The present essay, studying the historical, social, political, and military factors, traces the development of ideas culminating in the detention. Considering the affair in this manner should more clearly explain the "why" of Japanese removal. Particularly, the concept of "military necessity," the Army's major reason for evacuation, is considered with emphasis on factors which contributed to the development of this position. The role of Lieutenant General John L. DeWitt, the primary advocate of removal based on necessity, is explored.

Comment un troisième fils d'une famille de noblesse récente eut-il autant de pouvoirs sur la province du Lyonnais, Forez et Beaujolais, sous le règne de Louis XIV, est l'interrogation principale de ce sujet. En effet, Camille de Neufville fut lieutenant général du roi en 1646, avant de devenir archevêque de Lyon en 1653, cumulant ainsi toutes sortes de pouvoirs à la fois temporels et spirituels qui se mêlent et s'entremêlent alors que lui les veut étanches. Il convient d'analyser au travers de deux mots-clés, "pouvoir" et "fortune", comment il put atteindre un tel niveau de pouvoirs, puis comment il exerça ses charges de lieutenant général et archevêque, comment il imprima matériellement ses fonctions dans le paysage au travers de résidences séparées et comment il ancra, dans la province, le pouvoir de sa famille, de manière visible en érigeant le marquisat de Neufville. Ensuite, il convient d'étudier par quelles ressources en influences, en hommes (les différents réseaux), il put se maintenir au pouvoir pendant plus de quarante années et ce qu'il en retira en terme de fortune. / How could the third son of a recently annobled family gather so many powers in the Lyon, Forez, Beaujolais province, under the reign of Louis XIV? Here lies the main question of this work. Actually, Camille de Neufville was lieutenant general for the King in 1646, before becoming Archbishop of Lyon in 1653, this holdong concurrently all sorts of powers that were closely intermingled, though he wanted them totally independent. Consequently, we will point out, through two key words, "power" and "fortune", how he could get to such a high level of powers, then how he fulfilled his offices as lieutenant general and Archbishop, how he practically imprinted his practice on landscape through separated residences, and how he anchored the power of his family in the province, in a patent fashion, by creating the marquisat of Neufville. Then we will study on which influential and human ressources (his different networks) he relied on to stay in power for more than forty years and what he gained in terms of fortune.

Beginning in 1954, the United States Army attempted to build a viable armed force in South Vietnam. Until the early 1960s, other areas commanded more American attention, yet this formative period was influential in later United States involvement in Vietnam. This thesis examines United States advisory efforts from 1955 to 1960 by analyzing the tenure of Lieutenant General Samuel T. Williams as Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group in South Vietnam. During Williams's tenure, the communist forces in the north began the guerrilla insurgency in earnest. Williams's failure to respond to this change has been justly criticized; yet his actions were reflective of the United States Army's attitude toward insurgencies in the late 1950s.