Thesis (M.S. in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy)--Joint Forces Staff College, Joint Advanced Warfighting School, 2007. / Title from title screen; viewed on July 9, 2007. "17 May 2007." Electronic version of original print document. Includes bibliographical references (p. 69-71).

Thesis (M.S. in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy)--Joint Forces Staff College, Joint Advanced Warfighting School, 2007. / Title from title screen; viewed on July 9, 2007. "April 2007." Electronic version of original print document. Includes bibliographical references (p. 61-66).

Thesis (M.S. in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy)--Joint Forces Staff College, Joint Advanced Warfighting School, 2007. / Title from title screen; viewed on July 9, 2007. "5 April 2007." Electronic version of original print document. Includes bibliographical references (p. 63-66).

Thesis (M.S. in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy)--Joint Forces Staff College, Joint Advanced Warfighting School, 2007. / Title from title screen; viewed on July 9, 2007. "1 June 2007." Electronic version of original print document. Includes bibliographical references (p. 96-100).

This thesis argues that contemporary views of the laws of arms among soldiers, and of the laws of war by legal theorists, influenced particular military campaigns and individual actions in a variety of armed conflicts. Elizabeth I’s officer corps were careful to act in wars so that their actions would be seen as honourable by outside observers in the belief that such actions would add to their personal glory. Their individual and corporate perception of the laws of war directly affected military practices. However, the Elizabethan military establishment was engaged in conflicts that did not conform to contemporary views of just war. Catholic popes funded military expeditions against England and its dominion of Ireland, where the leaders were granted commissions to wage holy war not just war. The suppression of armed rebellions in Ireland employed numerous soldiers, and much of the machinery of state was supported by the English military. Holy war and counterinsurgency operations had no parallels in just war theory. The laws of war provided an important new context for re-evaluating military practices. Although legal discourse was predominantly ordered towards fighting regular wars, with careful reading of contemporary sources, there are important indicators that illuminate contemporary justifications for some of the more brutal military actions associated with the English military establishment, particularly in Ireland. By re-examining the discourse on the laws of war, the thesis finds that soldiers took seriously the customs of war and through them, it reassesses the motivations and mentalities of commissioned officers. This discourse was then used as a basis by which the conduct of soldiers can be understood and contextualised within English political and ethical structures.

Individuals carrying threat objects inside secured areas possess significant risk to security of establishments and safety of public. Traditional weapon inspection equipment is limited in portability and requires trained operators in confined security checkpoints. Although various methods to screen people for threat objects have been employed at secured establishments, screening equipment and procedures have not been designed to work in open spaces like airport check-in areas, hospitals, schools and university entrances. Coupled to this, relatively large numbers of false alarms from non-threat metal objects are identified as a threat by the current Concealed Weapon Detection (CWD) screening equipment, is a major cause of concern and is associated with higher operational costs. Hence, the design and development of a concealed weapon detection system, with reduced false alarms and increased detection along with classification capability that can operate in a large open area is essential. A comprehensive numerical model of a CWD system, using the Finite Element Analysis (FEA) method, to detect and classify metal objects with accuracy within a single zone of a multi zone Open Area CWD (OACWD) system, was developed. A mathematical model was developed and applied to the time-domain transient electromagnetic field, which are modelled and simulated using FEA methods. The methods were then applied to a single zone of a multi zone OACWD system to create an object signature database utilising the decay time constant; a unique property of metal objects in time-domain transient electromagnetic fields. The objects were detected by the unique signature property in OACWD system, Since early and intermediate stages was found contain object signatures, receiver current for these stages are digitised and stored in a weapon database, which is then used to match target for identification within the OACWD system. The thesis analyses the following characteristics of a single zone OACWD system; target material variation, target shape (both geometric and common weapon shape) variation, size, rotational variation, proximity variation of targets, the successful estimation and comparison of these parameters lead to classification of metal objects in OACWD system. This work also explores the characteristic properties and components of OACWD models such aspublic safety and the privacy of individuals using the system. The system, when integrated with other screening devices, e.g. Close Circuit Television (CCTV) monitoring system, is able to find individuals with threat objects in real-time detection space. Summarizing, In this thesis work, single zone detection system was designed by developing have developed an electromagnetic circuit to design, which can successfully detect threat metal objects irrespective of their orientation based on time constant decay. This system is a significant advance over the existing portal based detection system, as it would reduce the incidence of false alarms and traffic congestion at the security establishment.

This thesis aims to provide a comprehensive investigation of the reformed British militia between its reconstitution in 1852 and its abolition (and replacement by the Special Reserve) in 1908, addressing one of the major remaining gaps in our understanding of the auxiliary forces of this period. The post-1852 militia has generally been overshadowed by its eighteenth and early nineteenth century predecessor, and of the few major works that do examine the force after its reform, most do so as part of broader studies examining it from the point of view of the regular army, or as an epilogue to a much broader study of the militia of the earlier period, or the wider amateur military tradition as a whole. Therefore, the aim of this thesis is to provide the first dedicated study of the reformed British militia in recent years. It will move beyond the limited ‘top-down’ approach characteristic of many works examining the wider Victorian army and instead tap into a more recent methodological trend which utilises a range of national and local archival material to examine the nuances of what remained a locally organised force. It will examine not just the role of the militia and the way in which it was organised, but also study the nature and composition of its officer corps, its rank and file, and will investigate areas which have been hitherto largely ignored such as the way discipline was maintained in what remained an amateur force. It will conclude with an examination of the militia’s unprecedented service during the South African War before going onto examine the process by which the militia was ultimately abolished and replaced by the Special Reserve (and ask whether or not this represented a moment of continuity, or an outright break with the past.) This study rejects the idea that during this period the militia largely became ‘an anachronistic auxiliary’ to the regular army. There can be no doubt that it became increasingly centralised under the control of the War Office and that it also provided a vital role as a source of both officers and men for the regular army. Yet by looking at a mix of both national and local archival material, a more nuanced picture emerges. Several units managed to retain a degree of organisational independence and a social distinctiveness from the wider army. Furthermore, many of the reforms which altered the organisation of the force had important benefits. Compared to the 1850s and 1860s, during which the newly reconstituted force was forced to yield to the exigencies of the regular army, the militia of the 1870s, 1880s and 1890s was arguably better trained, better equipped and quantitatively stronger than during the preceding decades.

This thesis examines the utility of coercion theory in complex contemporary conflicts through a study of the Afghan conflict as it unfolded in the provinces of Faryab and Kunduz from 2005 to 2012. The last two decades have produced ample examples of incidents where the UN, international alliances or states have found it necessary to use force in order to coerce states or armed groups to stop unacceptable activities or change their behaviour. However, the potential of military force to induce behavioural change in such conflicts is understudied and poorly understood. In the Afghan conflict the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) together with the Afghan security forces applied force in order to influence the Taliban and other groups who violently opposed the elected government to change their behaviour. Although neither ISAF nor the participating nations had articulated a coercive strategy, force was used consistent with coercion theory on a number of occasions. Coercion theory consists of a number of assumptions and presuppositions, the existence of which should be present on the ground for theory to have utility. This thesis argues that these were generally not, or only to a limited degree present in the Afghan conflict. It further argues that in the cases where ISAF and its Afghan allies applied force consistent with theory, it did generally not translate to the desired outcomes, in particular when coercion represented the dominant effort. This thesis consequently argues that coercion theory is not well suited to provide explanatory power to or predict outcomes in conflicts that are comparable to the conflict in Afghanistan. In particular, theory’s presumption of unitary actors, the rationality presumption and the notion of the credible threat is insufficient. Theory’s notion of coercive mechanisms also assumes a connection between human behaviour and what may influence it that is overly simplistic. This consequently proposes a revised set of assumptions and presuppositions as well as a revised understanding of mechanisms that acknowledges that coercion alone is rarely sufficient to instil sustainable change.

The purpose of the thesis is to reinterpret Lord Wellesley's forward policy in India, with particular reference to his dealings with the Marathas, and to consider its motivation and the reasons for its failure. Lord Wellesley was the product of his age and environment. He was a colonial with ambitions to play a major role in metropolitan affairs. At the time of his appointment as Governor General of India the most important aspect of metropolitan concerns was the war with France, so that a major element in his policy was the protection of India from French interference. His policy was formed before he reached India, and had as its motivation, not only fear of the French, but fear of aggression by the Indian rulers, with or without French support. This fear derived from a conviction that Indian rulers were totally untrustworthy; only treaties permitting British control of their affairs (subsidiary treaties) could be effective to preserve peace in India. A balance of power between the Indian states, which was thought to have existed five years earlier, had been destroyed. Lord Wellesley succeeded at Mysore and Hyderabad, but failed with the Marathas. His primary target had been the Pune state, which was emphasised in the autumn of 1800 by conditional orders given to Arthur Wellesley to occupy Pune in certain circumstances. These did not occur and he retired. Meanwhile a new treaty had been concluded with the Nizam which was intensely provocative to the Marathas. It involved the British in protecting the Nizam's territory from all comers, including the Marathas who had legitimate claims on the Nizam. Their pursuit of them was liable to lead to war at some point and the British obligation made Lord Wellesley's forward policy towards them irreversible. The Peshwa of Pune was driven from Pune by Holkar and concluded the Treaty of Bassein with the British. This further provocation of the Marathas led to war with Sindhia and the Raja of Berar. The war was short lived and peace treaties were concluded with the Maratha chiefs separately by Arthur Wellesley who had been granted plenipotentiary powers in Western India. His policy was one of conciliation, not as Lord Wellesley's conquest. As a result the British failed to dominate Sindhia. Holkar now arrived on the scene and after abortive diplomatic exchanges war was declared on him. Lake the Commander-in-Chief failed to conquer Holkar, and Arthur Wellesley took no direct part in the war. Sindhia was sympathetic to Holkar and elements of his army, and, later, Sindhia himself, joined him. Lake's failure and Arthur Wellesley's divergent policy led to Lord Wellesley's failure to dominate the Marathas and, therefore, his failure to bring peace to India by conquest.

Requests for battlefield euthanasia have, no doubt, occurred on battlefields as long as there have been battlefields. When men have taken up arms against one another, for whatever reason, there have always been those wounded who do not die immediately, but clearly cannot live for long, either because of their wounds or their circumstances. This can generate the desire to hasten their inevitable death, by both the wounded soldier as well as their comrades. These situations have probably occurred throughout history.’ Mercy killings, those lethal actions carried out to relieve suffering, enacted by soldiers upon wounded enemy combatants during and after combat have been evidenced since the earliest recordings of armed conflict. An action which was taken from necessity due to inadequate medical knowledge and resources and also because of the existence of a less humane, but perhaps more practical society, are now considered as a criminal act. However, the act is often carried out from compassion and a feeling of sympathy towards the victim. Meanwhile, public values, the common law and legislation dealing with euthanasia have all developed in the domestic civilian setting. Mercy killings have traditionally been dealt with in a confusing manner by the courts, using ill-fitting doctrines such as diminished responsibility to alleviate the criminal stigma placed upon the defendant. In other situations the application of the law has created uncertainty concerning the demarcation between whether an act constitutes murder or manslaughter. This uncertainty is compounded when the law developed to deal with civilian situations is juxtaposed on a mercy killing carried out by a soldier on another combatant in a battlefield setting. These situations present circumstances beyond the comprehension of civil domestic law. To implement it correctly requires a strained alignment between the pressures facing the soldier in combat and the pressures facing the defendant in peacetime, and there is a high likelihood that by doing so an injustice shall be served to the soldier and the victim. The potential trial processes faced by the soldier who has carried out a battlefield coup de grace are also questionable. To try the soldier in a civilian court is to place the deliberation of his actions into the hands of those who are not his military or cultural peers and who will judge his actions in accordance with a belief system contrary to those the defendant is indoctrinated with through his military training. However, implementing civil criminal law in a court martial alongside military discipline offences for crimes which represent serious operational misconduct, creates conflict between which values should be prioritised. The values of military discipline are in competition with the values of the criminal law. The court martial also carries with it the aura of unfairness due to its inherent bias, and there are concerns over its partiality. However, it also offers potentially the best place for the soldier to face trial because the case is deliberated upon by a Board of military personnel, his peers, who understand the unique culture of the soldier. By comparing the professional soldier with medical professionals, who are also involved with end of life decision making a better sense of the ‘wrongness’ of the action can be found. In the medical context consent can be used to legitimise many actions which may lead to death, and even without it the doctor may act in the patient’s best interests in a manner which avoids liability but results in death. The practice of double effect allows a physician to deliver pain relief even though there is a foreseeable consequence of death. The soldier’s actions exhibit many of the same motives but are never legally justified. The comparison serves to change the perception of the action, from merely legally wrong to morally legitimate. Although difficulties exist in arguing that mercy killing actions should be made legal, the wider consideration of the influences and behaviours can show that such actions can be morally legitimate and that it is not just to punish the soldier too harshly, nor is it just to hold him to account to laws which ill-fit the circumstances, be they domestic criminal laws, international criminal laws or military offence.