Thesis (Ph.D.)--York University, 2008. Graduate Programme in Social and Political Thought. / Typescript. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 349-361). Also available on the Internet. MODE OF ACCESS via web browser by entering the following URL: http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&res_dat=xri:pqdiss&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:dissertation&rft_dat=xri:pqdiss:NR38996

Habilitation - Universität Konstanz. / Includes bibliographical references and index.

Thesis (Ph. L.)--Catholic University of America, 2008. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 72-74).

Thesis (M.A.)--Dominican House of Philosophy, 1962.

Thesis (Ph. L.)--Catholic University of America, 2008. / Description based on Microfiche version record.

Thesis (M. A. in Philosophy)--Vanderbilt University, Aug. 2009. / Title from title screen. Includes bibliographical references.

This thesis concludes that our commonplace conviction that dreams are dreamt during sleep and remembered or forgotten upon waking is, at best, a speculative hypothesis open to a very reasonable scepticism. The conclusion follows from a defence of the Dispositional Analysis, that to remember or forget a dream is to retain or lose an ability acquired during sleep to tell without invention or inference a fictitious story as if of events witnessed and deeds done. According to the Dispositional Analysis everyday talk about dreams being dream during sleep stands open to contradiction by empirical evidence supporting Globot's Hypothesis that the content of our awakening narratives is explained by peculiarities in the manner of awakening. According to the Dispositional Analysis, our ordinary assumption that 'telling a dream' is an exercise of memory can only be tested within a theory enabling us to predict whilst a person is asleep what, if any, dream he would tell, if awoken in a normal manner, prompted to say what appeal's to have happened (no matter how incredible or unimaginable), and not distracted. Chapter One ("Events Witnessed and Deeds Done") argues that sober reflection on what we already know shows that, in 'telling a dream', a person usually does not remember perceptions and actions from sleep. In Chapter Two ("The Unimagined and Unimaginable") argues that the ability to tell a dream cannot be reduced to memory of thoughts and intentions directed towards images. The conclusion drawn from Part One (What Appeals To Be Remembered) is not merely that there is no general account of what beaming consist in, as if the fact that we do not remember illusory perceptions, thoughts or images shows that we do remember something else, some irreducible mental activity. The conclusion is that when we 'remember dreams' we generally remember nothing of what happened during sleep. Chapter Three ("'Actions' During Sleep") argues that the scientific study of sleepwalking, sleeptalking, night terrors, prearranged 'signalling' during sleep fail to support die hypothesis that a person remembers thoughts and intentions from sleep. Chapter Four ('"Perceptions During Sleep"), it is argued that neither evidence of physiological activity peripheral to the central nervous system (e.g. eye movements, muscular twitches, penes erections, etc.) interpreted as 'covert behaviour' during sleep, nor evidence of neurological activity of the forebrain interpreted as critical responses to internally generated 'stimuli' supports the Received Opinion that dreams are episodes remembered from sleep. Part Two ("Scientific Studies of Sleep and Dreaming"), concludes that experimental sleep research is consistent with the conclusion that a person telling a dream is typically not remembering mental acts, events, states or processes from sleep. Part Three ("The Dispositional Analysis") questions the implications of the conclusion that the Received Opinion is false. Chapter Five ("Dreaming Without Experience") argues that our conviction that dreams are dreamt or 'occur' during sleep is an empirical hypothesis which survives the falsification of die Received Opinion. The conclusion drawn here departs both from that of Malcolm's (1959) argument that the concept of dreaming is not a theoretical concept and from that of Squires' (1973) argument that dreaming is a bad theoretical concept. Chapter Six, argues that assumptions about the causal explanation of telling a dream whilst central to our talk about dreams being dreamt or occurring during sleep cannot not explain our commonplace conviction that dreams are remembered from sleep. In particular, it is argued against Dennett (1976) that a causal-cum-representational analysis of remembering dreams does not escape the need to distinguish between the everyday notion of memory appropriate to retaining an ability to tell a dream and a technical notion of storage in short-term 'memory'. The Conclusion ("A Truth of Underwhelming Importance?") reflects upon the gap forced by the thesis between the unreasoning confidence of our awakening conviction that dreams are remembered from sleep and the speculative justification accorded to it by the Dispositional Analysis. It recommends an uneasy resignation to die conclusion that our undoubting faith that something is remembered reduces to nothing more substantial than the hypothesis that 'telling a dream' is the exercise of an unconsciously acquired and retained disposition to awake with a merely apparent memory of episodes occurring during sleep.

This research paper places the three Research Projects 2 DIVINE, CARNIVAL, and HER STORIES: THE WENTWORTH WOMEN against the background of memory, remaking history, play, as well as hermeneutics. It is argued that the understanding of a work of art involves participation in its meaning by the audience which is not so much a mere receiver of information as a catalyst of the work's content. This Research Paper also attempts to place the three Research Projects, which when combined are entitled REMEMORIES/IMAGETEXTS, into a feminist remaking of history (in Barbara Kruger's sense), realigning the male-oriented histories with a female presence. Questioning the 'historical document' as the authority on history, and giving alternative versions of the life of Jeanne d'Arc and the life of Sarah Cox Wentworth are some of the concerns in the Research Projects. How these three Research Projects came to be linked is that each was originally exhibited during 1995 for the Twentieth Anniversary of International Women's Year, in venues from Penrith to Paddington. Their making spans many years, and in essence comes down to a fascination with the portrayal of women throughout history.That our images of women originally derived from how women were portrayed in carnival is one of the emerging themes, and that there are a number of different memories of specific events, depending on who is remembering them, and what their (hidden) agenda entails. In moving between time zones, questioning the portrayal of 'woman as sign', and subverting the traditional sign of woman, the artist puts forward the argument that women are the producers of signs and thus not merely objects as represented by signs / Master of Arts (Hons)(Visual Arts)

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Oregon, 2006. / Typescript. Includes vita and abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 169-176). Also available for download via the World Wide Web; free to University of Oregon users.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Notre Dame, 2006. / Thesis directed by Michael DePaul and Alvin Plantinga for the Department of Philosophy. "April 2006." Includes bibliographical references (leaves 238-244).