The German blitzkrieg across France during May 1940 was the culmination of three years of daring political and military moves that had brought most of Europe under German control. It was the German dictator Adolf Hitler who had outguessed his advisors. Yet, Hitler's bold moves in Western Europe ended with his army's dash across France, and the failure to strike Great Britain that summer when the British were at one of the weakest points in their entire history. After Germany defeated France, Hitler began a fruitless period of waiting for Great Britain to sue for peace. Unlike Hitler, some in the German High Command believed that Great Britain would fight and that a coherent strategy was needed to defeat that island nation. During late June 1940, two strategies emerged for defeating Great Britain. The first, code-named Operation SEA LION, called for an invasion of southern England. This plan was the surest way to bring about a decisive outcome, but also the riskiest. Hitler nonetheless ordered that planning and training for the operation go forward, a process halted by the Luftwaffe's inability to defeat the RAF as the necessary prelude to the invasion. The strategic option less risky than an invasion of the British Isles called for an attack on the important colony of Gibraltar. German planners believed that seizure of "the Rock" would place immense stress on the British Empire and possibly force a negotiated peace. In November, German military units were task-organized and trained for the operation, now code-named Operation FELIX. Hitler understood the importance of Gibraltar, but wanted the approval of Francisco Franco, the Spanish dictator, before ordering an attack. Hitler waited. By the spring of 1941, Hitler had failed to act and had lost his opportunity to strike Great Britain when it was most vulnerable. He did not have the will to make the difficult decision and implement either strategy. After December 1940, Great Britain would never again be in danger of an invasion of either the island home or of its valuable colony.

The America intelligence community in 1950, unprepared to perform its missions, failed to provide adequate indications and warning to U.S. national leaders and to the Commander, Far East Command (FEC), about the North Korean invasion of South Korea and Red Chinese intervention in the Korean War. Post-World War II policies that reduced the size of the military, cut systems and training, and reorganized intelligence services are responsible for that failure. Training deficiencies meant that intelligence soldiers deployed to Korea without required skills. The military trained analysts to assess enemy capabilities rather than intentions, contributing to poor predictive analysis. Shortages of analysts, photo interpreters, and linguists further plagued the intelligence community and degraded intelligence collection and production. The post-war political climate focused on the Soviet threat. American estimates saw the Soviet Union as the center of control for other communist states, such as Red China and that paradigm framed analysis of Chinese intentions. Assessments by General MacArthur, head of the FEC and Supreme Commander of United Nations Forces in Korea, of Chinese intentions proved decisive in shaping the course of the war in the fall of 1950. The Far Eastern Command (FEC) G-2 shared MacArthur's view that the Chinese would not intervene and spread that appraisal throughout the FEC intelligence community. In MacArthur opinion, the Chinese would not attack late in 1950 because the opportune time to do so had passed; furthermore, he thought since the Red Chinese lacked an Air Force, they would be annihilated by U.S. airpower. Analysts at all levels underestimated the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) and failed to understand Chinese operational art and tactics. Consequently, they did not recognize the Chinese first phase offensive in North Korea, and erroneously concluded that the Chinese would withdraw and defend its border. The intelligence community's poor readiness and lack of capability to provide indications and warning resulted in the enemy's achieving surprise. The first surprise led to the deployment, and near defeat, of Task Force Smith at Pusan. The second surprise led to the withdrawal and rout of U.N. forces, which led to a prolonged war of attrition.

The U.S. Army in 1940 was in the early stages of developing an airborne capability to exploit the vertical envelopment concept. That concept became reality in 1942 with the first airborne operation in North Africa. Although the first parachute drop contributed virtually nothing to the overall success of the mission, it was the beginning of an important capability. In 1943, the War Department authorized five airborne divisions despite a lack of experience and doctrine to direct the new organizational structure. The airborne initiative expanded much more quickly than did the doctrine, training, or employment principles. The first attempts of conducting large-scale airborne operations in combat during the Sicilian Campaign that year proved to be disastrous. Because of these failures, the airborne division, as well as the vertical envelopment concept itself, were in jeopardy. Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall appointed a special board to investigate the causes of the disasters and make recommendations as to the soundness of the airborne division. While the board was meeting, half-way around the world in the South West Pacific Area, a successful airborne operation occurred when the 503d Parachute Infantry Regiment executed a drop at the Nadzab Emergency Landing Strip that allowed the capture of the essential port of Lae, New Guinea. This operation had a broader impact than just the tactical objectives that it achieved. This was the first unqualified successful American airborne operation of World War II and it allowed the airborne advocates to make a case for the soundness of the vertical envelopment concept, as well as that of the airborne division. Had it not been for this parachute drop, the U.S. Army might have abandoned the whole initiative just when it was planning to employ two airborne divisions during Operation NEPTUNE, the airborne portion of Operation OVERLORD.

Sexual assault disproportionately affects female college students, more so than any other group of women in the general population. Therefore, consideration for the safety needs of this particular group of women constitute a great concern for university administrators. Safety measures currently utilized at universities for decreasing sexual assault rates have been insufficient. Some researchers have turned their attention to the role of campus sexual assault policies as a means in which to alleviate this crisis. The present investigation analyzes the prevalence and quality of sexual assault policies at 102 public Doctoral/Research extensive universities in the United States. The majority of institutions in this study, or 55.9% did not have a sexual assault policy in place, indicating an overall lack in the existence of sexual assault policies. Of those 45.1% of schools that do have a policy in place, the majority of these institutions, (67.4%) met at least 60% of the criteria for determining a high-quality policy as defined by the researcher. Overall, the majority of sexual assault policies that are in place are of good quality.

This thesis explores how arguments about gender and labor roles have determined women's exclusion from or acceptance to the academy throughout the history of the United States. Race, gender, and class are identified as interlocking identities that shape experiences and women's gendered relationship to labor is demonstrated through the use of a materialist feminist framework. By tracing the distinct eras of colonial and United States history, the thesis illustrates the debates and public mindset of each time period and how they relate to women and higher education. The thesis concludes that popular social conceptions of the female body and women's labor have dictated women's involvement in higher education throughout the centuries, and, to some degree, these ideas still define women in the academy today.

America was not prepared for the War of 1812. The army and navy were so small they could not oppose Britain directly. American strategy in the first year called for the seizure of Canada. Multiple expeditions were complete failures resulting in military defeats and political embarrassment for President Madison. During the second year of the war there were more defeats for American forces, but some victories. These successes came mainly against Indians allied with the British along the frontier. The third and final year of the war started ominously. With Napoleons first abdication the wars in Europe seemed over, allowing England to shift forces to North America. The war reached a low point for the Americans when the British entered Washington, burned the Capitol, the White House, and other public buildings. This force was turned back at Baltimore, but then sailed south to linkup with the largest British strike force of the war, with the mission of seizing New Orleans. Major General Andrew Jacksons task was to save New Orleans from the British. From September through December of 1814 Jackson sparred with the British, and their Spanish allies, in a series of engagements that ranged along the Gulf Coast from Pensacola to islands just east of the city. These engagements narrowed British options and allowed Jackson to prepare for the defense of New Orleans. His leadership was exemplary, as he recruited and mobilized disparate forces, used terrain to great advantage, and effectively directed a series of four engagements with the enemy that culminated in the epic fight along the Rodriguez Canal and decisive victory.

This thesis is a biographical description of the lives of two men that fought in the Pacific War, 1941-1945. One was a member of the Third Marine Division, the other a member of the Imperial Japanese Army stationed on Lubang Island in the Philippines. They were connected by a very intense, almost Paleolithic conflict across the vastness of the Pacific Ocean. Primary sources were drawn from the two privately published books by both. Clifton Cormier's A Postcard From Joseph (2002) and Onoda's No Surrender, My Thirty Year War (1974). In addition, Clifton Cormier graciously supplied self-written newspaper articles, private telephone conversations, and e-mail messages providing data not found in his book. The treatment of this thesis attempts to describe the experiences of these two gentlemen as seen through their eyes. It describes how the battlefield behavior of the Japanese soldier and the United States Marine were different yet strangely similar when fought on a stage of live combat were the will to survive is paramount to the will to win. Also find brief thematic descriptions of the military cultures that spawned the two along with eye witness descriptions of two of the largest banzai attacks in the Marianas (1944) along with a short treatment of the Bougainville, Guam and Iwo Jima campaigns. It concludes that the war itself is the real culprit as opposed to the political, racial, and social differences that existed in that era between these two armies and the cultural diversity under extreme stress that goes with it. This thesis explains how both gentlemen had no choice and did what they could to survive within the parameters allowed. Clifton Cormier rationalized that victory achieved revenge and Onoda sought isolation to circumvent the dishonor of defeat both of which brought to each the crowning glory of survival.

This qualitative study examines the field of public relations though the lens of Everett Rogers diffusion of innovation research. The fields of public relations and diffusion of innovations are paired for the first time in a study of the effects of proximity to innovators on public relations practitioners. In-depth interviews and focus groups with practitioners working in both high-tech and low-tech environments are transcribed and coded to compare the effects of technology adoption on roles, status and power in organizations. This study not only contributes to the literature in public relations and diffusion of innovations, but also its findings are useful to PR practitioners seeking career benefits through strategic technology use.

Student leadership development programs are an emerging topic of conversation within the field of student affairs. This paper uses the personal narratives of five recent graduates of the LeaderShape program to consider student perceptions of the effects of this program. A literature review discusses recent publications in the field of student leadership development. The interview data collected in this study confirm the findings of this recent research, including generally positive leadership experiences, improved racial relations, and the importance of small group interactions. Additionally, this thesis includes a cross-case analysis and discussion section that present several themes that emerged from participants' narratives. Recommendations for future research and practice associated with student leadership development are presented.

Sendero Luminoso first appeared in Peru in May 1980 by burning several ballot boxes and hanging dogs from streetlights. This unusual event signaled the beginning of one of the most violent insurgencies in the Western hemisphere. Abimael Guzmán, the founder of Sendero Luminoso, set out to utterly destroy Peruvian society in order to replace it with his vision of a utopian communist society by creating a peasant uprising starting in the Andean highlands and spreading throughout Peru, eventually surrounding the capital, Lima. The government of Peru virtually ignored Sendero Luminoso for two years, which allowed the group to establish strong base areas in and around the department of Ayacucho. When the government finally reacted, it was forced to declare a state of emergency in the south central highlands and send in the military to regain control. Through successive administrations over the next decade, Peru was engulfed in violence and destruction, human rights abuses, corruption, and economic catastrophe. Sendero Luminoso demonstrated an uncanny ability to avoid the militarys concentrated efforts while expanding into new regions of Peru. The group also benefited from the drug trade to finance the insurgency by providing protection to coca farmers and narcotraffickers in the Upper Huallaga Valley. Only after Guzmáns capture in 1992 did the government witness visible progress in the fight against the insurgents. Sendero Luminoso rapidly declined without Guzmáns leadership and the remnants withdrew to the Upper Huallaga Valley. Yet many of the conditions that led to the creation of Sendero Luminoso still plague the country, including corruption in the government, poverty, and a weak economy. The missing catalyst is another leader like Abimael Guzmán.