Submitted by Fernando Salazar (fernando.salazar@votorantimcorretora.com.br) on 2013-08-22T19:23:02Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação_FernandoSalazar_final.pdf: 716420 bytes, checksum: 1581ff723525f8a036c7a630a8650453 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Suzinei Teles Garcia Garcia (suzinei.garcia@fgv.br) on 2013-08-23T12:25:24Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação_FernandoSalazar_final.pdf: 716420 bytes, checksum: 1581ff723525f8a036c7a630a8650453 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2013-08-23T12:36:41Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação_FernandoSalazar_final.pdf: 716420 bytes, checksum: 1581ff723525f8a036c7a630a8650453 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013-08-05 / This paper aims to investigate the competition aspects of banking multiproduct operation. Based on an extension of Panzar and Rosse (1987)’s test to the case of a multiproduct banking firm, we take advantage of a new dataset constructed to Brazilian banking conglomerates to infer the impact of conglomeration on market power. We find that banks offering classic (i.e., loans and credit cards) and other bank products (i.e., brokerage services, insurance and capitalization bonds) have substantially higher market power than the ones which offer only classic products. Results suggest a positive bias on the traditional estimates of competition in which the multioutput actions are not taken into account.

This dissertation comprises three essays on the allocation of labour and capital in a large developing country, Indonesia. In the first essay, I examine the impact of the 1998 East Asian recession on child schooling outcomes in Indonesia. Using panel data on 7-15 year-olds, I exploit the heterogeneous impact of the recession across urban communities as measured by the variation in rice price increases, under the assumption that communities where rice prices increased the most were those where real wages declined the most. I find that for the youngest children (aged 7-12 years) there is a large negative impact of higher rice prices on school attendance and no effect on labour market participation. For older children (aged 13-15 years), schooling enrolment does not respond to rice prices but labour market participation declines sharply in the worst-hit communities. I find no evidence of adverse long-term consequences on human capital formation. In the second essay, I test the hypothesis that there exists a significant earnings differential between similar workers in the formal and informal sectors. Using panel data on salaried and self-employed individuals, I find that after controlling for firm size and individual-specific heterogeneity, there is no formal sector earnings premium, except in the public sector. The results are robust to the presence of unpaid family workers, measurement error, and non-random attrition in the survey. This questions the commonly held belief that labour markets in developing countries are segmented because of legal institutions that protect high formal sector earnings. In the third essay, I estimate the effect of a large exchange rate depreciation on the performance of importers. The ability to manage volatility in the cost of imported inputs is likely to depend on a firm's access to external sources of finance as well its ability to hedge against exchange rate movements. Using data from a census on Indonesian firms, I find that while domestic importers face lower value-added due to a rise in their costs of production, foreign-owned importers fare better: they are more likely to sustain higher value-added, hire more labour and use more materials than domestic owned firms. This suggests another channel through which FDI can add value to a firm in a developing country, particularly with the increasing importance of trade in intermediate goods.

This thesis comprises three chapters with the patent litigation as a central theme. The first chapter develops a methodology to compare the quality of patent litigation systems in six major economies: United States, United Kingdom, Germany, Japan, Korea, China. Quality is defined as whether it provides a fair and just legal environment for nullifying weak patents and adjudicating infringement actions. Ultimately, this study presents heterogeneity in the quality of the sample systems. Litigation systems with rigorous and predictable adjudication have a low risk of opportunistic and anti-competitive filings.In the second paper (Chapter 2), I explore the relationship between technology ownership frag- mentation and the opposition filing in European Patent Office (EPO). I develop a two-stages game, in which opposition can be used for an ex ante negotiation (e.g. licensing). The framework presents that high litigation risk happens under two kinds of conditions: when the ownership to external technologies is highly concentrated, profit dissipation is over the licensing revenue for the potential licensee; when the ownership to external technologies is widely fragmented, transaction cost is high for the entrance. That is, the opposition, replacing the licensing, will be frequently used. To empirically test this hypothesis, we use a data set that covers patent opposition cases during the period 1985-2005, and construct application-based “fragmentation index”. Finally, regression results confirm that opposition likelihood displays an U-shape re- lationship with the number of potential technology suppliers. Besides, the effect of ownership patterns is stronger in discrete product industries. This analysis controls for differences in filing, granted rate and other technological observed characteristics. Results are robust to alternative estimation strategies that account for over-dispersion in the patent counts data and industry heterogeneity.The third paper proposes that system designs influence the incidence of patent litigation risk. I construct three one-to-one matching data sets by total 2748 European patents, which includes 916 patents without any challenge, 916 patents having been challenged in the opposition at the European Patent Office (EPO), and 916 having been challenged in Germany Federal Patent Court (BPatG). the EPO and the BPatG follow different procedures to reexamine, amend or revoke a granted decision. To explore different filing patterns in two litigation systems, I provide a much more rigorous definition to describe patent quality: Novelty, Unique, Impact, which has been operationalized and utilized in the technological radicalness literature. By comparing litigated cases to control groups, I find a high degree of significance between opposition risk and ex ante-identifiable factors - Novelty, while a high degree of significance between invalidation trials and ex post indicator of technological radicalness - Impact. Moreover, I also confirm that the filing in the opposition is less constrained with firm’s patent portfolios and technological conditions. / Doctorat en Sciences économiques et de gestion / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

This dissertation presents work on gerrymandering in American legislative districts and on school competition and school choice. The work on gerrymandering analyzes how to measure gerrymandering and investigates some of its causal effects. The analysis of how to measure gerrymandering is presented in Chapter 1 and in the first half of Chapter 2. The context is the following. Legislative maps are often evaluated along dimensions of proportionality (the alignment between parties' seat shares and their state- or nation-wide vote shares) and competitiveness (the fraction of contests with uncertain winners). Since a map is intended to be used for multiple elections, policy-makers want to accurately predict how it will perform on these dimensions in the future. Doing this is difficult because future elections will differ from past ones due to changes in the demographic composition of the electorate and as a result of electoral shocks to preferences and turnout costs. Citing this uncertainty, the U.S. Supreme Court recently ruled that the judicial system is incapable of adjudicating claims of partisan gerrymandering. The first contribution of the dissertation is to develop a method for predicting the uncertainty in a map's performance due to electoral shocks and changes in demographics. The method relies on a structural voting model, which describes the preference and turnout decisions of a potential voter. The model decomposes an election into (i) a set of candidate qualities and (ii) individual-level utility parameters. I assess map performance in two steps. First, I examine the effect of electoral shocks by simulating alternative values of the candidate qualities and utility parameters. Second, I investigate the influence of demographic changes by re-running the simulations using different electorates. I apply the method to rich data from the 2008 to 2018 general elections in North Carolina and show that it allows credible and precise evaluations of maps. I also show that the method is better than existing approaches at predicting gerrymandering outcomes in excluded elections. The remainder of Chapter 2 concerns the causal effects of gerrymandering. Specifically, I examine whether the probability that someone turns out to vote is influenced by the competitiveness of his or her legislative districts. I do this by comparing outcomes over time for individuals in North Carolina who were placed into more or less competitive districts in 2011 as part of the decadal ``redistricting" process. I compare individuals who shared the same districts in each legislative chamber (U.S. House, NC Senate, NC House) before redistricting and who differed in districts for only one chamber after redistricting. Within these comparison groups, I match individuals on demographics and history of turnout and party registration. I find that being placed into a less competitive district reduces turnout. Effects grow over time and exist in both midterm and presidential elections. By 2018, having been placed in a district in which one party is always predicted to win versus one in which the parties have an even chance of winning reduces turnout by 1.9 percentage points for U.S. House districts and 1.4 percentage points for NC House and NC Senate districts. These results highlight the importance of considering district competitiveness when drawing legislative maps. Chapter 3 is work that is joint with Rajeev Dehejia, Cristian Pop-Eleches, and Miguel Urquiola. It examines how schools' incentives are influenced by the way in which households make school choice decisions. A summary is as follows. Recent work examines whether households choose schools based on school value added (Abdulkadiroglu et al. 2020; Beuermann et al. 2019). Given that value added is difficult to observe, households' choices are likely to depend on both (i) how much they care about value added and (ii) how well informed they are about which schools have high or low value added. We examine this concern using administrative data, a survey, and an experiment in Romanian high school markets. Using the survey, we can explain households' preferences based on their beliefs about school traits, rather than on the values of these traits that are measured by researchers. In the administrative data, we find that households' choices are better explained by measured values of peer quality than by measured values of value added. By contrast, in the survey data, we find that households' beliefs about value added and peer quality have equal explanatory power for their choices. This motivates an experiment in which we provide households with information on school value added. We find that the information has a positive but heterogenous effect on the extent to which households prioritize value added in their school choices. Effects are largest for households who were initially less certain of their choices and for households with low-scoring students.

An A/B test is implemented on a SaaS rm's product page to examine the dierence in conversion rates from website visitors who are randomly assigned to two dierent product-landing pages that show dierent prices. To count as a successful conversion the visitors that view a product-landing page have to click on a \Free Trial" button. Half of the group will be assigned the treatment page, which will state higher prices and the other half will be assigned the controlled page, which will state today's current price. The only variant that will dier from the two pages will be the stated price of the product and all other factors will be kept constant. The controlled experiment is executed to get a sense of customers' price sensitivity, hence this thesis contributes to microeconomic research of the private sector, more specically to the ICT industry by using a novel approach with the help of A/B testing on prices. The results showed no statistical signicance difference between the two variations, which can be translated to accepting the null hypothesis; the demand for a particular Software-As-A-Service product will hold unchanged after the proposed price increase. At first, this could be a surprising result but when looking into the industry, which the rm participates in and their early mover advantages this result could have been assumed.

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This study surveys the theoretical literature dealing with the behavior of technology suppliers in the presence of network externalities with a focus on economies of compatibility setting and promotional pricing. Positive network externalities arise when a good is more valuable to a user because more users adopt the same good or compatible ones. There are two issues with network externalities: demand side and supply side. This paper focuses on the supply side, and it relates the way that technologies are chosen and promoted. On the supply side, product compatibility choice, technology sponsorship, penetration pricing, and product pre-announcement are the competing strategies of firms operating in a market with network externalities. Among these strategies, compatibility choice decisions and promotional pricing are presented in the two different subsections, which follows. / Master of Arts

Systematic mispricing by the state-of-the-art option pricing models is a paradox in financial economics as both the magnitude and direction of the mispricing is debated. The models have been found to overprice out-of-the-money and deep-in-the-money call options while underpricing in-the-money and deep-out-of-the-money calls. In addition, research has shown these biases have different signs in different time periods. We propose that when investors maximize expected utility for Friedman-Savage-Markowitz utility functions, the option mispricing observed in the market will result. The theories and empirical tests in the literature of higher-order utility functions and risk-neutral valuation (RNV) in the options market are presented. Though investor attitudes towards risk are irrelevant in the non-arbitrage world of modern option pricing, to the extent the options market does not meet the non-arbitrage conditions, investor risk preferences will affect the pricing of options. Risk-loving traders will bid up market prices relative to risk-neutral model prices; risk-averse traders will bid down prices. And investor risk preferences can, and do, change over time as market conditions change. New tests are run to analyze the relationship between mispricing biases and investor preferences before and after the historic stock market crash of October 19, 1987. We find mispricing biases which imply a decreased risk aversion on the part of investors in the IBM call option markets for the period prior to the market crash and mispricing biases which imply an increased risk-averse (and decreased risk-loving) behavior in those markets following the crash. Similar analyses are also performed in the Microsoft call options markets with less conclusive results. / Ph. D.

The purpose of the study is to determine if there is an effect on intervention/nonintervention attitudes associated with an introductory microeconomics class. The population consisted of all students enrolled in eighteen sections of Economics 1100 during the Fall semester, 1984, at North Texs State University. There were seven sections of Economics 1100, ten sections of Sociology 1510, and ten sections of Political Science 2010 used as control groups. The instruments used for pretesting and posttesting were the twenty-three item Attitude Scale and Demographic Questionnaire. The Attitude Scale contained twelve intervention and eleven nonintervention questions. Intervention questions were reverse scored so that a high score is noninterventionist and a low score is interventionist. Data were analyzed using a multiple linear regression to determine how each variable affected the intervention/nonintervention student attitudes.