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Throughout much of the twentieth century, early modern metaphysical literature has been interpreted as an upholder of traditional morals and cosmic unity. By re-examining the early critical reception of these works in connection with current theories of cultural reproduction, we can develop a new understanding of how metaphysicality undermines, in particular, an ideology of "natural" desire and identity. Focussing on desire, metaphysical authors produce a dissident knowledge of the cultural contingencies of normative thought, identity, and behaviour. Taking a philosophical approach to the subject, Edward Herbert reveals the impact of personal desires on the development of mental concepts. Christopher Marlowe, meanwhile, demonstrates the way definitions of natural gender identity inhibit sexual expression between men. Elaborating on women's same-sex desire, John Donne and Andrew Marvell contest heteronormative narratives of growth, while Aemilia Lanyer offers a vision of love between women as a homoerotic state of grace and alternative to men's violence. In his thoughts on martyrdom and political allegiance, Donne denaturalizes absolute authority and carves a space for liberty of conscience, an endeavour that corresponds to the desire for personal freedom that each of the other writers also expresses.

The aim of my dissertation is to show that Plato’s metaphysics in the Laws (Chapter 1) commits him to particular accounts of virtues (Chapter 2) and political leadership (Chapter 3).In the first chapter, I show that Laws X contains a metaphysical-cosmological theory that is directly relevant to Plato’s discussion of virtue. With this proposal, I reject the assumption that Plato’s Laws does not contain any extended discussion of metaphysics. I develop this argument by attending to a puzzling passage that, I think, has not received the attention it deserves: in X 896d-e Plato seems to talk of a good and a bad cosmic soul. Given his theological-cosmological commitments, it seems inconceivable that he takes there to be a bad cosmic soul. This passage, I argue, makes sense once we attend to the immediately preceding text. This text contains a comprehensive metaphysical account of movement in the universe. Plato presents ten kinds of movement, among them “Other Movement” and “Self/Other Movement.” Only the Self/Other Movement of the cosmic soul is independent and good. This account enables us to make sense of the passage that mentions a bad cosmic soul: Plato entertains the hypothesis that there is such a soul, because he must explain where bad things in the universe come from. But the hypothesis that they come from a bad cosmic soul is immediately dismissed. Instead, the bad in the world is generated by those kinds of movements that are “lesser” as compared to the Self/Other Movement of the cosmic soul. This includes human movement. Human beings are Dependent Self-Movers: they participate both in bodily movement (Other Movement) and in psychic movement (Self/Other Movement). Since bodily movement is dependent, human beings cannot be inherently good. This status limits humans and makes them passive, weak, and inherently vulnerable to corruption. In the second chapter of my dissertation, I turn to the intriguing notion of demotic virtues. According to Plato, attainable virtues are “demotic,” literally, “people-like.” So far, there is not much scholarship on this notion, as Plato construes it in the Laws. Insofar as there is work on demotic virtue in Plato, it tends to address passages from across the corpus. Contrary to this approach, I argue that the very framework of the Laws draws attention to the way in which human nature frames our ability to become virtuous. In the Laws, demotic virtues are the virtues of human beings. On this reading, “demotic” speaks to the ethical implications of a dependent nature. Human beings cannot attain perfect virtue. Only divine beings are perfect models of virtue; they are also perfect models of political organization, psychic states, as well as poetic and governance skills in the Laws. Demotic virtues, on the other hand, are a humanly-accessible type of virtue that does not require precise knowledge, and that everyone can possess. Given their ethical limitations, the “first-best” political system (i.e. the one achieved solely through reason) is out of human reach. But mortals have access to a second-best tool to achieve a second-best order: laws. Laws are expressions of νοῦς tailored to human needs, and are meant to make humans as godlike as possible. In the third chapter, I argue that none of Magnesia’s magistrates possesses perfect virtue. Plato first introduces demotic virtues when he discusses the city’s rulers. Why should “people-like” virtues figure in the discussion of those who are presumably best? I believe that this puzzle is instructive; its solution reveals an important aspect of the Laws’ theory of virtue. The rulers have two features (XII 965a-968a): they have cosmological knowledge about soul and universe, and they have demotic virtues. Rather than assume that both of these traits differentiate them from the non-rulers, I argue that only the first trait, their knowledge, marks them out. Rulers have knowledge that others lack, but they cannot attain a different type of virtue based on that. Through an examination of Magnesia’s offices, I show that even the highest-standing officials must make an ongoing effort to sustain virtues. An analogous consideration applies to the laws. Laws can attain a high level of goodness, but they inherit the temporal and imperfect nature of their human creators. Over time, and viewed in the light of experience, laws require amendments and corrections. Eventually, Magnesia’s officials will declare them stable, but not because they attain inherent stability. Rather, the laws should be perceived as stable, and hence the process of amendments shall be called to a halt. My account of the magistrates’ demotic virtues explains why Magnesia depends on an intricate system of examination and testing. Plato scholars tend to be fairly silent on these policies of testing. I argue, however, that Plato makes a proposal we can appreciate: rather than defend the superior standing of rulers, he argues for political accountability. This need to hold leaders accountable is the political manifestation of the type of virtue human beings can attain, one that is “people-like” rather than “divine-like.”

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沈婷. / "2003年8月". / 論文(哲學碩士)--香港中文大學, 2003. / 參考文獻(leaves 165-172). / 附中英文摘要. / "2003 nian 8 yue". / Shen Ting. / Lun wen (zhe xue shuo shi)--Xianggang Zhong wen da xue, 2003. / Can kao wen xian (leaves 165-172). / Fu Zhong Ying wen zhai yao. / 目錄 --- p.i / Chapter 第一章 --- 前言 --- p.1 / Chapter 第二章 --- 東晉玄言詩槪述 --- p.3 / Chapter 第一節 --- 玄言詩的定義 --- p.3 / Chapter 第二節 --- 東晉玄言詩的分類 --- p.6 / Chapter 第三節 --- 東晉玄言詩的分期 --- p.6 / Chapter 第三章 --- 玄言詩的思想背景 --- p.9 / Chapter 第一節 --- 玄言詩的玄學背景 --- p.9 / Chapter (一) --- 玄學的槪念 --- p.9 / Chapter (二) --- 玄學的發展與玄言詩的盛行 --- p.11 / Chapter (三) --- 玄學的重要命題與玄言詩 --- p.13 / Chapter 1. --- 以無爲本 --- p.13 / Chapter 2. --- 言意之辨 --- p.15 / Chapter 3. --- 名教與自然 --- p.16 / Chapter 第二節 --- 玄言詩與佛學的關係 --- p.17 / Chapter (一) --- 玄佛合 流 --- p.19 / Chapter (二) --- 佛理對玄言詩的影 響 --- p.20 / Chapter 第三節 --- 玄言詩的清談背景 --- p.22 / Chapter (一) --- 清談的性質與內容 --- p.22 / Chapter (二) --- 清談對玄言詩的影響 --- p.23 / Chapter 1. --- 審美性質的清談一一玄言詩創作動力之一 --- p.23 / Chapter 2. --- 清談對玄言詩語言形式的影響 --- p.25 / Chapter 3. --- 清談對玄言詩聲律節奏的影響 --- p.27 / Chapter 第四章 --- 東晉玄言詩的藝術特色 --- p.29 / Chapter 第一節 --- 引言 --- p.29 / Chapter 第二節 --- 東晉玄言詩的篇章結構 --- p.30 / Chapter (一) --- 玄言詩的類別與篇章結構分析 --- p.31 / Chapter 1. --- 純粹說理的玄言詩 --- p.31 / Chapter 2. --- 理景交融的玄言詩 --- p.33 / Chapter 3. --- 情、景、理三者融合的玄言詩 --- p.35 / Chapter (二) --- 篇章結構與詩歌的形式美 --- p.36 / Chapter (三) --- 篇章結構與詩歌的情感表達方式 --- p.39 / Chapter 第三節 --- 東晉玄言詩的藝術手法 --- p.41 / Chapter (一) --- 遣詞用字 --- p.41 / Chapter 1. --- 玄學內容對遣詞用字的影響 --- p.42 / Chapter 2. --- 語言和辭采 --- p.44 / Chapter 3. --- 玄言詩中的虛字 --- p.47 / Chapter 3.1. --- 虛字的數量 --- p.48 / Chapter 3.2. --- 虛字對詩歌藝術特色的影響 --- p.50 / Chapter a. --- 虛字與意象的表現 --- p.50 / Chapter b --- .「以文爲詩」與虛字的關係 --- p.52 / Chapter c. --- 虛字與情感的表達 --- p.54 / Chapter d. --- 小結 --- p.56 / Chapter (二) --- 修辭手法 --- p.57 / Chapter 1. --- 比喻 --- p.57 / Chapter 1.1. --- 玄言詩中的比喻 --- p.57 / Chapter 1.2. --- 比喻手法與東晉玄言詩的藝術特色 --- p.58 / Chapter 2. --- 聲律節奏 --- p.61 / Chapter 2.1. --- 清談對聲律節奏的影響 --- p.61 / Chapter 2.2. --- 東晉玄言詩的聲律節奏 --- p.62 / Chapter 3. --- 玄言詩中的典故 --- p.66 / Chapter 第四節 --- 結語 --- p.68 / Chapter 第五章 --- 東晉玄言詩的淵源與發展 --- p.69 / Chapter 第一節 --- 玄言詩的源頭 --- p.69 / Chapter (一) --- 「《詩》、《騷》之體盡矣 」 --- p.69 / Chapter (二) --- 東晉玄言詩與《詩經》 --- p.70 / Chapter 1. --- 東晉時《詩經》的地位 --- p.70 / Chapter 2. --- 《詩經》對東晉玄言詩的影響 --- p.72 / Chapter 2.1. --- 文本關係 --- p.72 / Chapter 2.2. --- 體裁風格方面的影響 --- p.74 / Chapter (三) --- 東晉玄言詩與楚辭 --- p.76 / Chapter 1. --- 「熟讀離騷」的啓示 --- p.76 / Chapter 2. --- 東晉玄言詩與楚辭的直接關係 --- p.77 / Chapter 2.1. --- 童蒙者拾其香草 --- p.77 / Chapter 2.2. --- 吟諷者銜其山川 --- p.78 / Chapter 3. --- 間接影響一一情感表達與屈子精神 --- p.80 / Chapter 第二節 --- 東晉玄言詩與前代詩歌 --- p.82 / Chapter (一) --- 題材 --- p.82 / Chapter 1. --- 詩歌中的說理傳統 --- p.82 / Chapter 2. --- 嵇康、阮籍詩中的玄言 --- p.84 / Chapter (二) --- 體 裁 --- p.86 / Chapter 1. --- 東晉玄言詩的體裁 --- p.86 / Chapter 2. --- 東晉四言詩的背景 --- p.87 / Chapter 2.1. --- 玄學思想 --- p.88 / Chapter 2.2. --- 哲學著作 --- p.89 / Chapter 2.3. --- 魏晉四言詩 --- p.89 / Chapter 3. --- 四言詩對東晉玄言詩之影響 --- p.91 / Chapter (三) --- 情感風格 --- p.93 / Chapter (四) --- 篇章結構 --- p.96 / Chapter (五) --- 小結 --- p.97 / Chapter 第三節 --- 東晉玄言詩與山水詩 --- p.98 / Chapter (一) --- 玄言詩中的山水因素 --- p.99 / Chapter (二) --- 山水興起的背景探討 --- p.103 / Chapter 1. --- 地理環境 --- p.103 / Chapter 2. --- 文學作品 --- p.105 / Chapter 3. --- 玄學思想 --- p.108 / Chapter (三) --- 玄言詩與山水詩的傳承關係 --- p.109 / Chapter 第四節 --- 玄言詩與後代詩歌理論 --- p.115 / Chapter (一) --- 東晉詩歌理論試探 --- p.115 / Chapter 1. --- 東晉典籍及著作中所見詩歌理論試析 --- p.116 / Chapter 1.1. --- 《抱樸子》 --- p.117 / Chapter 1.2. --- 《世說新語》 --- p.119 / Chapter 1.3. --- 東晉詩序 --- p.121 / Chapter (二) --- 東晉玄言詩所見之詩歌理論試析 --- p.122 / Chapter 1. --- 由東晉玄言詩的藝術特色見其詩歌理論 --- p.123 / Chapter 1.1. --- 創作論之一：詩歌對形式美的追求 --- p.123 / Chapter 1.2. --- 創作論之二：詩歌對聲律節奏的重視 --- p.124 / Chapter 1.3. --- 欣賞論之一：東晉玄言詩的情感表達 --- p.125 / Chapter 1.4. --- 欣賞論之二：玄言詩對雅與正的追求 --- p.127 / Chapter 2. --- 東晉玄言詩中詩論成分綜述 --- p.128 / Chapter (二) --- 玄言詩與詩歌形式理 論 --- p.133 / Chapter 1. --- 詩歌形式論 --- p.133 / Chapter 2. --- 語言修辭 --- p.134 / Chapter 3. --- 聲律節奏 --- p.138 / Chapter 4. --- 篇章結構 --- p.140 / Chapter (三) --- 玄言詩與意境觀念 --- p.143 / Chapter 1. --- 意境觀念 --- p.143 / Chapter 1.1. --- 意境觀念的發展 --- p.144 / Chapter 1.2. --- 「意境」的槪念 --- p.146 / Chapter 2. --- 意境學說與老莊玄學 --- p.148 / Chapter 2.1. --- 老莊之「道」一一意境學說的哲學基礎之一 --- p.149 / Chapter 2.2. --- 言不盡意一一魏晉玄學對意境學說的直接影響 --- p.151 / Chapter 3. --- 東晉玄言詩與意境觀念 --- p.154 / Chapter 3.1. --- 詩歌風格 --- p.154 / Chapter 3.2. --- 意境的層次 --- p.157 / Chapter 3.3. --- 意境的基本要素 --- p.159 / Chapter 第六章 --- 結語 --- p.162 / 參考文獻 --- p.165 / 附錄一：東晉玄言詩人與玄言詩作對應表 --- p.173 / 附錄二：東晉玄言詩篇章 --- p.175

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Thesis (Ph.D.)--Baylor University, 2008. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 147-152)

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Washington, 1999. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 266-276).

No description available.

No description available.