Thesis (Ph. D.)--UCLA, 2008. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 91-106).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Michigan, 1915. / Bibliography: p. 69.

No description available.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Oregon, 2005. / Typescript. Includes vita and abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 95-104). Also available for download via the World Wide Web; free to University of Oregon users.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Wollongong, 2003. / Typescript. Bibliographical references: leaf 285-306.

Issued also as Thesis (Ph. D.)--Columbia University. / Bibliography: p. 56.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Catholic University of America, 1940. / Bibliography: p. 42-43.

Following exposure to consistent stimulus–stop mappings, response inhibition can become automatised with practice. What is learned is less clear, even though this has important theoretical and practical implications. The main contribution of this thesis is to investigate how stimulus-stop associations are acquired and the conditions under which they influence behaviour. To this end, this thesis addressed several outstanding issues concerning the associative architecture of stop learning, the role of expectancies, and the specificity of learning in inhibition tasks. Experiments 1-4 provide evidence that participants can acquire direct associations between specific stimuli and the stop goal without mediation via a single representation of the stop signal. However, these experiments also suggest that the influence of stimulus-stop associations on behaviour depends on top-down attentional settings: if participants begin to ignore the stop-associated stimuli, the effects of stop learning are diminished or eliminated entirely. Across eight experiments, this thesis provides evidence that participants generate expectancies during stop learning that are consistent with the stimulus-stop contingencies in play. However, Experiments 5-6 indicate that there may be some differences in the relationships between stimulus-stop expectancies and task performance under instructed and uninstructed conditions; stimulus-stop associations that are acquired via task instructions or via task practice have similar effects on behaviour, but seem to differ in how they trigger response slowing for the stop-associated items. Experiments 7-8 investigated the role of signal detection processes during the acquisition of stimulus-stop associations. To distinguish between stimulus-stop learning and stimulus-signal learning, the contingencies between specific stimuli and the stop goal and the contingencies between specific stimuli and the spatial location of the stop signal were independently manipulated. Although these experiments showed evidence of stop/go (goal) learning, there was no evidence that participants acquired the stimulus-signal associations. Across four experiments, this thesis investigated the specificity of stop learning. Experiments 9-10 compared the effects of training on behavioural performance in inhibition (go/no-go) and non-inhibition (two-choice) tasks. The results of these experiments revealed that learning in inhibition and non-inhibition tasks could arise through similar associative mechanisms, but suggest that the effects of training in these tasks could also depend on top-down response settings and general non-associative processes. Experiments 11-12 investigated the neural specificity of stop learning. These experiments also revealed similar effects of training across the go/no-go and two-choice tasks adding weight to the claim that training in inhibition tasks primarily influences task-general processes. Combined, the overall conclusion of this thesis is that bottom-up control can influence response inhibition but what is learned depends on top-down factors. It is therefore important to consider bottom-up factors and top-down factors as dependent, rather than independent, influences on response inhibition.

Age can affect memory performance. This statement is so often heard that it has become almost a truism. When research surrounding memory inhibition – the ability to ignore irrelevant material to aid in the retrieval of a target memory – is examined specifically, a more mixed picture of findings emerges. Whilst some previous work has found evidence of an age-related deficit, other research has rather found intact memory inhibition in older adults. Less often discussed, too, are the effects of individual differences on memory inhibition in addition to age, including differences in metacognitive strategy, working memory capacity, stress and mood. The present thesis set out primarily to investigate the effects of age on memory inhibition chiefly using cognitive experimental paradigms, and also to investigate potential individual differences in this ability which exist across the lifespan. The findings of the present thesis showed that age alone was not related to a deficit in memory inhibition, - young and older adults rather showed equivalent levels of inhibitory forgetting on two different paradigms, when methodological measures were put in place to control for alternative, interference-based explanations (Study 1). These findings also could not be explained by differences in metacognitive, covert-cuing strategies (Study 2). Instead, age-related inhibitory deficits were qualified by differences in working memory capacity (Study 3a & b). In combination, older age and low working memory capacity were related to impaired memory inhibition, whereas young age or high working memory capacity were not. Finally, natural variations in stress and mood over time were found to be related to significant differences in working memory capacity, but not memory inhibition (Study 4). This suggests that these important cognitive abilities may be capable of changing even over relatively short time periods, and thus they may also potentially be improved, - a proposal which is considered in the General Discussion.

The overall objective of this thesis was to test the Default Interventionist (DI) account of belief-bias in human reasoning using the novel methodology introduced by Handley, Newstead & Trippas (2011). DI accounts focus on how our prior beliefs are the intuitive output that bias our reasoning process (Evans, 2006), whilst judgments based on logical validity require effortful processing. However, recent research has suggested that reasoning on the basis of beliefs may not be as fast and automatic as previous accounts claim. In order to investigate whether belief based judgments are resource demanding we instructed participants to reason on the basis of both the validity and believability of a conclusion whilst simultaneously engaging in a secondary task (Experiment 1 - 5). We used both a within and between subjects design (Experiment 5) examining both simple and complex arguments (Experiment 4 – 9). We also analysed the effect of incorporating additional instructional conditions (Experiment 7 – 9) and tested the relationships between various individual differences (ID) measures under belief and logic instruction (Experiment 4, 5, 7, 8, & 9). In line with Handley et al.’s findings we found that belief based judgments were more prone to error and that the logical structure of a problem interfered with judging the believability of its conclusion, contrary to the DI account of reasoning. However, logical outputs sometimes took longer to complete and were more affected by random number generation (RNG) (Experiment 5). To reconcile these findings we examined the role of Working Memory (WM) and Inhibition in Experiments 7 – 9 and found, contrary to Experiment 5, belief judgments were more demanding of executive resources and correlated with ID measures of WM and inhibition. Given that belief based judgments resulted in more errors and were more impacted on by the validity of an argument the behavioural data does not fit with the DI account of reasoning. Consequently, we propose that there are two routes to a logical solution and present an alternative Parallel Competitive model to explain the data. We conjecture that when instructed to reason on the basis of belief an automatic logical output completes and provides the reasoner with an intuitive logical cue which requires inhibiting in order for the belief based response to be generated. This creates a Type 1/Type 2 conflict, explaining the impact of logic on belief based judgments. When explicitly instructed to reason logically, it takes deliberate Type 2 processing to arrive at the logical solution. The engagement in Type 2 processing in order to produce an explicit logical output is impacted on by demanding secondary tasks (RNG) and any task that interferes with the integration of premise information (Experiments 8 and 9) leading to increased latencies. However the relatively simple nature of the problems means that accuracy is less affected. We conclude that the type of instructions provided along with the complexity of the problem and the inhibitory demands of the task all play key roles in determining the difficulty and time course of logical and belief based responses.