<p>Bertrand Russell is one of the grandmasters of 20^th Century Analytic Philosophy. It is surprising, then, that his work fell out of fashion later in his career. As a result, very little has been discussed concerning Russell’s work from the period of 1927 – 59. This thesis provides an analysis of Russell’s philosophical work from this era. Our attention here is on Russell’s theory of perception and the underlying metaphysical structure that is developed as a result of his scientific outlook. Russell’s philosophy during this time focused almost exclusively on perception, knowledge, and the epistemic relationship humans have with the world according to science. It is these topics that are engaged with and explicated. We discover that, due to Russell's outright acceptance of that conclusion found in physics, metaphysically he defends a four-dimensional neutral monist event ontology; perceptually he defends a causal theory where one's perceptions must be understood as only being of one's brain; and epistemically he is a fallibilist, wherein justification can be found in a coherent set of beliefs founded on intrinsically credible individual propositions, but knowledge itself is ultimately a vexed and imprecise concept.</p> / Master of Arts (MA)

Metaontological discourse, inquiring into the nature, methodology, and aims of ontology, has functioned as the war ground for those skeptical of ontological projects against those who believe that ontological inquiry is substantive (i.e., meaningful, important, worth pursuing). I call the inquiry which engages in determining criteria to distinguish substantive from nonsubstantive inquiry/discourse: “the metaphysics of discourse”. In this project, I identify three frameworks in the metaphysics of discourse: Easy Ontology, The “Merely Verbal” Framework, and Metaphysical Structuralism. My primary concern is to show that these discourse frameworks or dismissive strategies all fail to provide sufficient criteria to properly delineate substantive from non-substantive inquiry. My approach is to accept a dismissive strategy, apply it to disputes in the metaphysics of race and gender, and run through its consequences. Each framework, when applied to disputes in the metaphysics of race and gender, incorrectly renders the disputes non-substantive. These implications are unacceptable, because the disputes in metaphysics of race and gender are prima facie substantive disputes. We find that each application of a dismissive strategy provides us the basis for developing a web of problematic assumptions running throughout the metaphysics of discourse. Namely: 1) that the metaphysics of discourse itself can be robustly normatively neutral, 2) that discovering linguistic defects in an inquiry (often about “the meaning” or “the right meaning” of terms) is sufficient to conclude that an inquiry is non-substantive and that 3) we determine a better candidate for theory choice in substantive inquiry by determining which candidate is more objectively accurate (in a vague sense). I will conclude that these assumptions lead to an oppressive metaphysics of discourse, then I briefly suggest a feminist, pragmatist, and democratic-objective basis for a new one.

Wright's 'Truth and Objectivity' seeks to systematise a variety of anti-realist positions. I argue that many objections to the system are avoided by transposing its talk of truth into talk of warrant. However, a problem remains about debates involving 'direction-of-fit'. Dummett introduced 'anti-realism’ as a philosophical view informed by mathematical intuitionism. Subsequently, the term has been associated with many debates, ancient and modern. 'Truth and Objectivity' proposes that truth admits of different characteristics; these various debates then concern which characteristics truth has, in a given area. This pluralism of truth is at odds with deflationism. I find fault with Wright's argument against deflationism. However, transmission of warrant across the Disquotational Schema suffices to ground Wright's proposal, which survives as a pluralism of classes of warrant. The two main debates concern whether truths are always knowable (Epistemic Constraint) and whether disagreements in an area must be down to some fault of one of those involved (Cognitive Command). I introduce Assertoric Constraint, relating to Epistemic Constraint, where truths cannot outstrip the availability of warrant for their assertion. I solve a structural problem by a comparison with a constitutive analysis of Moore's Paradox. The relativism of blameless disagreement is problematic. Wright's response invokes a sort of ignorance which he calls 'Quandary'. I criticise this before proposing an alternative. I agree with Wright that Dummett's original anti-realism does not belong among the positions which Wright seeks to systematise. However, two candidates show that the proposal suffers a weakness. Wright thinks Expressivism misguided, and implicitly rules out his earlier non-cognitivism about necessity. I argue that Expressivism has promise, and I endorse Wright’s Cautious Man argument for non-cognitivism about necessity; both involve play with 'direction-of-fit'. I conclude that this sort of anti-realist debate needs to be accommodated by the proposal.

No description available.

No description available.

Thesis advisor: Ronald Tacelli / Thesis advisor: Micah Lott / Physicalism has a problem: experience must derive from wholly physical things, but how can physical matter produce experience? An answer to this question may require a drastic change in the physicalist paradigm. Some propose Panpsychism as the best available response. Panpsychism contends that all physical matter has mental properties. To many such a notion is a sheer absurdity. Two mainstream responses may be more tolerable: Reductionism and Emergentism. Panpsychism is defensible only if these alternate approaches fail. This project lays out the logic of the panpsychist arguments against reductionism and emergentism, as well as stating an overall case for physicalist panpsychism. The apparent absurdity of panpsychism will be found trivial in comparison with the remaining difficulties for more traditional physicalist approaches. Panpsychism should therefore be considered a viable option on the mind-body problem. Despite outstanding difficulties with the view, it has considerable theoretical value and cannot be merely considered an absurd position. / Thesis (BA) — Boston College, 2015. / Submitted to: Boston College. College of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Arts and Sciences Honors Program. / Discipline: Philosophy.

黎國強. / 論文(碩士)--香港中文大學, 1977. / 附參考書目 / Li Guoqiang. / Includes bibliographical references. / Chapter 第一章 --- 導言 --- p.1 / Chapter 第二章 --- 希臘哲學與實體問題 --- p.8 / Chapter （一） --- 什麼是世界質料？──米里塔斯學派與世界質料 --- p.16 / Chapter 1 --- 泰利斯（thales）的學說　 --- p.16 / Chapter 2 --- 阿克納西曼德（Anaximander）的學說 --- p.18 / Chapter 3 --- 阿克納西米尼斯（Anaximenes）的學說 --- p.19 / Chapter 4 --- 赫拉克里斯特（Heraclitus）的學說 --- p.22 / Chapter （二） --- 什麼是實有？──伊利西學派與存有的概念 --- p.24 / Chapter 1 --- 巴曼尼得斯（Parmenides）的學說 --- p.25 / Chapter （三） --- 什麼是世界和人生的第一原則？──柏拉圖和亞里士多德的系統哲學 --- p.30 / Chapter 1 --- 柏拉圖的理型學說　 --- p.34 / Chapter 2 --- 亞里士多德的四因說和他對實體的意義之反省 --- p.40 / Chapter 第三章 --- 中古哲學與實體問題 --- p.47 / 「實體怎樣才能被證明出來？」 / 「聖經中的上帝，作為實體（宇宙和人生的最後實有），怎樣能被證明出來？」 / Chapter 第四章 --- 理性主義哲學與實體問題 --- p.57 / Chapter 1 --- 笛卡兒（Descartes）的心物二元論　 --- p.57 / Chapter 2 --- 斯賓諾莎（Spinoza）的「一本體實」──實體=自然=上帝 --- p.69 / Chapter 3 --- 萊布尼茲（Leibniz）的「萬殊實體」──單子 --- p.75 / Chapter 第五章 --- 經驗主義哲學與實體問題　 --- p.80 / Chapter 1 --- 洛克（Locke）與外界實體　 --- p.82 / Chapter 2 --- 巴克萊（Barclays）與精神實體 --- p.83 / Chapter 3 --- 休謨（Hume）否定一切知覺能力之外的實體　 --- p.100 / Chapter 第六章 --- 實體問題由希臘哲學發展到經驗主義哲學的小結 --- p.104 / Chapter 第七章 --- 康德的「純粹理性批判」的中心問題´ؤ´ؤ實體問題 --- p.117 / 「對實體（本體）的知識是否可能？ / Chapter 第八章 --- 康德處理「實體（本體）知識是否可能的進程一：知識範圍的決定 --- p.138 / Chapter A --- 知識成素的孤立分析´ؤ´ؤ感性與理解的超馭成素的分析 --- p.141 / Chapter B --- 知識成素實際運行的情況´ؤ´ؤ感性與理解的超馭成素統一運行建構對象性 --- p.150 / Chapter 第九章 --- 康德處理「實體（本體）知識是否可能的進程二：知識範圍外的「本體觀念」的根源問題 --- p.165 / Chapter （一） --- 「純粹理性批判」的序言與「理性之幻相」的概念 --- p.165 / Chapter （二） --- 純粹理性的原則與本體觀念的根源　 --- p.172 / Chapter （三） --- 「純粹理性的概念」或「超馭觀念」 --- p.193 / Chapter （四） --- 「純粹理性的超馭觀念」的系統 --- p.212 / Chapter 第十章 --- 康德的「純粹理性之超馭哲學」與「新形之學」或「新存有論」 --- p.223 / Chapter 第十一章 --- 全文總結 --- p.262 / 注釋 / 參考書目

This thesis is an exploration of several themes in the work of Aristotle and Hegel concerning the nature of action and ethics, and discusses the issues raised in relation to modern moral philosophy. The thesis takes as its starting point both Aristotle's and Hegel's conception of rational, purposive human action as being central to ethics and morality. This is carried out in contrast to influential trends in modern moral philosophy regarding the nature of reason and desire. Part one considers Hegel's view of the task of philosophy, i. e. the assimilation and reflection of the particular subject matter of which it speaks, rather than abstract theoretical thinking. The discussion will highlight that many of the problems raised in the rationalist/empiricist debates of the 17th and 18th Centuries are due to the abstract nature of those discussions, and to attempts to assimilate the subject matter to primary assumptions about reason, experience and the individual. In particular, the metaphysics of mind and the epistemology that the debate involved, it will be claimed, draws a hard and fast distinction between reason and desire. This has led to abstract theories of reasoning and motivation. One particular consequence of abstract, theoretical thinking is that the conceptual language of debate becomes divorced from the subject matter under discussion. In particular, the cluster of concepts that form the basis of the philosophy of mind, action, ethics - reason, desire, motive, intention, purpose, etc. - become refined and specialised to a degree that they come to bear only a vague resemblance to the reasons, etc. that are features of actual (as opposed to theoretical) human conduct. In Part Two of the thesis, I will offer a contrasting perspective, discussing Aristotle's and Hegel's treatment of these concepts without the theoretical framework inherited from 17th and 18th Century metaphysics and epistemology.

Abstract not available

Technological mediation| The implications of technology on the human experience