No / The Mental Capacity Act 2005 introduced legal safeguards (which came into force in April 2009) aimed at protecting the liberty of people lacking capacity admitted to institutions in England and Wales. This paper discusses the adequacy of the Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards for protecting the liberty of residents in social care settings and the role of regulation in monitoring their implementation. In particular, the potential impact of planned unitary regulation on the regulator's ability to protect residents’ liberty is critiqued, centring on people with dementia living in care homes. It is suggested that the capacity of the safeguards to adequately protect the liberty of residents with dementia may be limited by under-recognition of the extent to which deprivation of liberty can actually occur in care homes, insufficient resourcing and a lack of critical independence in their proposed implementation. In addition, the planned contraction of regulation – especially a reduction in inspections – will constrain the regulator's ability to ensure that residents’ right to liberty is protected. The author concludes that the new model of regulation adopted by the UK government has prioritised economic efficiency over safeguarding the right to liberty of vulnerable residents in institutions.

Thesis (D. Min.)--Midwestern Baptist Theological Seminary, 2005. / Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 126-128).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Chicago, Committee on Social Thought, June 2001. / Includes bibliographical references. Also available on the Internet.

Not available / text

Thesis (doctoral--Inaug. diss.)--Eberhard-Karls-Universität, Tübingen, 1984. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 385-408).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Graduate Theological Union, 1983. / Includes bibliographical references (p. [928]-537).

Thesis (Th. M.)--Dallas Theological Seminary, 1996. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 69-80).

M.A. (Politics). / This is a study in political philosophy. It defends the following thesis: where there is poverty there is a lack of power and thus a lack of freedom. It does not follow from this that a life of wealth is a life of freedom and a life of poverty is a life of complete unfreedom. This is because full freedom also involves other components such as political freedom, economic freedom and so on. The thesis defended here is simply the negative one that humans remain unfree as long as they live in conditions of poverty. Thus poverty should be construed as lack of freedom in the sense of constraints or fetters it casts upon people collectively. For example, the harsh effects of segregation in the United States and apartheid in South Africa are that people continue to live in separate communities somewhat along the colour line. The worse effect of this is that those who live in poorly resourced communities are Black. They in this manner remain without freedom here construed as power to tum their situation around. This thesis criticises the liberal account of Berlin and others of similar persuasions and offer a distinct account of freedom that locates it in an individual's capacity to carry out desired actions. It will then argue that poverty constrains freedom in this sense. Thus if you are poor, you are unfree and without power to generate the requisite necessaries of life. This thesis also aims to show how the two concepts of liberty or the liberal perspective of freedom as such do not take into account the important social problems confronting us in the world today, for example poverty which in this project is taken as an exemplar of lack of freedom. Poverty is characterized best as being without the necessities to meet basic human needs such as shelter, food and recreation. More importantly, any alternative to address poverty must take into account the fundamental significance of participation in politics.

Philip Pettit claims his neorepublican theory of freedom as non-domination is preferable to the liberal ideal of non-interference, and he is right. But the reasons why he is right run deeper than is apparent if we attend solely to his arguments defending non-domination in negative terms. In fact, embedded in the three benefits that Pettit claims non-domination can offer (which non-interference cannot) lie significant resonances with a positive idea of freedom concerned with a person’s sense of agency. We find such an idea in Charles Taylor, where freedom as self-realization is intricately linked with his “significance view” of human agency. By adopting this Taylorian lens and assessing Pettit’s non-domination, I show that non-domination does have much to offer those of us who think of freedom primarily in positive terms and, more generally, to all those of us who believe that freedom and agency are inextricably linked and must be treated as such.

The recent years have seen the revival of neo-Roman republicanism through the works of Philip Pettit, who has replaced Isaiah Berlin’s taxonomy of positive/negative liberty with freedom as nondomination. This essay compares the neo-Roman conception of nondomination to the liberal conception of noninterference, with the purpose of clarifying whether nondomination is a distinct concept of liberty and preferable to that of noninterference. The essay highlights the exchange between Pettit/Skinner and Carter/Kramer, wherein Carter and Kramer make their case for ‘pure negative liberty’, which is claimed to be the proper articulation of negative liberty. Pure-negative theorists believe that nondomination is a strand of negative liberty, adding nothing new to the concept, whereas their republican counterparts disagree. My essay argues that nondomination is a distinct, preferable concept of liberty, thanks to its view on fundamental unfreedom and the mere presence of arbitrary power, which the pure negative view fails to account for satisfactorily.