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Liberty, equality and justice : a critique of Kai Nielsen's radical egalitarianism /Chan, Chong-fai. January 1997 (has links)
Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Hong Kong, 1997. / Includes bibliographical references (leaf 340-354).
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Freiheit und staatsomnipotenz in Rousseaus "Contrat social" ...Schwarz, Erich, January 1936 (has links)
Thesis--Tübingen. / "Literaturverzeichnis": p. v-vi.
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Zum Verhältnis von Vertragsfreiheit und Gesellschaftsordnung während des 19. Jahrhunderts, insbesondere in den Auseinandersetzungen über den Arbeitsvertrag.Kaiser, Andreas, January 1972 (has links)
Diss.--Freie Universität Berlin. / Bibliography: p. viii-liv.
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An analysis of negative libertySalman, Basil January 2016 (has links)
Too many people analyse the concept of negative liberty in a way that obscures its place and significance in our lives. Here I seek to redress the balance by shining light on its structure and value. With respect to the essential structure of negative liberty and unfreedom, I push for a more intuitive, dynamic, and subjectivist agent-centred approach in place of the more mechanistic Hobbesian and austere Hayekian conceptions that have tended to predominate. Emphasising the importance of self-direction, authenticity and self-development to liberty delivers both a more coherent negative concept internally, and a notion that is more compellingly distinguished from its positive counterpart. Regarding liberty's relationship with coercion and manipulation, my explanation is that rational and emotional compulsion constrains negative liberty because it interferes with options and restricts freedom of choice. With respect to the significance of negative freedom and why we care about it, I consider its general, content-independent value to lie in its contributions to autonomy as well as to values more often associated with positive freedom such as individuality and self-realisation. Harnessing Mill's thesis, I highlight the importance of self-understanding and self-knowledge in the process of self-development, and explain from a non-utilitarian angle the nature of the negative opposition to paternalism and control.
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A theory of preference-based choice : its empitical implications /Strand, Paul J. January 1975 (has links)
No description available.
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The theme of freedom in the anthropology of Paul Ricoeur.Wells, Harold George. January 1972 (has links)
No description available.
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Where There is No Love, Put Love: Rethinking Our Life with TechnologyMackh, David Paul 07 1900 (has links)
The bedrock of this dissertation is the idea that our patterns of thought, speech, and action can be distilled into two distinct approaches defined by (1) the use of things on one hand and (2) the relation to persons on the other. That first approach is represented in our life with technology and has expanded to the point of omnipresence. Being so ubiquitous, technology largely goes unexamined in the way it functions, the effect it has on us, and the effect it has on our neighbor. In this manner, the technological approach is an over-extension of the manipulation of things to the negation of the relation to persons. As a result, our capacity to relate to persons outside a narrow scope had been atrophied. This work is an attempt at renewing the relational approach within contexts shaped by and shaped for the manipulation of things, i.e., technically minded society. To that end, it is necessary to first explore the work of thinkers who have written on relationality in ways which address the over-extension of the technological approach. The thinkers I have chosen in this endeavor are Martin Buber, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Dorothy Day, and Ivan Illich, each of whom wrote thoughtfully about relationality as community, which I am naming to be the heart of the relational approach, as expressed in hospitality as the embrace of strangers as neighbors. Likewise, it is necessary to understand the true nature of technology, which is remarkably difficult for those of us who live in contexts shaped by and shaped for the manipulation of things. The thinkers I have chosen to draw from in exploring technology as a pattern are Ivan Illich, Albert Borgmann, and Lewis Mumford, each of whom carefully and thoughtfully explored the nature of technology beyond the obvious form of devices. I then apply the community approach to our life with technology by exploring ways in which individuals and communities can reorient their patterns of thinking and technology in their lives in order to place the manipulation of things into service of the relation to persons. In doing so, I advocate for the inversion of our life with technology through the embrace of freedom and creativity rather than causality and slavery, as well as the choices to reuse and obtain devices used, educate ourselves and others on how our devices and institutions actually work, repair our devices rather than replace them, liberate our devices by "jailbreaking" them, and sharing our devices freely as acts of technological hospitality. There are, however, technologies which cannot be satisfyingly inverted due to their production of morally abhorrent commodities, extractive nature, or some combination of the two. These I call unspeakable, and the task of renewing the relational approach in our lives necessitates we distance ourselves from these through conscious choices of thought and action. Choices I explore to this end are the embrace of voluntary poverty in our life with technology, taking regular sabbatical rest from technological patterns, and fasting from technological patterns of living altogether. It is my argument that, should we undertake these efforts together with like-minded persons and the willingness to break a few rules, we may yet find ourselves able to carve out spaces for relational (communal) living within contexts bent toward the manipulation of things.
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Constitutional rights relating to criminal justice administration in South-Asia : a comparison with the European Convention on Human RightsSilva, Kelaniyage Buddhappriya Asoka January 2000 (has links)
No description available.
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Schelling's philosophy of freedomLaughland, John January 1998 (has links)
No description available.
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A administração da justiça nas "Linhas fundamentais da filosofia do direito" de Hegel /Lima, Cristiane Moreira de. January 2019 (has links)
Orientador: Pedro Geraldo Aparecido Novelli / Banca: Agemir Bavaresco / Banca: Ricardo Pereira Tassinari / Resumo: A presente dissertação tem como objetivo compreender e analisar a administração da justiça na perspectiva de Hegel, especialmente na obra "Linhas Fundamentais da Filosofia do Direito", apresentando a sua forma de constituição e organização, analisando qual seria a função desta, bem como seus alcances e limites. Questiona-se: Qual é a finalidade da administração da justiça? A quem incumbe o exercício desta função? Nas atuais circunstâncias estaria a administração da justiça representada através da figura do Estado atingindo o seu desígnio? Buscando verificar qual seria o objetivo e a finalidade da administração da justiça para Hegel e se esta teria atingido sua finalidade primeiramente iremos evidenciar qual é a visão de Hegel sobre a justiça e como o filósofo a conceitua, salientando a distinção que este realiza entre o direito natural e o direito positivo e o que Hegel considera como injustiça. Mostraremos os distintos tipos de justiça em consonância com sua época, quais sejam: o direito aristocrático ou justiça da igualdade; o direito burguês ou justiça da equivalência e por fim o direito cidadão ou justiça da equidade. Iremos expor os diferentes momentos da justiça na Filosofia do Direito de Hegel, ou seja, Direito Abstrato, Moralidade e Eticidade, elucidando a relevância de cada um destes instantes para a efetivação da justiça, ressaltando que cada um destes momentos possui sua singularidade e importância, porém estão presentes e integrados em uma unidade, vindo a se comp... (Resumo completo, clicar acesso eletrônico abaixo) / Abstract: The present dissertation aims to understand and analyze the administration of justice in Hegel's perspective, especially in the work "Principles of Philosophy of Law", presenting its form of constitution and organization, analyzing what would be its function, as well as its length and limits. What is the purpose of the administration of justice? Who is responsible for this function? In the present circumstances would the administration of justice represented through the figure of the State achieve its design? Seeking to ascertain what the objective and purpose of the administration of justice for Hegel is and whether it is presupposed an effective justice we will first evidence what Hegel's view of justice is and how the philosopher conceptualizes it, emphasizing the distinction he makes between natural law and positive law and what Hegel considers as injustice. We will show the different types of justice in line with your time, namely: aristocratic right or equality justice; the bourgeois right or justice of equivalence and finally the citizen's right or justice of equity. We will expose the different moments of justice in Hegel's Philosophy of Law, that is, Abstract Law, Morality and Ethics, elucidating the relevance of each of these instants for the effectuation of justice, highlighting that each of these moments has its singularity and importance, in the However, they are present and integrated in a unit, complementing each other and finally we will illustrate the relatio... (Complete abstract click electronic access below) / Mestre
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