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Measuring spouses’ ages allows us to explore larger sociological issues about marriage, such as whether narrowing gaps signal gender progress or if a rise in female-older unions reveals a status change. Using Census and American Community Survey data, I test the merits of beauty-exchange and status homogamy theories as explanations for how heterosexual marital age gaps changed over a 40-year period of social and economic revolution. Analyses address questions about how age gaps compared for people with different characteristics, whether similarly aged couples exhibited greater educational and socio-economic homogamy than others, and if the odds of being in age-heterogamous marriages changed. Chapter 4 provides the historical context of U.S. marriages from 1910 on, and shows that while disadvantaged groups retreated from marriage, the percentage of individuals with greater education and income who married remained high. Age homogamy rose over 100 years due to a decline in marriages involving much-older husbands rather than increases in wife-older unions. Results in Chapter 5 show that mean age gaps decreased significantly over time for first-married individuals by most—but not all—characteristics. Gaps narrowed for those who were White, Black, other race, or of Hispanic origin; from any age group; with zero, one, or two wage earners; with any level of education; and from most types of interracial pairs. One exception was that mean age gaps increased between Asian wives and White husbands, and Asian women’s odds of having a much older husband were higher than the odds for racially homogamous women. Those odds increased over time. Findings lent support for status homogamy theory, since same-age couples showed greater educational homogamy than others in any decade, but showed mixed support for beauty exchange. In 2010-14, the median spousal earnings gap was wider in husband-older marriages than age-homogamous ones; however, the reverse was true in 1980. Women-older first or remarriages exhibited the smallest median earnings gaps in 1980 and 2010-14, and women in these marriages contributed a greater percentage of the family income than other women in 2010-14 (43.6% vs 36.9%, respectively). The odds of being in age-heterogamous unions were significantly higher for persons who were remarried, from older age groups, from certain racial backgrounds, in some interracial marriages, less educated, and from lower SES backgrounds. Age and remarriage showed the greatest impact on odds ratios. While age homogamy increased overall, the odds of being a much older spouse (11+ years older) increased dramatically for remarried men and women between 1970 and 1980, and then remained high in 2010-14. Remarried women’s odds of being the much older wife versus a same-age spouse were 20.7 times that of the odds of first-married women in 2010-14. Other results showed that Black men’s odds of being with a much-older wife compared to one around the same age were about 2.5 times that of the odds of White men in each decade. Hispanic men’s odds of being in a first marriage with a much-older wife versus one of the same age were also twice the odds of White men in 1980 and 2010-14. Analyses demonstrated that marital age gaps have, indeed, changed significantly since the second-wave women’s movement, and that while age homogamy increased, the odds of being age heterogamous also shifted for people with different characteristics. / Sociology

One hundred twenty African-American and Euro-American married individuals were asked to complete inventories measuring marital distress, dysfunctional beliefs about marital relationships, and socioeconomic status (SES). It was hypothesized there would be a negative relationship between the dysfunctional beliefs that married individuals held and their level of marital satisfaction; there would be no significant difference between the dysfunctional beliefs that married individuals held across gender and race; and finally, the dysfunctional beliefs of married individuals would provide a better prediction of marital satisfaction than SES, gender, age, or race.Results indicate that Disagreement is destructive (D), Mindreading is expected (M), Partners cannot change (C), Sexual perfectionism is a must (S), and The sexes are dramatically different (MF) each obtained a statistically significant negative association with marital satisfaction. Examining the relationship between gender and marital satisfaction, males reported higher levels of marital satisfaction than females. Furthermore, statistically significant differences were obtained for gender but not for race when considering all five dysfunctional marital beliefs simultaneously. Finally, the various factors considered in this study accounted for 30% of the variance in marital satisfaction. / Department of Counseling Psychology and Guidance Services

This study is an attempt to analyze some of the social psychological underpinnings of the contemporary trends in postponement of marriage and possible increase in singlehood in the U. S. Recent census data, for 1970-78 specifically, and for 1960 to date generally, show marked increases in that direction among the young marriageables 18 to 34 years old. / After reviewing the available literatue, we have identified three loosely defined categories of writings that exist on the topic, namely, "psychological-ideological", "structural", and "social psychological." For reasons of parsimony, as well as in view of other theoretical considerations, we favor the social psychological analyses as a source of our hypotheses in this study. Therefore, utilizing primarily social psychological theory and research we have proposed a model relating the peer group, the family, and selected personality variables to traditionalism in individual sex role perceptions and to singlehood predispositon, and stated thirteen hypotheses which were tested from empirical data gathered for the study. / The data were gathered by the use of a questionnaire which was administered to a probability sample of some four hundred and fifty undergraduate students on the campus of a small, private, independent, midwestern university in the fall of 1976. The actual sample size used in the analysis consisted of 394 students (233 males and 161 females): some 56 questionnaires had to be rejected for various reasons such as those with incomplete responses, or those completed by married or divorced individuals, etc. / The data tended to support some of our hypotheses and indicated rejection of others thus providing only selective support for our over all model. Our central hypothesis positing a negative correlation between the degree of traditionalism in individual sex role perceptions and singlehood predisposition was supported by our data for males only even though we obtained a somewhat low correlation (Gamma = -.130). For females we found a relatively stronger positive association (Gamma = +.37). It is our interpretation that the more the females perceive traditionalism in societal sex role definitions the more they are likely to choose the singlehood alternative. / It seems that future work and career plans may be important factors in current marriage postponement among the college females studied. We found a strong association between future work and career plans and singlehood for females (Gamma = +.622). Marriage interest in general is still very high in this generation and all but a small minority intend to marry ultimately. There is also strong attitudinal support for the "liberal" view of sex rule definitions in general. / Our most significant findings were in the area of male-female differences where we frequently found correlations in the opposite directions for the two sexes. The study found the males to be a bit more likely to uphold traditional view of sex roles. Whereas personality variables (assertiveness and dependence) appeared to be unrelated to the degree of traditionalism in individual sex role perceptions and to singlehood predisposition, happiness and conflict in the family of orientation seemed to influence marriage decisions. Males from happy families and females from unhappy families of orientation were somewhat more likely to choose marriage; at the same time there is low positive correlation between family conflict and choosing marriage for males and negative correlation for females in this respect. / We find it challenging to extrapolate from our data and analysis the implication that those men who marry or those who prefer to remain single choose those states for different, even opposite, reasons from those of the females. What meaning this has for the marriages of those who do marry and for the sex role relationships of those who remain single is an intriguing question somewhat beyond the scope of our present study.

The purpose of this research is to investigate the relationship among the following variables: occupational opportunities for women, career participation, percentage married by specific age groups, and fertility. The areal units of analysis are the one-hundred largest standard metropolitan statistical areas in the United States in 1970. The independent variables are occupational opportunities for women and career participation of women, and the dependent variables are percentage married by specific age groups and fertility. The objectives are (1) to substantiate earlier findings that there is a negative relationship between occupational opportunities for women and fertility, (2) to include career participation as one dimension of occupational opportunities for women, (3) to compare the relationship and predictive ability of occupational opportunities for women and career participation in terms of the dependent variables of percentage married by specific age groups during regression analysis in order to determine its influence on fertility, and (4) to test propositions concerning the assumption that female labor-force participation does not necessarily inhibit fertility. The findings of the study indicate that there is a negative correlation between occupational opportunities for women and the percentage married by specific age groups and a negative correlation between work opportunities and fertility. Specifically, female-median income acts as a deterrent to marriage and fertility. Career participation does not compete impressively in explaining the variance of marriage or fertility.

Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis (IUPUI)

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In just over one year since United States v. Windsor— the case invalidating sections of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) that defined marriage, for purposes of federal statutes, as the “union of man and woman”— more than a dozen states have had their same-sex marriage bans ruled unconstitutional. This suggests a shift in legal meaning; previously successful arguments against same-sex “marriage” now seem irrational as argumentative ground has shifted. Since favorable rulings redefine “marriage” to include same-sex unions, this thesis analyzes Kitchen v. Herbert, a 2014 legal opinion from the United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit, to understand the rhetorical processes underpinning its redefinitional act. That analysis draws on Kenneth Burke’s theories of entitling and constitutions and discusses the rhetorical concepts of terministic screens, casuistic screens, scope and circumference as key features of the rhetoric of the legal opinions. The findings call for a balancing of deconstructive and conventional approaches to legal discourse. / Includes bibliography. / Thesis (M.A.)--Florida Atlantic University, 2015. / FAU Electronic Theses and Dissertations Collection

This study presents results from a survey of 108 African American women. Survey questions covered attitudes towards marriage, qualities of an ideal spouse, and opinions of African American men in general.

Scholarly research on the subject of the swift pace of change in support for same-sex marriage has evolved significantly over the last ten years. The shift has gone beyond the scholarship's initial description amongst demographic groups on how opinion has changed on gay rights issues, like same-sex marriage, to an examination of why the change has occurred. A great deal of the initial research on the topic seemed to focus on demographic traits that suggested a greater propensity toward support for same-sex marriage as time went on. Is the existent literature sufficient to explain why such a dramatic change in public opinion has occurred in the United States? My goal in this paper is to explore the plausibility that electoral events and the public dialogue/debate that surround them have accelerated the impact described in the four predominant theories, cohort succession, contact theory, intracohort theory, and media exposure. This paper includes three separate hypotheses to explore the possible connections between efforts to restrict gay rights at the ballot box and the ever-increasing support for same-sex marriage in public opinion polls. The results provide some preliminary indication that there are plausible connections between individual statewide efforts to restrict gay rights and increases in national public opinion support for same-sex marriage. The first analysis examines electoral events concerning gay rights in states where these issues have faced voters most frequently; California, Maine, and Oregon. The first hypotheses posits a potential connection between exposure to gay rights at the ballot box and greater support for gay rights in subsequent elections concerning gay rights in the same state. No clear or consistent pattern of support emerges for successive electoral measures concerning gay rights where voters have been previously exposed to gay rights question in an electoral context. The second analysis explores national public opinion support for same-sex marriage as statewide ballot measures increase in popularity across the United States. The second hypotheses posits a connection between an increase in statewide electoral events concerning questions of same-sex marriage and an increase in national public opinion support for same-sex marriage with state-to-nation diffusion occurring and prodding upward national public opinion support for same-sex marriage simultaneously. The hypotheses is confirmed by data that suggests as election events on same-sex marriage increase across the United States at the state level, so too increases national public opinion support for same-sex marriage. The third analysis explores the rate of change in support for legal same-sex marriage across the three states where gay rights referenda and ballot initiatives have been most frequent; it posits that in states where voters have greater familiarity with gay rights at the ballot because of previous exposure to them, their support will be greater over time than public opinion measured in other states that have similar political cultures but have not faced the same level of electoral activity on gay rights. The final hypothesis is inconclusive because of the fluid nature of the same-sex marriage debate in the universe of states within the United States. States are handling this salient issue in a number of ways; some legislatures now seem to be taking steps to legalize same-sex marriage statutorily; others may take no action to propel the provision of same-sex marriage equality or end constitutional bans on the practice; while another group of states are leaving activists to litigate the policy in Federal courts or shift the debate toward statewide popular votes on the issue of authorizing same-sex marriage at the ballot box via ballot initiative or referendum.