Thesis (Honors)--Liberty University Honors Program, 2007. / Includes bibliographical references. Also available through Liberty University's Digital Commons.

Not available / text

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 2008. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 2004. / Supervisor: Maxwell E. McCombs. Vita. Includes bibliographical references.

No description available.

Lai Wan Yee Lucia. / Thesis submitted in: April 2003. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2004. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 106-112). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / CHINESE ABSTRACT --- p.3 / ENGLISH ABSTRACT --- p.4-6 / Chapter 1 --- Introduction --- p.7-15 / Chapter 2 --- Stardom --- p.16-27 / Chapter 3 --- Prerequisite of data collection Table1-3 --- p.28-36 / Chapter 4 --- Background of Takeshi Kaneshiro --- p.37-40 / Chapter 5 --- Strategizing over the Far East stardom --- p.41-53 / Chapter 6 --- Media strategy --- p.54-92 / Chapter 1. --- Identities / Chapter 2. --- Cultural characters / Chapter 3. --- Cultural events and stories / Chapter 7 --- Conclusion and Discussion --- p.93-105 / BIBLIOGRAPHY --- p.106-112 / Books and Articles / Internet Resources

The study examines the effects of executives’ media connection on corporate policies. Extant literature in finance, economics and journalism provide inconclusive evidence in determining whether media works as watchdog to the financial market or whether media facilitates bias through manipulation of corporate news events. I introduce two competing hypotheses that may explain the research question. Information Efficiency Hypothesis predicts that media connected firms mitigate information asymmetry among its investors, enjoy better governance, and are less likely to manipulate information on corporate policy choices. Manipulation Hypothesis, in contrary, suggests that firms may strategically utilize media connections to alter the information flow that may paint a tainted picture of the firm’s prospects, thereby facilitating greater misvaluation and devising of opportunistic corporate finance policies. I test these hypotheses on a set of investment policies (mergers outcomes and innovative efficiency) and financing policies (seasoned equity offerings and share repurchases). In the first essay, I find that media connection increases merger announcement return, reduces takeover premium, increases the likelihood of deal completion, although post-merger long term performance exhibit inconclusive results. Also, media connection reduces innovative efficiency and change in innovative efficiency attributable to media connections is harmful for the firm in the long run. Overall, results are consistent with the manipulation hypothesis to some extent though further investigation is required before disregarding the information efficiency effect. In the second essay, results show that media connection increases the likelihood of an SEO event, reduces the announcement period CAR. However, analysis of post SEO long term operating and stock performance show mixed results. For repurchasing firms, media connection increases announcement returns, increases the likelihood of repurchase and the amount repurchased. Media connection also increases the likelihood that repurchase is preferred over dividends as a mode of payout. Post repurchase long term operating and stock performance, however, provide inconsistent results. In general, results are consistent with the manipulation hypothesis though information efficiency hypothesis could not be ruled out entirely. / Includes bibliography. / Dissertation (Ph.D.)--Florida Atlantic University, 2018. / FAU Electronic Theses and Dissertations Collection

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 2000. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 262-297). Also available on the Internet.

Thesis (M.S.)--West Virginia University, 2003. / Title from document title page. Document formatted into pages; contains v, 92 p. Includes abstract. Includes bibliographical references (p. 78-92).

This dissertation examines the potential for the media to act as a corporate governance mechanism and suggests how corporate leaders, through the use of symbolic action, can influence the media’s ability to effectively enact this role. Specifically, I examine how media scrutiny may prompt firms to adopt governance structures that increase the structural independence of the board and thus, according to the prevailing agency logic of corporate governance, are thought to increase the board’s ability to monitor and control corporate leaders. However, the adoption of structurally independent boards may be largely symbolic wherein formal structural changes in board independence are made without increases in the social independence of the board. I argue that symbolic responses to scrutiny will meet the media’s expectations for proper governance and engender more positive subsequent evaluations in the media of the firm and its leaders. I conclude by showing why the effects of symbolic action on media coverage are important for a range of outcomes relevant to firms and CEOs including the likelihood of strategic change, CEO dismissal and compensation, and subsequent board appointments. By influencing the manner in which they and their firms are portrayed in the media, firm leaders may enhance their reputations in the press and garner personal benefits. Thus, while agency theory focuses on the media’s ability to curb agency costs, this study points out that because of the media’s susceptibility to symbolic action, the press may actually perpetuate agency costs in some cases. Longitudinal analysis of a sample of S&P 500 firms provides some support for these ideas. / text