published_or_final_version / Education / Master / Master of Education

This thesis comprises four essays in the economics of networks and market design. The common thread in all these essays is the presence of complementarities or externalities. Chapter 2 presents a unified model of networks and matching markets. We build on a contribution by Pycia (2012). We show that strong pairwise alignment of agents’ preferences is a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of strongly stable networks and strongly stable allocations in multilateral matching markets with finite contracts. Strongly stable networks are not necessarily efficient. Although we use a demanding stability concept, strong pairwise alignment allows for complementarities and externalities. In Chapter 3, we generalise the gross substitutes and complements condition introduced by Sun and Yang (2006). Our new condition guarantees the existence of competitive equilibrium in economies with indivisible goods. Competitive equilibrium can be found using an extension of the double-track adjustment process (Sun and Yang, 2009). In this chapter, we also study contract networks (Ostrovsky, 2008). We show that chain-stable contract allocations can exist even in cyclical contractual networks, such as electricity markets, as long as they are appropriately segmented. In Chapter 4, we run a series of experiments to compare the performance of four auctions – first-price, Vickrey, Vickrey-Nearest Rule (Day and Cramton, 2008), and Reference Rule (Erdil and Klemperer, 2010). In our setting, there are two items and three bidders. Two local bidders want an item each, but the global bidder wants both items. We introduce various exposure and package-bidding treatments. We find that the first-price auction always revenue-dominates all the other auctions without any loss in efficiency, strengthening the results of Marszalec (2011). Exposure affects global bidders only in the first-price auction. In other auctions, global bidders often do not take into account the effect of their own bids on their payments. We find no evidence of threshold effects. Finally, in Chapter 5, we develop a new model of online social network formation. In this model, agents belong to many overlapping social groups. We derive analytical solutions for the macroscopic properties of the network, such as the degree distribution. We study the dynamics of homophily – the tendency of individuals to associate with those similar to themselves. We calibrate our model to Facebook data from ten American colleges.

In many developing countries, the electricity system is too weak to meet growing demand and the availability and reliability of generating capacity is inadequate. Protracted mismanagement, political interference, subsidised pricing, and corruption all undermine the ability of developing electricity supply industries to finance and deliver service or attract new private investment. Power sector reform is an acute need in developing countries where implementation of a top-down liberalisation approach has been pursued without adequately considering the social, political and economic conditions. The conventional response to low levels of electricity sector investment has been from the top-down: aim to create competitive electricity markets by encouraging new entry into the generation sector and by breaking up vertically integrated power companies. Using a case study from Gujarat, India, this thesis argues for an alternative approach—utilise distributed generation (DG) and captive power capacity (self-generation) of industry to reshape the generation and distribution sectors from the bottom-up. The thesis examines the economic viability of distributed generation in a rural setting and captive power for industrial use in Gujarat, India, taking into account the economic, technical and political factors that shape investment decisions. In India, 40 percent of the population still does not have an electricity connection, but an array of new energy technologies for small-scale electricity generation near the site of use may provide a new development path. The bottom-up model enables rapid addition of generation capacity to a system struggling to meet demand while increasing competition in the power market. The thesis concludes that more power from independent and industrial sources will best harness the financial and engineer resources of the Indian electricity supply industry (ESI) and ultimately benefit the economy. The solution proposed is not suggested as an optimal policy programme, but instead is advanced as the best of the feasible options available within current political and economic constraints.

<p>This dissertation extends the empirical industrial organization literature with two essays on strategic decisions of firms in imperfectly competitive markets and one essay on how inertia in consumer choice can result in significant welfare losses. Using data from the airline industry I study a well-known puzzle in the literature whereby incumbent firms decrease fares when Southwest Airlines emerges as a potential entrant, but is not (yet) competing directly. In the first essay I describe this so-called Southwest Effect and use reduced-form analysis to offer possible explanations for why firms may choose to forgo profits today rather than wait until Southwest operates the route. The analysis suggests that incumbent firms are attempting to signal to Southwest that entry is unprofitable so as to deter its entry. The second essay develops this theme by extending a classic model from the IO literature, limit pricing, to a dynamic setting. Calibrations indicate the price cuts observed in the data can be captured by a dynamic limit pricing model. The third essay looks at another concentrated industry, mobile telecoms, and studies how inertia in choice (be it inattention or switching costs) can lead to consumers being on poorly matched cellphone plans and how a simple policy proposal can have a considerable effect on welfare.</p> / Dissertation

Ideally, land use policies correct for negative externalities. However, the barriers they impose on individuals and communities have serious implications. Existing studies on this topic focus on singular, specific areas because land regulation is determined at the local level and varies extensively across the nation. Furthermore, current housing literature focuses on the “norm” of single family housing. This ignores the changing attitudes toward different types of dwellings. My study examines local regulatory environments across the nation by using Gyourko et al. 2008’s Wharton Residential Land Use Regulation Index, which develops a comparative scale for the otherwise impossibly varied regulatory environments. I also use micro data from the American Community Survey to see individual housing choices. Then, with a custom-made dataset from these two sources, I use empirical regression analysis to study the effects of land use regulation on people’s housing decisions, specifically the choice between a single-family house and a multi-family apartment complex. My results show that more restrictive regulation makes a person more likely to rent their home as well as occupy a multi-family apartment complex as opposed to a single-family home.

This thesis presents two chapters on credence goods and one on ongoing partnerships in an infinitely repeated game. The chapters on credence goods focus on the welfare and efficiency of equilibria in overcharging models of credence goods, something which has not been explicitly addressed before. The chapter on partnerships presents a theory explaining ongoing partnerships as solving a commitment problem for clients. There is a small literature on partnerships, and this chapter represents a novel but complimentary approach to that literature. At core, chapters 2, 3 and 4 of this thesis ask the following questions respectively: Do competition and information increase welfare in credence goods markets? How do customers in credence goods markets discipline experts from committing fraud? Can these strategies be welfare ranked? Why do ongoing partnerships exist? What problem do they solve?

Apart from the introduction (Chapter 1) and conclusion (Chapter 7), this thesis comprises five chapters organized into two parts: Part I studies promotion incentives in the public sector, and focuses on the case of teachers in rural China. All teachers in China compete with their colleagues for rank promotions. I aim to answer two questions: first, whether the promotion system for teachers in China elicits effort from teachers, and second, how the design features of the promotion system affect effort incentives. Part I includes four chapters. Chapter 2 introduces the topic and provides a background on promotions for teachers in China. It also discusses related work in this area, and introduces the data that will be used in Part I. Chapter 3 presents and tests a theoretical model of promotions as an incentive device. The model treats all teachers as identical in terms of their ability, and as such, focuses on average levels of teacher effort. It predicts that effort is exerted in response to potential promotions. In addition, the model also predicts that average effort incentives are higher in promotion contests in which the wage gap is higher, the promotion rate is closer to one half, the number of teachers competing for a promotion is higher (for promotion rates between 1/3 and 2/3), and the average age of teachers in the contest is lower, or the proportion of female teachers is lower. The model is used to derive an estimating equation by which to test predictions on average levels of teacher effort. An equation is estimated for the probability of promotion as a function of teacher effort, which is proxied by the teachers' annual performance evaluation scores. There is simultaneity present as effort increases the probability of promotion, but it is also the promise of promotion that motivates effort. As a result, effort is instrumented using wage changes, which are both informative (higher wage gaps are associated with higher effort) and valid (wages only affect promotions through effort). The second stage of the regression demonstrates that effort is indeed exerted by teachers in order to win promotions. The first stage confirms the predictions of the model with regards to wage gaps, the promotion rate, and the size and composition of the pool of competitors. Chapter 4 extends the model of Chapter 3 in two ways: teachers are now treated as heterogeneous in ability, and a multi-period model of teacher effort over time is also added. This chapter focuses on individual levels of teacher effort, and on how the parameters of the promotion system interact with teacher characteristics to affect teacher effort. The predictions include that teachers in the extremes of the skill distribution will have lower incentives, and as the contest size increases these teachers will have effort incentives that are lower still, that teachers who are five or more years from promotion eligibility will have zero effort, as will teachers in the highest rank, that teacher effort will increase in the five years leading up to promotion eligibility, and that teacher effort will decrease after a teacher is eligible for promotion but has been passed over several times. An effort equation is estimated that captures all of these components, and the predictions are largely affirmed by the data. Tests are conducted in order to alleviate concerns about selection, as well as measurement error in the performance evaluation scores. Chapter 5 concludes Part I. Part II of this thesis looks at teacher labour markets, social distance, and learning outcomes in Punjab, Pakistan. Chapter 6 explores the link between the distribution of teachers in the labour market, caste differences between teachers and students, and child learning outcomes. Using rich longitudinal data from Pakistan that allows me to convincingly identify the causal effects of caste on learning outcomes, I show how the distribution of teachers across public schools induces particular matches of high and low caste teachers and students, and that these matches are highly predictive of test score outcomes. Specifically, low caste male children perform significantly better when taught by high caste teachers than when they are taught by low caste teachers. Several possible channels are explored, including discrimination in the classroom, role model effects, teacher quality, patronage, peer effects, and returns to education. Although the channel cannot be proven, the data points to high caste teachers being able to raise the already high returns to education for low caste children because they are able to assist these children in getting educational benefits and employment later on using their patronage networks. Low caste children therefore work harder to impress high caste teachers, and this results in higher learning outcomes.

The dynamics of demand for energy goods such as gasoline are complicated by investment decisions and behavioral habits. Both types of complication can be captured by a habits model, in which past consumption enters into an agent's current utility function. If the agent is forward-looking, or 'rational', then habits imply his consumption of the habit-forming good will be sensitive to his expectation of future market conditions, in particular future prices. This sensitivity implies, in turn, that demand and price elasticity will depend upon price volatility, and that the agent will respond differently to different types of price changes. Price elasticity measured over the mixture of price changes that occur in a given market will therefore underestimate the power of policy instruments that act through permanent or long-run price changes. This thesis examines the implications of rational habits on demand behavior in a multi-good setting, drawing motivation from and considering applications to gasoline demand. Chapter 1 introduces the theory of rational habits, examines a simple perfect-foresight model, and uses microeconometric techniques to look at an application to U.S. gasoline demand. Chapter 2 builds a theory model in which agents have rational habits and future prices are uncertain. The implications of this model are then utilized in Chapter 3, which uses macro-type econometric techniques to test for rational habits in international gasoline demand. The empirical evidence suggests that rational habits may indeed shape demand for gasoline and that traditionally-measured price elasticity should not be used to project consumers' responses to policy interventions.

The existing literature on information disclosure commonly assumes full commitment to truthful disclosure and therefore revelations are always credible, which can be quite unrealistic in many circumstances. This thesis mainly contributes to the literature by studying information disclosure in the form of cheap-talk in auctions and monopoly pricing, which allows for mis-reporting and false disclosure. The thesis is composed mainly of three research papers. The first paper (Chapter 2), also the major chapter of this thesis, investigates cheap-talk information disclosure in auctions, where bidders' preferences are horizontally differentiated. The seller may reveal information of product attributes before the auction, and the disclosure policy is characterized by a partition of the attribute space. In a symmetric setting, I first show that informative equilibria reveal the feature that more precise information is provided for less popular product attributes. Second, I prove an equilibrium existence theorem that an informative equilibrium can be supported by an information partition of any degree, as long as the number of bidders is sufficiently large. And finally, the optimal disclosure policy reveals a complementarity relationship between the number of bidders and the optimal degree of equilibrium partitions. In this chapter, optimal information structure is endogenously determined. In the second paper (Chapter 3), I turn to study how a monopoly seller should reveal a product's horizontal attributes, when consumer preferences conform to a mixture distribution. I show that the optimal disclosure policy largely depends on the characteristics of the mixture distribution. Specifically, when consumer preferences are highly heterogenous, it is better for the seller to reveal information and serve different groups of consumers separately. And when the preference distribution becomes more asymmetric, cheap-talk disclosure is more likely to be dominated by no disclosure at all. In this chapter, information structure is taken as given. The third paper (Chapter 4) studies optimal regulation of risk-averse producers, in a setting of complementary production with independent cost realization. The production can be organized in the form of either component, or integrated production. I show in this paper that the relative virtues of these two forms of production depend on the degree of risk aversion of the producers.

This thesis consists of three chapters that analyze theoretically the role of income inequality in consumer markets. Each chapter introduces distributional considerations into an economic model where previously inequality did not play a major role. Chapter one uses a consumer search model to show under what conditions the distribution of income within a community is related to the type of firms that exist within that community, impacting the level of prices. We show that if time and money costs of search are high enough, only the middle class have incentive to search and therefore are the most aggressive shoppers. Using a supply side model, we argue that firms located in more informed communities are more likely to enter the market as large low-priced retailers. Connecting these two results, the model shows under what conditions the size of the middle class can have a negative relationship with the level of prices. Chapter two demonstrates how firm pricing strategy and determinants of household location can interact to determine city structure. In this city, consumers and firms live on a continuous line interval. The model consists of two types of firms; many high-cost perfectly competitive firms located in the Central Business District, and one large low-cost "Superstore", choosing its price strategically. We show how the shopping habits of the consumer population, as determined by the relative price of the Superstore and the Corner Stores, can contribute to the various income segregation outcomes described in previous literature. In addition we consider the impact of city population structure on the pricing decision of a monopolist facing a competitive fringe. Chapter three uses a simple model of banking services to consider how deposit-taking banks price for their services and choose the type of deposit customers that they target. This chapter goes beyond previous theoretical work on consumer banking, identifying the role of household income in the access to deposit services. We show that a higher rate of return on investments available to banks lowers financial exclusion, increasing the profitability of low-income consumers for deposit-taking institutions. This suggests that the possibility of financial exclusion increases in periods of recession. The chapter demonstrates how an increase in income dispersion can lead to a greater proportion of consumers excluded from mainstream banking.