Thèse. Sc. pol. et écon. Montpellier. 1918.

Thesis (D. Min.)--Western Conservative Baptist Seminary, 1996. / Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 338-373).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Washington, 2001. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 75-78).

“Being with oneself in the other” is Hegel's famous definition of freedom, and, I argue, it is also the key topic of his entire Science of Logic. Hegel's Logic is an ontological analysis of the underlying relational structure of everything: the structure of thinking as much as the structure of the world. Hegel proposes at the beginning of the Logic that this structure must display the form of “being with oneself in the other”, i.e. consist in a relation of identity and difference between a totality and its elements. After presenting the different forms of “being with oneself in the other” developed in the Logic, I will offer a new interpretation of the Philosophy of Right and the Philosophy of History in the light of my interpretation of the Logic. This serves to show how exactly Philosophy of Right is the exposition of the existence of freedom and how it is grounded in the Logic. While the connection between Hegel's Logic and social philosophy has often been taken to have authoritarian and anti-individualist implications, I will show that this is not the case and that this connection instead highlights the republican aspects in Hegel's theory.

Project (M.F.A.) - Simon Fraser University, 2004. / Theses (School for Contemporary Arts) / Simon Fraser University. Also issued in digital format and available on the World Wide Web.

Chez Augustin et chez Sartre, l’homme se confronte au trouble tout au long de son existence. Cette existence est un processus de réalisation pratique fondé sur la liberté de ses actions dans le monde. Toutefois, en l’absence de compréhension de ce que cette existence pourrait être, perdu, ignorant et isolé, il recherche le sens à lui donner. Son expérience initiale du trouble le mène à comprendre qu’il peut intentionnaliser un devenir, c’est-à-dire affirmer par ses actes une vérité qui lui est révélée par son expérience, que cette vérité soit immuable (Augustin) ou relative(Sartre). C’est en se confrontant activement à l’hostilité du monde dont il est partie que l’homme peut alors façonner son devenir. Contraint néanmoins dans son élan parles conditions du monde qui s’exercent à son encontre, il prend conscience de la limitation de sa liberté et de la nécessité de la transformer afin de la réaliser pleinement. Il comprend alors que la socialité, qui conditionne et trouble l’homme tout au long de son existence, peut et doit être utilisée afin de faire émerger sa liberté conjointement avec celle des autres, et que des liens forts peuvent être créés.L’affirmation collective d’une vérité constituante du groupe fonde alors le processus politique, aboutissement de l’existence. Cet épanouissement est pourtant lui aussi porteur de trouble, au sein du groupe comme entre les groupes. L’homme, singulier comme collectif, doit alors défendre sa liberté en projetant sa vérité avec abnégation vers une universalité historique (Sartre) ou eschatologique (Augustin). / In Augustine and Sartre, the man is confrontated to the trouble all his existencelong. This existence is a practical realization process based on the liberty of hisactions in the world. Nonetheless, missing the understanding of what this existencemight be, lost, ignorant and isolated, he looks for the meaning to give to hisexistence. His initial experience of trouble leads him to understand that he can decidethe direction of his becoming through his intentionality, which means to affirm byhis actions a truth revealed by his experience, whether this truth is immutable(Augustine) or relative (Sartre). It is by confrontating himself to the hostility of thisworld he is a part of that the man can therefore shape his becoming. Constrainedhowever in his impetus by the world’s conditions against him, he realizes thelimitation of his liberty and the necessity to transform it in order to realize it totally.He thus understands that sociality, which preconditions and trouble the man all alonghis existence, can and should be used to bring his liberty out, together with the one ofthe others, and that strong ties can be establish. The collective affirmation of aconstituting truth found therefore the political process, outcome of the existence.This fulfillment is however also carrying troubles, inside the group as between thegroups. The singular as collective man should therefore defend his liberty byprojecting his truth with abnegation toward a historical (Sartre) oreschatological (Augustine) universality.