. Had it not been for this parachute drop, the U.S. Army might have abandoned the whole initiative just when it was planning to employ two airborne divisions during Operation NEPTUNE, the airborne portion of Operation OVERLORD.

Sexual assault disproportionately affects female college students, more so than any other group of women in the general population. Therefore, consideration for the safety needs of this particular group of women constitute a great concern for university administrators. Safety measures currently utilized at universities for decreasing sexual assault rates have been insufficient. Some researchers have turned their attention to the role of campus sexual assault policies as a means in which to alleviate this crisis. The present investigation analyzes the prevalence and quality of sexual assault policies at 102 public Doctoral/Research extensive universities in the United States. The majority of institutions in this study, or 55.9% did not have a sexual assault policy in place, indicating an overall lack in the existence of sexual assault policies. Of those 45.1% of schools that do have a policy in place, the majority of these institutions, (67.4%) met at least 60% of the criteria for determining a high-quality policy as defined by the researcher. Overall, the majority of sexual assault policies that are in place are of good quality.

This thesis explores how arguments about gender and labor roles have determined women's exclusion from or acceptance to the academy throughout the history of the United States. Race, gender, and class are identified as interlocking identities that shape experiences and women's gendered relationship to labor is demonstrated through the use of a materialist feminist framework. By tracing the distinct eras of colonial and United States history, the thesis illustrates the debates and public mindset of each time period and how they relate to women and higher education. The thesis concludes that popular social conceptions of the female body and women's labor have dictated women's involvement in higher education throughout the centuries, and, to some degree, these ideas still define women in the academy today.