Venture capital finances high-risk, high-return projects. In addition to financing, venture capitalists provide advice and expertise in management, commercialization, and development that enhance the value, success, and marketability of projects. Venture capitalists also have skills in selecting projects with potentially high returns. The first chapter investigates the contracting relationship between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs in a setting where the venture capitalist and entrepreneur contribute intangible assets (advice and effort) to a project that are non-contractible and non-verifiable. In general, in the private market equilibrium, advice provided by the venture capitalist and the number of projects funded are lower than the social optimum. Government tax and investment policies may alleviate these market failures. The impact of a capital gains tax, a tax on entrepreneur’s revenue, an investment subsidy to venture capitalists, and government run project enhancing programs are evaluated. Finally, we analyze the effects of a government venture capital firm competing with private venture capital. The second chapter focuses on competition in venture capital markets. We model a three-stage game of fund raising, investment in innovative projects and input of advice and effort, where fund raising is used as an entry deterrence mechanism. We examine the impacts of taxes and subsidies on venture capital market structure. We find that a tax on venture capitalist revenue and a tax on entrepreneur revenue increase the likelihood of entry deterrence and reduce the number of projects funded in equilibrium. A subsidy on investment reduces the likelihood of entry deterrence and increases the number of projects funded. The third chapter examines the venture capitalist's choice of investment in project selection skills and investment in managerial advice. We model, separately, a private venture capitalist and a labour-sponsored venture capitalist (LSVCC) with different objectives. A LSVCC is a special type of venture capitalist fund that is sponsored by a labour union. The private venture capitalist maximizes its expected profits, while the LSVCC maximizes a weighted function of expected profits and returns to labour. Consistent with empirical evidence, the quality of projects, determined by project selection skills and managerial advice, is higher for the private venture capitalist.

Diss. Uppsala : Uppsala universitet, 2007.

188 p. / Submitted by Santiago Fabio (fabio.ssantiago@hotmail.com) on 2012-12-17T20:37:54Z No. of bitstreams: 1 5959595959.pdf: 2368108 bytes, checksum: 065c98849d77e300640299f7665acccc (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2012-12-17T20:37:54Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 5959595959.pdf: 2368108 bytes, checksum: 065c98849d77e300640299f7665acccc (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010 / A petroquímica é um dos segmentos mais expressivos de qualquer economia industrial, produzindo insumos para diversos bens de consumo. A partir da década de 1970, com os dois choques do petróleo, essa indústria passou por intensa reestruturação em todo o mundo, aprofundada na década de 1990. A racionalização dos negócios petroquímicos promoveu uma intensa onda de fusões, aquisições, joint ventures e spin-offs, refletindo as estratégias adotadas pelas empresas líderes, de integração vertical e focalização em core business. As grandes petrolíferas moveram-se downstream, beneficiando-se de vantagens de custo e acesso a matérias-primas. Os anos 2000 foram marcados pela emergência da Ásia como centro produtor, adicionando-se novas capacidades no Oriente Médio, e consumidor, com destaque para a China, apontando que o acesso às matérias-primas e aos mercados com elevado potencial de crescimento são as variáveis com maior capacidade de desencadear movimentos de reestruturação nessa indústria. No Brasil, a petroquímica foi implantada seguindo um modelo tripartite, com importante participação do Estado, via Petroquisa, que acabou por resultar em uma estrutura industrial fragmentada, de empresas monoprodutoras, diversa do padrão mundial do setor. Na década de 1990, a abertura da economia e a privatização, com redução expressiva da participação da Petroquisa, tornou manifesta a vulnerabilidade das empresas nacionais e a necessidade de reestruturação. A formação da Braskem e o retorno da Petrobras deram início ao processo de reorganização da petroquímica nacional. O objetivo do presente trabalho é analisar se o processo ocorrido no Brasil guarda semelhança com aqueles ocorridos em nível mundial, bem como identificar, utilizando-se de modelo das decisões de investimento nessa indústria baseado em determinadas driving forces, as principais estratégias da Braskem, maior player nacional, e da Petrobras, além dos desafios competitivos enfrentados pela petroquímica brasileira, associados à disponibilidade de matérias-primas, escoamento da oferta, mudanças tecnológicas, crescimento da demanda e políticas governamentais. Os resultados encontrados sugerem que a reestruturação ocorrida, além de fortalecer a petroquímica brasileira, equacionou parte de suas fragilidades competitivas, adequando-a ao padrão mundial do setor. Seu crescimento está bastante vinculado ao mercado interno brasileiro e uma maior inserção no âmbito internacional demonstra hoje boas perspectivas de se concretizar, especialmente no continente americano, tanto pela via das exportações, quanto pela internacionalização das empresas nacionais, in casu, a Braskem. Apesar dos desafios que se apresentam, majorados pela crise financeira de 2008, essa indústria conseguiu alcançar melhores condições competitivas para seguir uma trajetória sustentada de crescimento. / Salvador

This thesis presents an examination of the importance of Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) for economic growth and examines how sensitive employment in SMEs is to business cycle fluctuations in Brazil. The thesis uses different empirical techniques to investigate the role of SMEs in the Brazilian regional economic growth, using a panel dataset from 1980 to 2004 for 508 Brazilian micro-regions. It first uses standard panel data estimators (OLS, LSDV, system and first differenced GMM) to analyse the (augmented) Solow growth model encompassing the importance of the relative size of the SME sector measured by the share of the SME employment in total formal employment and the level of human capital in SMEs measured by the average years of schooling of SME employees. The results show that the size of the SME sector is not significantly important for regional economic growth, but that human capital embodied in SMEs is more important in this process.

Few public and social policy subjects have attracted as much attention as Affirmative Action Policy (AAP) in social sciences. AAP’s main aim is to eliminate or prevent past discrimination against disadvantaged groups and to enhance their position in society. Its role has become controversial around the world. In Saudi Arabia, despite changes and improvements in laws and strategies, over past decades, to tackle the age-old issue of native unemployment, the problem is still deeply ingrained in society. This research has investigated the role, effectiveness and consequences of AAP on Saudi labour market structure. The research has employed a pragmatic methodology over three phases of analysis. The first phase has been based on an interpretive paradigm, and been conducted through semi-structured interviews with labour market experts, to identify and understand the policy. The interviews have been analysed using a thematic analysis technique. The findings of this phase contributed significantly to the understanding of AAP’s legislative nature and role. Two different historical versions of AAP (pre- and post-2011) have been identified. The earlier version (pre-2011) was found to be a non-strategic and vague policy that made no real impact on natives’ employment, while the new version (post-2011) has been positive in increasing native employment (relatively), but it has been associated with serious unintended consequences due to its stricter enforcement. The second phase has been based on a positivist paradigm, and been conducted through time-series analysis (2004-2014), to examine policy effects on labour market structure. The results have indicated that, in addition to the continuing issue of the high inward flow of expatriates, AAP has failed to either improve the distribution of job opportunities across the country, or enhance structural issues with some occupations in the private sector. The third phase has also been based on a positivist paradigm, and was carried out using a survey (sent to over 1,000 participants) examining the policy’s socio-psychological effects on employees. The findings have suggested that employees tend to perceive AAP negatively. Mainly, the results reveal a strong correlation between AAP and all types of discrimination, both individual and institutional, and such a negative perception of discrimination has direct and indirect effects on employees’ intention to leave. The main contribution of this research is to provide much desired information on the AAP’s practice and approaches, in an interesting context. The research provides vital information about old and new AAP legislations in Saudi Arabia. Two frameworks have been developed, (with one being tested), to understand the policy effects from different perspectives. Importantly, the research shows how a strict form of AAP can have side effects on the beneficiary group and destabilise the labour market.

Esse trabalho faz da indústria de combustível de aviação no Brasil, especificamente o querosene de aviação - QAV, o seu objeto de pesquisa, uma vez que a mesma, do ponto de vista da estrutura de mercado, se caracteriza pela presença de poucas empresas atuantes desde a produção do bem até a sua distribuição, possibilitando o exercício de poder de mercado, levando à perda de bem estar social e alocação ineficiente de recursos. Ademais, busca analisar o ambiente institucional e como são formados os preços desse combustível no Brasil, tanto a nível de produtor quanto a nível do distribuidor, visto que os preços nacionais do querosene de aviação ao consumidor são elevados em relação aos preços praticados no mercado internacional. Devido a isso, esse estudo visa identificar também a existência de poder de mercado no segmento de distribuição desse combustível. O que tem se verificado no período de análise desta pesquisa é o Estado intervindo na política de preços de alguns combustíveis, por exemplo a gasolina, através da Petrobras, empresa aberta de capital misto sendo o governo nacional o maior acionista, e que é líder no mercado de refino e distribuição de derivados no país, apesar da desregulamentação nacional do setor do petróleo e seus derivados iniciada na década de 1990 e finalizada em 2001. A indústria nacional de querosene de aviação tem apresentado consideráveis índices de consumo e produção no período recente, devido principalmente ao aumento na demanda pelo transporte aéreo no país na última década. Por fim, a lacuna existente na literatura sobre a indústria referida motivou a realização da pesquisa, almejando contribuir para o entendimento da estrutura de mercado e formação de preços, bem como apresentar o ambiente institucional em que tal sistema produtivo está inserido. Para tanto, são utilizadas vertentes teóricas da Organização Industrial, especificamente o paradigma Estrutura-Conduta-Desempenho (ECD), a Nova Economia das Instituições (NEI) e a NEIO (New Empirical Industrial Organization). / This paper has the Brazilian aviation fuel industry (specifically the jet fuel) as object of research since that, from the point of structural view, is characterized by the presence of few firms operating in the production and in the distribution segment, which ones may exert market power, leading to loss of social welfare and inefficient allocation of resources in the economy. Moreover, aims to analyze the institutional environment of that industry and how the jet fuel prices are formed in national market, both at the producer and distributor level, since domestic prices of aviation fuel to consumers are high in comparison to that in the international market. Because of this aspect, the study also aims to identify the existence, or not, of market power in the Brazilian jet fuel distribution segment. Currently, what has been verified during the analysis period of this research is the Union intervening in pricing policy of some fuel, e.g. gasoline, through Petrobras, a mixed capital company, being the national government the largest shareholder, leader in the refining and distribution of oil products in the Brazilian market, despite the national deregulation oil and its derivatives, which started in the 1990s and was completed in 2001. Beyond these issues, the potential of the jet fuel industry is remarkable, showing considerable rates of consumption and production in the recent period, due to an increase in the national demand by air transportation in the last decade. Finally, the gap in the literature about the Brazil\'s industry of jet fuel is a notable fact to accomplish this study witch will contribute to the structural and institutional understanding of it. Therefore, to support this paper, theoretical stands of Industrial Organization are used, specifically the paradigm Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP), the New Institutional Economics (NIE) and the New Empirical Industrial Organization (NEIO).

Os bancos nunca foram tão grandes como depois da Crise de 2008. No momento de maior pânico, logo após a quebra do Lehman Brothers, autoridades do mundo inteiro autorizaram fusões e aquisições antes vetadas. Era preciso garantir a estabilidade do sistema financeiro alegava-se e tentar preservar a concorrência nesse instante apenas aumentaria o pânico. O Brasil não ficou imune a esse movimento. Fusões como a do Itaú com o Unibanco e aquisições como a da Nossa Caixa pelo Banco do Brasil levaram o setor a um grau de concentração nunca visto antes. A discussão entre o Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica (CADE) e o Banco Central, sobre quem deve julgar tais concentrações, faz parecer que existe uma contradição entre a disciplina constitucional da defesa da concorrência e a garantia da segurança e estabilidade das instituições financeiras. O resultado é a proliferação de instituições hipertrofiadas, os megabancos, em prejuízo desses mesmos princípios da ordem concorrencial estabelecidos constitucionalmente. Os principais argumentos em favor dos megabancos seriam, primeiro, o de que as rendas derivadas de poder no mercado que estes auferem (o chamado valor de franquia) formaria um colchão que aumentaria a sua resistência no caso de choques como o de 2008. Em segundo lugar, sugere-se que esses bancos, ao crescerem, acumulariam ganhos de escala, de escopo e de eficiência custo. Este trabalho propõe que não existe nenhum antagonismo entre a defesa da concorrência e a regulação bancária tradicional, de cunho prudencial e sistêmico. Propõe ainda que o modelo dos megabancos coloca um grande risco para a sociedade, tratando-se na realidade de um movimento estratégico de grandes instituições para acumular mais poder no mercado. São dois os motivos pelos quais se defende que não existe nenhum ganho no crescimento dessas instituições. Em primeiro lugar, as economias de escala se esgotam muito cedo, proposição com amplo suporte teórico e empírico. Na previsão mais otimista, bancos com mais do que 25 bilhões de dólares em ativos já estão na área de deseconomias de escala. Tampouco existem economias de escopo que autorizem a concentração de atividades tão diversas como as de banco comercial e de investimento. Bancos que concentram muitas atividades são, na realidade, avaliados negativamente pelo mercado. Mesmo os ganhos de eficiência custo, resultantes de uma melhor gestão de instituições mal administradas, não tem suporte empírico relevante. Em segundo lugar, uma estrutura moderna do setor bancário pressupõe bancos especializados e concentrados nas áreas em que têm maior eficiência. São bancos menores, que dividem com os mercados financeiros e outros intermediários a tarefa de prover o crédito. A concorrência do mercado de capitais, de instituições não bancárias (como gestores de fundos e financeiras) e de instituições não financeiras (como redes de supermercados, correios e empresas comerciais) forçou esses bancos a fazer o descruzamento de subsídios e a abandonar as atividades em que eram menos eficientes. Os megabancos vão na contramão dessa modernização, negando os princípios da Ordem Concorrencial. A reação dessas instituições, entretanto, é contundente. Os bancos procuram o crescimento excessivo, de forma a criar as megainstituições, para colher ganhos que não vêm de uma operação mais eficiente. São ganhos provindos das inconsistências na atuação do regulador. Este trabalho propõe a extensão das doutrinas de comportamento estratégico, de forma a incluir três categorias novas de comportamentos adotados pelos megabancos: 1. Expansão Não-Eficiente de Participação no Mercado: Bancos operam muito além da escala eficiente para obter as vantagens da garantia de socorro aos grandes bancos (o too big to fail), para influenciar a regulação e aumentar lucros e, por fim, para explorar os acionistas não controladores. 2. Saturação Anticompetitiva de Mercados: Bancos acumulam produtos para além do recomendado pelos ganhos de escopo, e também agências além do que geraria ganhos de escala, para bloquear a entrada de novos concorrentes. Mostra-se neste trabalho como o excesso de agências e produtos funciona como uma barreira à entrada, o que explicaria essas expansões como um movimento preventivo. 3. Bloqueio de Modernização Pró-Competitiva: Como uma estrutura moderna do setor obriga uma redução do tamanho dos bancos e, também, uma redução da participação do setor bancário nas atividades de crédito, os bancos tentam bloquear a modernização. O bloqueio é feito através de práticas anticoncorrenciais já conhecidas, como o bloqueio ao acesso de bens essenciais (por exemplo, ao sistema de pagamentos) e as ações concertadas, entre outros. A resposta do regulador para esses comportamentos estratégicos seria a aplicação pura e simples das ferramentas do Direito Concorrencial. Este deve aplicar medidas ordenando a desconcentração de mercados e deve investigar e punir as práticas anticompetitivas. É uma atuação que difere, portanto, da regulação bancária tradicional, em que constantemente se consideram os aspectos prudenciais e sistêmicos. Isso ocorre porque, no caso desses comportamentos, o restabelecimento da livre concorrência é condição necessária e suficiente para garantir a segurança e a higidez dos mercados financeiros. Essa conclusão, aplicada ao Brasil, leva a que se deve proceder à desconcentração no setor, com a adoção de medidas compensatórias para a maioria das fusões recentemente aprovadas. Essas medidas encontram precedente significativo naquelas adotadas tanto na Europa quanto nos Estados Unidos durante a Crise de 2008. Finalmente, algumas das previsões das hipóteses desenvolvidas no trabalho são testadas empiricamente. Foi desenvolvido um modelo jurimétrico que mostra que mais competição resulta em maior estabilidade financeira. O modelo também confronta a abordagem da Nova Economia Institucional com a NeoEstruturalista, mostrando que esta última resulta em mais competição e maior estabilidade financeira. / Banks have never been as great as after the 2008 crisis. At the moment of greatest panic, just after the collapse of Lehman Brothers, authorities all around the world authorized otherwise unlawful mergers and acquisitions. It was necessary to ensure the stability of the financial system, it was claimed, and try to preserve competition right now would only increase the panic. Brazil has not been immune to this trend. Mergers such as Itaú and Unibanco and operations as the acquisition of Nossa Caixa by Bank of Brazil led the industry to a concentration degree never seen before. The discussion between the Council for Economic Defense (CADE) and the Brazilian Central Bank, about who should examine such concentrations, makes it appear that there is a contradiction between the constitutional underpinnings of antitrust policy and the ensuring of soundness and stability of financial institutions. The result is a proliferation of institutions hypertrophied, the megabanks, with unrepairable damages to the principles of competition constitutionally assured. The main arguments in favor of megabanks would be, first, that the income derived from market power they earn (franchise value) form a buffer that increases its resistance to such shocks as the 2008 Crisis. Secondly, it is suggested that banks accumulate economies of scale, scope and cost efficiency as they grow. This research proposes that there is no antagonism between antitrust law and traditiona banking regulation, more focused in prudential and systemic aspects. It also proposes the model of megabanks poses a major risk to society, since it is actually a strategic move from large institutions to accumulate more market power. There are two reasons why it is argued that there is no gain in the growth of these institutions. First, economies of scale are exhausted too early, a proposition that rests in extensive theoretical and empirical support. In the most optimistic forecast, banks with more than $ 25 billion in assets are already incurring in scale diseconomies. Nor are there economies of scope allowing the concentration of activities as diverse as commercial and investment banking. Financial institutions that concentrate many activities are actually evaluated negatively by the market. Even the cost efficiency gains resulting from better management of institutions has no relevant empirical support. Second, a modern financial system requires specialized banks, focused in areas which they have greater efficiency. They are smaller banks, which share with the financial markets and other intermediaries the task of providing credit. The competition provided by non-bank institutions (such as mutual funds and credit unions) and non-financial institutions (such as retail stores and conglomerates) forced these banks to do the unwinding of subsidies and abandon activities they were less efficient. Megabanks go against this modernization, and they are a deny of the principles of the competition order. The reaction of these institutions, however, is striking. Banks seek overgrowth in order to create megainstitutions, seizing profits that does not come from a more efficient operation. They seek gains stemmed from inconsistencies in the work of regulators. This work suggests the extension of the opportunistic behavior doctrines, in a way to include three new types of strategic behavior adopted by the megabanks: 1. Non-efficient Increase of Market Share: Banks operate far beyond efficient scale to take advantage of the implicit government guarantee of the rescuing of large banks (the too big to fail policy), to influence regulation and thus increase profits, and finally, to explore non-controlling shareholders. 2. Anticompetitive Market Crowding: Banks accumulate products beyond what is recommended in order to attain gains of scope, and also agencies in excess of what generates economies of scale, doing so to block the entry of new competitors. It is shown here how the excess branches and products acts as entry barrier, explaining these expansions as a preemptive move. 3. Blocking of Pro-Competitive Modernization: As a modern industry structure requires a reduction in the size of banks and also a reduction in the share of the banking sector in lending activities, banks try to block the modernization. This blocking is done through anticompetitive practices already known, such as denying access to essential facilities (eg, the payment system) and by adopting a collusive behavior, among others. The answer of regulators for such strategic behavior would be a pure and simple application of Competition Law remedies. They should apply measures ordering the deconcentration of markets and should investigate and punish anticompetitive practices. This approach differs from traditional banking regulation, in which constantly consideration of prudential and systemic aspects reign. This is because, in the case of these behaviors, restoring free competition is necessary and sufficient condition to ensure the safety and soundness of financial markets. This conclusion applied to Brazil, means that one must increase competition in the industry, with the adoption of compensatory measures to the most recently approved mergers. These measures have a significant precedent in the measures adopted in both Europe and the United States during the Crisis of 2008. Finally, some of the predictions of these hypotheses are tested empirically. It is developed a jurimetric model, which shows that more competition yields more financial stability. The model also confronts the New Insitutional Economics approach to the question with a neo-structuralist approach, showing that the former entails more competition and financial stability.

Venture capital finances high-risk, high-return projects. In addition to financing, venture capitalists provide advice and expertise in management, commercialization, and development that enhance the value, success, and marketability of projects. Venture capitalists also have skills in selecting projects with potentially high returns. The first chapter investigates the contracting relationship between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs in a setting where the venture capitalist and entrepreneur contribute intangible assets (advice and effort) to a project that are non-contractible and non-verifiable. In general, in the private market equilibrium, advice provided by the venture capitalist and the number of projects funded are lower than the social optimum. Government tax and investment policies may alleviate these market failures. The impact of a capital gains tax, a tax on entrepreneur’s revenue, an investment subsidy to venture capitalists, and government run project enhancing programs are evaluated. Finally, we analyze the effects of a government venture capital firm competing with private venture capital. The second chapter focuses on competition in venture capital markets. We model a three-stage game of fund raising, investment in innovative projects and input of advice and effort, where fund raising is used as an entry deterrence mechanism. We examine the impacts of taxes and subsidies on venture capital market structure. We find that a tax on venture capitalist revenue and a tax on entrepreneur revenue increase the likelihood of entry deterrence and reduce the number of projects funded in equilibrium. A subsidy on investment reduces the likelihood of entry deterrence and increases the number of projects funded. The third chapter examines the venture capitalist's choice of investment in project selection skills and investment in managerial advice. We model, separately, a private venture capitalist and a labour-sponsored venture capitalist (LSVCC) with different objectives. A LSVCC is a special type of venture capitalist fund that is sponsored by a labour union. The private venture capitalist maximizes its expected profits, while the LSVCC maximizes a weighted function of expected profits and returns to labour. Consistent with empirical evidence, the quality of projects, determined by project selection skills and managerial advice, is higher for the private venture capitalist.

The main goal of this thesis is to find out whether National football league players are, even 15 years after the birth of unrestricted free agency, still paid monopsonistic salaries or whether competition among NFL teams eliminated them. After a theoretical discussion, which will help to form expectations about the player market, models in line with the standard theory of labor compensation and with Becker's human capital theory are estimated. The part of the research following the standard theory focuses mainly on estimations of players' marginal revenue product and subsequently on comparison of their wages with their MRP. To do so, OLS regressions, as well as quantile regressions, are run. The part of the research following the human capital theory has a supporting role and is used to further confirm the previous findings. It is represented by OLS player salary estimation. The hypothesis that players under a full control of their teams are still paid salaries below their MRP cannot be rejected, thus confirming a presence of monopsonistic salaries. A significant effect of free agency status on player salaries is also found. Exclusive rights players are paid significantly lower salaries than all free agents, while restricted free agents are paid significantly lower salaries than unrestricted free agents. Superstar players are found to have salaries in excess of their MRP regardless of their free agency status.

The question of how to design efficient environmental policies has become one of the most important questions of our time, but finding the answer it is not easy. Simple models of environmental regulation do not take into account the complexity of real markets. One aspect that is sometimes ignored is the market structure of the regulated industry. This critical review of the literature shows that market structure can both influence and be influenced by environmental regulation and that determining the optimal environmental policy is complicated.