The United States has experienced a significant amount of difficulty of late with two factors: a) how to fight against a networked enemy, and b) the need for more cultural intelligence. This thesis will describe a structure to assist with both those needs. The premise is that an expanded and improved network of US Military Groups is the weapon of choice for the war on terror, and beyond. The purpose of this thesis is to propose a policy that will consolidate the functions of Defense AttachsÌ , Security Assistance Officers, and a proposed corps of ethnographic information officers into a network of embassy annexes that will cover every nation in which the United States has a country team. The intertwined questions of how to fight a network and how to gather cultural intelligence present the United States with a strategic challenge, and require the examination of the type of information the Department of Defense captures, and what is to be done with that information. This thesis proposes a means to collect ethnographic information and a structure for using it to make effective decisions in a variety of traditional security roles as well as in the fight against transnational terror networks.

CHDS State/Local / Our national security and prosperity depend in part on secure and competitive ports. Effective public and private sector collaboration is needed in a world with myriad security challenges and fierce global competition. Although steps have been taken in the years since 9/11 to realize these twin goals, much more needs to be done. The current maritime domain awareness (MDA) paradigm needs to be expanded to provide comprehensive awareness of intermodal operations in our ports. An effective Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) program that succeeds in leveraging intermodal data is fundamental to better port-level MDA. Developing effective port level MDA and using it to enhance the security of our ports relies on the effective organization of public and private sector resources. The joint operations centers called for in the SAFE Port Act, once broadened to include key intermodal players, provide an excellent organizational model to pursue enhanced port security. / Comptroller, U.S. Coast Guard (USCG)

With United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) being given the role as the lead Combatant Command in fighting the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) USSOCOM must examine ways to engage terrorists on a global scale. USSOCOM must look at means other than direct action to defeat these terrorist networks. It must also look at the entire network and not just the cells that carry out the terrorist operations. Terrorist Financing is an integral part of the GWOT, though; thus far it has mostly been pursued by law enforcement agencies rather than the U.S. Military. This is due to the perception that terrorist financing is criminal in nature and relegated to law enforcement agencies rather a threat to national security that would be the responsibility military. This thesis serves two purposes. The first is to analyze whether the U.S. military and Special Operations Forces (SOF) in particular should look at terrorist financing as part of the militaryâ s role in the GWOT and what that possible role could be. The second is to look at how SOF could organize itself in order to carry out such a role should it be necessary to do so. Ironically, during the time this thesis was being written DoD has determined that SOF does have a role in terrorist financing and that USSOCOM will be the executive agent for the DoD with regards to terrorist financing.

Thesis: George Washington, as Commander-in-Chief of the Continental Army led this nation to victory and independence in the American War for Independence. Victory was facilitated by his direct and effective use of intelligence sources and methods. Discussion: During the American War for Independence, intelligence information regarding location, movement, and disposition of British forces allowed the Continental Army to fight on its own terms and stymie British efforts to quell the revolution. General George Washington, as Commanding General of the Continental Army, was aware of the value of intelligence in the proper conduct of military operations. Washington literally became America's first director of military intelligence. He directed the intelligence operations that were conducted, and performed his own analysis. The Continental Army's effectiveness in intelligence includes examples of the proper use of espionage, counterintelligence, communications security, codebreaking, deception, operational security, surveillance, reconnaissance, reporting and analysis. Time after time, the Americans were properly prepared with good intelligence ultimately resulting in independence from the British. These intelligence successes can be directly attributed to the direction of General George Washington and the actions of his operatives.

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Thesis (Ph. D.)--Columbia University, 1974. / Typescript. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (master's)--United States Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 2002. Thesis--George Washington, as Commander-in-Chief of the Continental Army led this nation to victory and independence in the American War for Independence. Victory was facilitated by his direct and effective use of intelligence sources and methods. Discussion: During the American War for Independence, intelligence information regarding location, movement, and disposition of British forces allowed the Continental Army to fight on its own terms and stymie British efforts to quell the revolution. General George Washington, as Commanding General of the Continental Army, was aware of the value of intelligence in the proper conduct of military operations. Washington literally became America's first director of military intelligence. He directed the intelligence operations that were conducted, and performed his own analysis. The Continental Army's effectiveness in intelligence includes examples of the proper use of espionage, counterintelligence, communications security, codebreaking, deception, operational security, surveillance, reconnaissance, reporting and analysis. Time after time, the Americans were properly prepared with good intelligence ultimately resulting in independence from the British. These intelligence successes can be directly attributed to the direction of General George Washington and the actions of his operatives. / Mentor(s): John B. Matthews, David A. Kelley. Includes bibliographical references (p. 52-54). Also available online.

Thesis (M.A.)--University of Texas at Austin, 2001. / "May 2001." Includes bibliographical references (p. 49-51, 161-167). Also available via the Internet.

Thesis (M.S. in Systems Engineering and M.S. in Information Technology Management)--Naval Postgraduate School, September 2003. / Thesis advisor(s): Daniel Boger, Steve Iatrou. Includes bibliographical references (p. 69-71). Also available online.

The United States entered World War I in April, 1917, amid a German spy scare. There were persistent allegations that Blacks were opposed to the war, in spite of their declarations to the contrary. "ProGermanism among the negroes" was investigated by the Justice Department's Bureau of Investigation and the Military Intelligence Branch (MIB) of the War Department's General Staff. Efforts were made to discover disloyal motives behind orgnnisatione such as the NAACP and the National Equal Rights League; in the contents of publications such as the Crisis, the Messenger and the Chicago Defender; and in the activities of Black spokesmen such as W E B Du Bois, and Monroe Trotter, Kelly Miller, A Philip Randolph, Chandler Owen, and Hubert Harrison. No firm evidence was found to support claims that Blacks were disloyal, but investigation of what MIB called "Negro Subversion" became a regular part of domestic intelligence gathering during the war. Reports filed about Blacks were often inaccurate and the resulting misinformation was self-perpetuating. Black draft evasion, which was common, but not always deliberate, and rumours about harsh conditions and high casualty rates endured by Black troops were the subject of numerous reports by the Bureau and MIB, enhancing the misleading impression that there was a well-co-ordinated enemy plan to foment racial discord. The behaviour of Black soldiers was monitored by MIB. Particular attention was given to camp race riots and to the political views of Black YMCA staff. Joel E Spingarn, the white chairman of the NAACP, served as a military intelligence officer for 21 months in 1918. He attempted to persuade the General Staff to sponsor federal anti-lynching legislation and began to set up a subsection within MIB to identify those instances of racial discrimination which most damaged Black morale. Spingarn was ousted from MIB after his proposal that Du Bois be brought into military intelligence aroused bitter Black criticism. Had he remained in Washington, the subsequent attitude of federal government toward intervention in the field of race relations might have been different. In the final months of the war, MIB was re-organised and re-named the Military Intelligence Division (MID). Efforts of Blacks to travel to Paris to raise the question of race during the peace conference were in most cases foiled by the State Department's refusal on spurious grounds to grant them passports. At the same time, the return from France of Black troops with greater political and racial awareness than before the war was anticipated with some concern by military intelligence officers. The menace of the German agent was swiftly replaced in the American mind by the spectre of Bolshevism. In 1919 radical Black protest and organisation began to be attributed to the influence of the new alien threat. Randolph, Owen and Marcus Garvey were among those leaders watched by the federal investigative agencies in attempts to discover evidence of Bolshevik influence among Blacks. Race riots in Washington, UDC, and Chicago in July served to convince many officials, notably J Edgar Hoover, head of the Bureau's Radical Division, that some link must exist between Black protest, racial violence and Bolshevism. MID work on "Negro Subversion" was being scaled down, but the Radical Division maintained its interest in this area in the light of further riots. The climax of the Red Scare was accompanied by statements from the Justice Department that Blacks were part of the radical tide which threatened to sweep America. Blacks did not, in fact, adopt radical politics in significant numbers. However, in the minds of those who ran the investigative agencies of federal government, Blacks were now firmly established as a potentially disloyal and revolutionary element in American society - ever susceptible to, and the likely target of, the advances of subversive propagandists.