The thesis argues, in lie main, for both a negative and positive agenda to Wittgenstein's rule-following remarks in both his Philosophical Investigations and Remarks on the foundations of Mathematics. The negative agenda is a sceptical agenda, different than as conceived by Kripke, that is destructive of a realist account of rules and contends that the correct application of a rule is not fully determined in an understanding of the rule. In addition to these consequences, this negative agenda opens Wittgenstein to Dummett's charge of radical conventionalism (a charge that also, but differently, applies to certain mid-period views and this is addressed in the first chapter). These negative consequences are left unresolved by Kripke's sceptical solution and, notably, are wrongly assessed by those that dissent from a sceptical reading (e.g., McDowell). The positive agenda builds on these negative considerations arguing that although there is no determination in the understanding of a rule of what will count as a correct application in so far unconsidered situations, we are still able to follow a rule correctly. This seems to involve an epistemic leap, from an underdetermined understanding to a determinate application, and, in respect of this appearance, involves what Wittgenstein calls following a rule "blindly" in an epistemic sense. Developing this view, of following a rule blindly, involves developing an account of an alternative rational response to rule instruction, one that need not involve a role for interpreting or inferring, but all the same allows for correctness in rule application in virtue of enabling agreement in rule application.

The question of this thesis is whether the individual can resolve the problem of culture crisis in her own case. Culture crisis is a historical moment in which our culture leads us to expect a world drastically different from the one in which we find ourselves. This thesis will focus on the experience of Generation Y in the fall-out of the 2008 Recession. It will be argued that we need a Wittgensteinian view of language in order to account for the phenomenon of culture crisis. It will be suggested that our individual has to be a Nietzschean individual in order to resolve the problem of culture crisis in her own case. Potential incompatibilities between a Wittgensteinian view of language and the Nietzschean individual will be considered and rejected. It will be concluded that in order to resolve the problem of culture crisis in her own case the individual must change the way she lives.

El trabajo de investigación se propone medir la influencia y recepción de Wittgenstein y Gadamer en el debate del pluralismo teórico contemporáneo. El pluralismo se comprende como una pluralidad de marcos conceptuales lingüísticamente articulados y contextualmente definidos que constituyen unidades de sentido para comunidades de vida vertebradas a partir de prácticas sociales comunes. La variante del pluralismo en la que se centra la investigación es asimismo el resultado de la crisis del paradigma de conocimiento moderno, cuya última instancia de conocimiento y acción es el sujeto, y que es sustituido por la formas de vida tras el giro lingüístico-pragmático del siglo XX. El debate a propósito del pluralismo es una de las múltiples posibilidades del debate sobre la razón, su alcance, capacidades y competencia, en el que Wittgenstein y Gadamer han sido importantes referentes. En el primer nivel de análisis, se trata de acotar la especificidad de pluralismo teórico en la que Wittgenstein y Gadamer pueden tener cabida. Se procede por vía de una reconstrucción histórico-filosófica del pluralismo que parte de su primera mención en Kant y Wolff, pasando por William James, el liberalismo clásico y el debate actual sobre el multiculturalismo. El objeto de la reconstrucción es establecer las tesis y argumentos principales del pluralismo en el momento presente. En un segundo nivel de análisis, se examina el tránsito del problema del lenguaje a la primacía de la praxis en un tratamiento diferenciado para cada uno de los autores, para pasar luego a la discusión crítica de sus posibles aportaciones individuales al problema filosófico del pluralismo, dando cuenta de una vasta panorámica en la recepción de ambos autores, pero acotando la discusión a los tópicos relacionados con la problemática del pluralismo teórico. Este segundo paso consta de cuatro capítulos, dos por autor, que examina el giro lingüístico-pragmático que cada uno de ellos desarrolla por separado desde múltiples perspectivas. En capítulo quinto y final, ambos autores son comparados en referencia a sus claves conjuntas para la concepción del lenguaje: los juegos de lenguaje (Sprachspiele) y la forma de vida (Lebensform) en Wittgenstein; el juego del lenguaje (sprachliches Spiel, das Spiel der Sprache) y la tradición histórico-lingüística (Überliferung) en Gadamer. El lenguaje como juego, el modelo dialógico y el sistema compartido de creencias que actúa como trasfondo en la argumentación y en la contrastación con el mundo de la experiencia son los ejes de comparación entre los máximos representantes de dos corrientes contemporáneas de la filosofía, la filosofía analítica del lenguaje (Wittgenstein) y la hermenéutica filosófica (Gadamer), que, a pesar de haber desarrollado sus proyectos filosóficos sin contacto la una con la otra, presentan profundas afinidades en sus intereses y objetivos. Por último, la reflexión se cierra en torno a la discusión crítica de la posibilidad de incorporar su común contribución filosófica sobre el lenguaje y la praxis a una concepción pluralista de la razón humana.PALABRAS CLAVE: Filosofía de la intersubjetividad, Hermenéutica, Filosofía de la acción, Pluralismo / The goal of the Doctoral Thesis is to examine the common influence of Wittgenstein and Gadamer on the contemporary debate concerning the theoretical pluralism, i.e. the controversial question of the competence and limits of human reason in the context of a plurality of forms of life and historical traditions. Wittgenstein and Gadamer are held to be the most important referents of two opposite philosophical movements without any points of contact: the analytical philosophy and the philosophical hermeneutics. Nevertheless, a careful treatment of both philosophers reveals profound affinities in the concepts of language and praxis. The most important coincidence is thus the assumption that all relevant philosophical problems have to do with our language in its ordinary uses. This results in the requirement to abandon the modern paradigm of knowledge, for which a transcendental subject is postulated as the condition of possibility of science and action.The Thesis consist in big three sections. The first introductory section presents an historical and philosophical reconstruction of the main arguments of philosophical pluralism. The second section contains four chapters that follow the transition of each of the authors from language to praxis and discusses their separate impact on the present practical philosophy. The final section consists in a comparison between their philosophies of language. The comparison is based on the image of the language as a game or a play, the practical constitution of belief and the dialogic model of communal life-world, aiming a pluralistic approach of reason.