This dissertation consists of three essays in applied microeconomics.The first chapter investigates the effect of coroner partisanship on COVID-19 death reporting. The politicization of the COVID-19 pandemic in the United States has raised questions about the integrity and accuracy of death reporting, particularly in jurisdictions with elected, partisan coroners. Using mortality data from the CDC and manually collected data on county-level death certification systems and coroner party affiliation where applicable, I examine the parallel systems of appointed medical examiners and elected coroners and analyze the effect of partisanship on reported COVID-19 deaths. Cross-sectional comparisons do not seem to suggest counties with coroners report fewer deaths than those with medical examiners, and difference-in-differences specifications reveal limited evidence of a statistically significant but not economically meaningful effect of partisanship on reported COVID death counts. The second chapter examines the effect of new information on lead water pipes on housing prices. In 2016, the Water and Sewer Authority of Washington, DC released an online map that contains information on lead service lines (LSLs) for all properties in the district. Using the release as a natural experiment, I estimate the effect of the new information on prices of properties with and without LSLs. Recent literature has found that housing lead reduction policies such as remediation mandates have significant price effects. In DC, while the map’s release was followed by a marked increase in requests for water lead tests, neither a difference-in-differences model nor a repeat sales model captures a significant divergence between housing prices of the two types of properties after the release, implying the housing market response to the information was limited. The second chapter considers the effect of the marriage tax subsidy on the marriage decision of same-sex couples. The U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling on United States v. Windsor in June 2013 compelled the federal government to recognize state-sanctioned same-sex marriages, including for tax purposes. The switch in the income tax filing status for same-sex couples meant that the marriage penalty or subsidy as a result of joint filing became a relevant factor that may enter couples’ marriage decisions. I construct a sample of married and cohabiting same-sex couples in 2012 and 2014 from public-use data of the American Community Survey. Using a difference-in-differences methodology, I do not find evidence that same-sex couples who would earn a higher marriage subsidy became more likely to marry after the Supreme Court ruling.