No / Past research tells us that individuals can infer information about a target’s emotional state and intentions from their facial expressions (Frith & Frith, 2012), a process known as mentalising. This extends to inferring the events that caused the facial reaction (e.g. Pillai, Sheppard, & Mitchell, 2012; Pillai et al., 2014), an ability known as retrodictive mindreading. Here, we enter new territory by investigating whether or not people (perceivers) can guess a target’s social context by observing their response to stimuli. In Experiment 1, perceivers viewed targets’ responses and were able to determine whether these targets were alone or observed by another person. In Experiment 2, another group of perceivers, without any knowledge of the social context or what the targets were watching, judged whether targets were hiding or exaggerating their facial expressions; and their judgments discriminated between conditions in which targets were observed and alone. Experiment 3 established that another group of perceivers’ judgments of social context were associated with estimations of target expressivity to some degree. In Experiments 1 and 2, the eye movements of perceivers also varied between conditions in which targets were observed and alone. Perceivers were thus able to infer a target’s social context from their visible response. The results demonstrate an ability to use other minds as a window onto a social context that could not be seen directly.

Yes / Mentalizing (otherwise known as ‘theory of mind’) involves a special process that is adapted for predicting and explaining the behaviour of others (targets) based on inferences about targets’ beliefs and character. This research investigated how well participants made inferences about an especially apposite aspect of character, empathy. Participants were invited to make inferences of self‐rated empathy after watching or listening to an unfamiliar target for a few seconds telling a scripted joke (or answering questions about him/herself or reading aloud a paragraph of promotional material). Across three studies, participants were good at identifying targets with low and high self‐rated empathy but not good at identifying those who are average. Such inferences, especially of high self‐rated empathy, seemed to be based mainly on clues in the target's behaviour, presented either in a video, a still photograph or in an audio track. However, participants were not as effective in guessing which targets had low or average self‐rated empathy from a still photograph showing a neutral pose or from an audio track. We conclude with discussion of the scope and the adaptive value of this inferential ability.

Mentalising is an "imaginative mental activity that enables us to perceive and interpret human behaviour in terms of internal mental states (e.g. needs, desires, feelings, beliefs, goals, purposes and reasons)" (Bateman & Fonagy, 2012; page 4). While this has been studied within an adult population, there has been a lack of research in understanding this construct in adolescence and its associations with mental health. This thesis aimed to systematically review the literature to establish if there was an association between mentalising difficulties and mental health disorders in adolescence. It further aimed to empirically investigate using a questionnaire-based study with adolescents, the constructs of mentalising and their associations with mental wellbeing. The review found a negative association, indicating that low mentalising skills were a risk factor for mental health difficulties. However, there was a lack of research in this area and methodological and conceptual concerns about the measurement of mentalising. The empirical study found that the theoretical model of mentalising did not fit for adolescents. This was discussed in relation to the need for further adolescent specific research to understand this developing construct. In addition, a refined model that was hypothesised to be 'self-awareness' was suggested that was found to predict the mental wellbeing outcomes, indicating a potential risk factor for mental health difficulties in adolescence.

Theory of Mind (ToM) is often defined as “the ability to reason about mental states, such as beliefs, desires, and intentions, and to understand how mental states feature in everyday explanations and predictions of people’s behavior” (Apperly, 2012, p. 825). Recent research has introduced questions about performance on ToM tasks in emerging adulthood, a developmental period (ages 18-27) where exploration and identity formation occurs. The current study examined group differences between college students with acting experience, a population hypothesized to excel in ToM and empathy, and students without acting experience on cognitive and affective measures of ToM and empathy. The current study (N=162) used multiple tasks to measure ToM the Reading the Mind in the Eyes task (RME), Movie for the Assessment of Social Cognition (MASC), Faux Pas task (detection and belief subscales). All four subscales (perspective taking, fantasizing, empathic concern, personal distress) of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI) was used to measure empathy. It was hypothesized that students with acting experience would perform significantly better than those without acting experience on all measures of ToM and empathy. It was also hypothesized that the way emerging adults process identity relevant information, as assessed by the Identity Style Inventory (ISI), would be related to ToM and empathy. Students with acting experience performed significantly better on the RME task and the belief subscale of the Faux Pas task. Better performance on the RME task and the belief subscale of the Faux pas task suggest advantages in emotion processing and belief reasoning for students with acting experience. No group differences were observed on the IRI. Informational processing style was positively related to all measures of ToM and all empathy measures except the personal distress subscale of the IRI. Normative and diffuse-avoidant identity processing style was negatively related to all measures of ToM and the personal distress subscale of the IRI. Normative identity processing style was negatively related to the fantasizing subscale of the IRI. The current study supports a relationship between identity processing style in emerging adulthood and measures of ToM and empathy. A factor analysis was conducted to examine relationships between ToM and empathy, finding no distinctions between affective and cognitive dimensions but a clear difference between ToM and empathy. Students with acting experience performed significantly better on the ToM factor but no other factors, supporting the previous analyses. Implications for further research, therapeutic interventions, and occupational training integrating acting experience are discussed.

Yes / It has been proposed that mentalising involves retrodicting as well as predicting behaviour, by inferring previous mental states of a target. This study investigated whether retrodiction is impaired in individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASD). Participants watched videos of real people reacting to the researcher behaving in one of four possible ways. Their task was to decide which of these four “scenarios” each person responded to. Participants’ eye movements were recorded. Participants with ASD were poorer than comparison participants at identifying the scenario to which people in the videos were responding. There were no group differences in time spent looking at the eyes or mouth. The findings imply those with ASD are impaired in using mentalising skills for retrodiction.

Yes / To understand the executive demands of the false-belief (FB) task relative to an alternative theory-of-mind (or mechanical causality) task, picture sequencing, the present study used path analyses. One hundred and sixty-six children between 3 and 6 years old completed the FB and picture-sequencing tasks, three executive function tasks (updating, inhibition, and shifting), and the receptive language test. The model with the best fit indicated that FB performance had a direct contribution from shifting of attention and inhibitory control, which was independent of the significant contribution made by picture sequencing. This model indicates that FB inference requires more executive processing than picture sequencing, which is used as an alternative task to measure theory of mind. Statement of contribution What is already known on this subject? The majority of researchers use the false-belief task to assess mentalizing ability in young children. Sources of information used in various different mentalizing tasks require different levels of cognitive demand. Many executive functions (EFs) are involved in children's judgements of false belief. What does this study add? A statistical model was created to compare processing requirements of false-belief and picture-sequencing tasks. The model supported the claim that the false-belief task involves considerably more than just mentalizing. Shifting the focus of attention was an EF that was found to be a key component of performance in the false-belief task. / Japanese Society for the Promotion of Science: KAKENHI Grant No. 16K04327.

Yes / Posed facial expressions of actors have often been used as stimuli to induce mental state inferences, in order to investigate 'Theory of Mind' processes. However, such stimuli make it difficult to determine whether perceivers are using a basic or more elaborated mentalizing strategy. The current study used as stimuli covert recordings of target individuals who viewed various emotional expressions, which caused them to spontaneously mimic these expressions. Perceivers subsequently judged these subtle emotional expressions of the targets: in one condition ('classification') participants were instructed to classify the target's expression (i.e. match it to a sample) and in another condition ('retrodicting') participants were instructed to retrodict (i.e. infer which emotional expression the target was viewing). When instructed to classify, participants showed more prevalent activations in event-related brain potentials (ERPs) at earlier and mid-latency ERP components N170, P200 and P300-600. By contrast, when instructed to retrodict participants showed enhanced late frontal and fronto-temporal ERPs (N800-1000), with more sustained activity over the right than the left hemisphere. These findings reveal different cortical processes involved when retrodicting about a facial expression compared to merely classifying it, despite comparable performance on the behavioral task. / Experimental Psychology Society (EPS) Study Visit Grant; Young Researcher Support Grant DRM/2014-02; Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (SCHN 1481/2-1); Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (FOR 1097)

Language is arguably one of the most salient features that distinguish humans from other animal species. However, despite the existence of a large body of relevant theoretical and empirical research, there is currently no consensus as to why language emerged exclusively in the human species or how it evolved its unique communicative structure. In this thesis, I therefore take a multi-pronged approach to analysing and testing several different hypotheses for the biological function and evolution of language. In Chapter I, I review the evidence and theoretical arguments for each of these proposals and provide, in place, a synthetic perspective which integrates or eliminates each of these ostensibly competing hypotheses for the biological function of language. In Chapter II, I employ the first experimental test of the interdependence hypothesis: the unique proposal offered to explain the emergence and potential coevolution of language and cooperation in the human species. In pursuit of this experiment, I employed a cooperative social foraging task using small and large groups to determine what factors enable individuals to make sense of information from others and converge upon a group consensus. In Chapter III, I take an experimental approach to determine whether aspects of human language can be characterised in terms of honest signalling theory. In this respect, I test several different proposals predicted by the sexual selection and deception hypotheses for human language function. In Chapter IV, I divert attention away from biological function to focus more closely on language structure. More specifically, I take an experimental approach to the problem of how and indeed whether recursive syntax evolved to be a consistent feature of human language. In pursuit of this experiment, I utilized the Imposing Memory Task (IMT) and a recursive syntax measure, to determine relative performance on each of these cognitive tasks, thereby testing whether recursive syntax may have evolved in tandem with higher-order intentionality (also known as embedded mindreading). Finally, in Chapter V, I discuss the results and implications of these experiments, and possible suggestions for future studies.