Densification of the urban structure is a hot topic in urban development, but densification is almost absent as a strategy in rural settlements. This project studies densification in a rural settlement in a Nordic context by using the "dense and low-rise" design strategy and the concept of linear cities. Is linearity the key to rural densification? The concepts are tested on the small town of Kimito in south-western Finland.

Chapter 2 deals with a linear city model à la Hotelling where the two firms share linear transport costs with their customers. Mill pricing and uniform delivery pricing are special limiting cases. We characterize the conditions for the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium in the two-stage location-price game. These enable us to identify the causes for non-existence in the two limiting cases. We solve for the equilibrium of a location game between the duopolists with an exogenously given price. When the two firms are constrained to locate at the same central spot, we show the nonexistence of pure strategy equilibria, conjecture the existence of mixed strategy equilibria, and show that any such possible equilibria will always yield positive expected profits. Chapter 3 provides simulations as well as theoretical analysis of potential spatial separation of heterogeneous agents operating on a two-dimensional grid space that represents a city. Heterogeneity refers to a characteristic which is also a determinant of individual valuation of land. We study spatial separation with respect to the distinguishing characteristic and investigate the details of emerging spatial patterns. Simulations suggest that the process of interaction with little trade friction goes through stages which resemble its end-state with high trade friction. Several theoretical examples exhibit a distinguishing characteristic upon which the simulations are based. They reflect some of the causes for spatial separation. Examples for the absence of spatial separation are also given. In Chapter 4 simulations, in addition to some theory, are used to investigate certain aspects of a city formation process. The model assumes two types of economic agents, workers and employers, operating on a two-dimensional grid. The agents have simple preferences, positive for the opposite type and negative for the own type in the own location. In addition, they have positive or negative preference for agglomeration in the own location. The model helps build intuition about a potentially important factor for agglomeration formation, namely, the disparity between entrepreneurial and technical skills in localities. We also determine the minimum level of positive preference for agglomeration that leads to agglomeration formation. / Ph. D.

This particular study is about the main boulevard of the city center of Tirana that is the capital of Albania since 1920. The main boulevard, which has a function of a &quot / spine&quot / of the central business district, was designed as an idea by the Italian architects in 1925. The new government needed immediately governmental buildings like minstries, a palace and a strong form that connects all of these facilities together in a monumental way. This &quot / spinal&quot / circulation system was inspired from the urban movements of that time like near city and city beautiful movement. Tirana is studied as the case by the light of historical developments of other cities. The power of the spine and its effect to the macro form of the whole city is analyzed and determined.

This thesis expands upon the dialogue between speed and architecture, investigating how architecture reinterprets the linear city, originally defined by the continuous fabric of the freeway and more recently reconfigured by the high speed rail line. Using the linear city as a site of exploration and high speed rail as a ground to test new typologies of architectural insertions at amplified speed, this thesis produces an extended civic space along the proposed high speed rail line connecting Tampa and Orlando. Combining a series of performance and commercial programs, this new typology will make the obscured visual experience along the extended territory of the rail line legible, through a sequencing of specific architectural intersections, exploring how monumental civic space will be made and occupied in the sprawl of the American city.

Economides (1986) has shown that within a linear city an equilibrium exists in a two-stage location-price game when the curvature of the transportation cost function is sufficiently high. One important point is that not all of these equilibria are at maximal differentiation. In this paper we include an additional stage with decentralized wage bargaining. This intensifies price competition resulting in locations that are nearer to the extremes of the city. The magnitude of this effect depends on the bargaining power of the unions. (author's abstract) / Series: Department of Economics Working Paper Series

本研究以Hotelling之線形城市模型為基礎模型，但對運輸成本由消費者負擔之假設改為由生產者負擔，廠商以運送貨物至消費者所在地之形式負擔運輸成本，而非直接補貼消費者之運輸成本。在此新的模型架構之下，本研究對廠商是否能夠向消費者價格歧視，以及是否有買賣承諾存在，兩者組合產生之四種情況分別進行探討。最後得出在廠商不能夠對消費者價格歧視，但無買賣承諾存在時，以及在廠商能對消費者價格歧視，無論買賣承諾存在與否時，兩廠商會設廠於線形城市之1/4及3/4處，達到社會福利極大之均衡。但若廠商不得採價格歧視，而有買賣承諾之存在時，兩廠商會選擇極小化差異，也就是設廠於線形城市之中心點，此時將造成社會的無謂損失。 / This research is based on Hotelling model. The only difference is that the firms have to pay transportation cost in this research. The firms absorb transportation cost in two ways. One way is the firms accept orders from the consumer and send the commodities to them. The other ways is the firms sent the commodities to some chain stores and the consumers will go to buy them in their neighborhoods. Since the transportation cost is decreased almost to zero and thus can be neglected, it is just like the consumers do not have pay it. This research considers four conditions under this new structure -whether the firms can price discriminate or not and whether there exists a commitment between the consumers and firms- combined together. If the firms can price discriminates, the firms will settle down on the 1/4 and 3/4 of the linear city. But if the firms cannot price discriminates, when the commitment exits, they will still choose their location on 1/4 and 3/4, or they will minimize differenciation.