What shapes a state’s political order after a successful military coup? While the bulk of academic and public perspectives center on the power and preferences of the soldiers physically seizing power, this dissertation argues that civilians should be critical to our analyses of coup politics. Specifically, I use the concept of civilian praetorianism - the process in which civilians instigate or consolidate military coups - as my point of departure. First, I build on recent efforts to delineate military coup agents by rank and identity and present a similar logic to understand the powers and preferences of civilian coup collaborators. Civilian insiders - those tied to the incumbent regime - are well-positioned to coordinate and instigate military coups because of their available elite-based resources. While civilian outsiders - those outside the regime’s orbit - lack access to such resources, they can wield mass-based sources of power to consolidate military coups. Second, I argue that the primary type of civilian collaborator - insiders vs. outsiders - in a given coup shapes the post-coup political order along two critical dimensions: the degree to which an executive can monopolize political power, and whether the new regime seeks to redistribute powers and privileges within the state’s sociopolitical hierarchies. I rely on qualitative and quantitative tools to refine and test these propositions. First, I pair a Most-Similar-Systems Design (MSSD) and within-case process tracing to illustrate the varieties of civilian praetorianism on three coup episodes from post-colonial Sudan (1958; 1969; 1989). Using a wide array of qualitative material from participant testimonies to declassified material from the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the British Foreign Office, I demonstrate that civilian agency plays a critical role in shaping their type of involvement in military coups. Next, I test the broader consequences of civilian involvement on a global sample. Specifically, I develop the first comprehensive dataset on civilian involvement in all successful military coups between 1950 and 2017 to examine the variation in personalization and policy preferences in post-coup states. By demonstrating the salience of civilian agency and involvement in coup politics, this project makes valuable contributions to the study of military coups political instability, and authoritarian politics.

This study surveys the issue of military coups in Nigerian politics. An attempt is made to explain the causes of coups d'etat. To this end, Thompson's thesis of military grievances has been rigorously employed to explain the occurrences of military coups in Nigeria. The Thompson thesis asserts that coups occur because the military is aggrieved. A study of the opinions of expert observers familiar with Nigerian politics confirmed that four out of the six military coups occurred due to problems emanating from the Nigerian military establishment. Although military grievances such as its political positions, resource bases, ethnicity, and factions within the military caused most coups, there is sufficient evidence that societal factors like economic crises, election decisions, and the need for reforms also encouraged the military to overthrow governments in Nigeria.

The study focused on the positive or negative direction shown in 57 articles from ten English-language magazines covering the 1973 military coup in Chile, September 1 to December 31, 1973, inclusive. Magazines chosen were from the fields of news, religion, opinion, and business. Direction was determined by comparing individual thought units within articles against a category table comprising mutually exclusive pairs of thought units. Directional value of each article was determined by positive and negative ratios. Results showed a wide variation in scores, with news magazines adhering most closely to the objective ideal. Recommendations for further study included long-term study of single magazines or classes of magazines for direction, and an expanded mathematical analysis.

This study analyzed the causes of military coups and the consequences of military rule in the Third World during the 1960-1985 period. Using a coup d" etat score, including both successful and unsuccessful coups, as a dependent variable and collecting data for 109 developing nations from the World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators, The New York Times Index, and public documents, sixteen hypotheses derived from the literature on the causes of military coups were tested by both simple and multiple regression models for the Third World as a whole, as well as for four regions (Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East and North Africa) and in two time periods (1960-1970 and 1971-1985). Similarly, three models of military rule (progressive, Huntington's, and revisionist models) were analyzed to assess the consequences of military rule. The results of the study concerning the causes of military coups suggest four conclusions. First, three independent variables (social mobilization, cultural homogeneity, and dominant ethnic groups in the society) have stabilizing consequences. Second, six independent variables (previous coup experience, social mobilization divided by political institutionalization, length of national independence, economic deterioration, internal war, and military dominance) have destabilizing consequences. Third, multiple regression models for each region are very useful; most models explain more than 50% of the variance in military coups. Fourth, the time period covered is an important factor affecting explanations of the causes of military coups. In the analysis of the consequences of military rule, this study found that military governments did not differ significally from civilian governments in terms of economic, education, health, and social performances. However, the study found that military rule decreased political and civil rights. Its findings are thus very consistent with the best of the literature.

Cette thèse de doctorat vise à répondre à une question qui a été largement négligée par la littérature sur les crises des régimes autoritaires : pourquoi les forces armées tolèrent-elles ou répriment-elles les mouvements d’opposition en faveur de changements du régime ? L’hypothèse principale stipule que l’attitude conciliante ou réfractaire des forces armées dépend de la nature des mesures adoptées par le régime autoritaire afin de s’assurer de leur loyauté et prévenir des coups d’État. Lorsque ces mesures de préventions des coups d’État contribuent à créer des divisons au sein de l’armée, les factions marginalisées sont enclines à tolérer les mouvements d’opposition, si ces derniers offrent une alternative crédible au régime, en raison de leur capacité à s’unir autour d’une plate-forme commune de revendications modérées, réalistes et acceptables pour les militaires. À l’inverse, lorsque les mesures de prévention des coups d’État favorisent la cohésion interne de l’armée et son attachement au régime, les militaires adoptent une attitude répressive à l’égard des forces contestataires. Ces hypothèses sont vérifiées à l’aide d’une analyse comparative des différentes mesures de prévention des coups d’État adoptées par les régimes autoritaires du Bénin et du Togo et de leurs impacts sur le succès, dans le premier cas, et l’échec, dans le second cas, des mouvements d’opposition dans les deux pays, au début des années 1990. Cette analyse est effectuée à l’aide de deux approches méthodologiques : le traçage de processus ainsi que la comparaison de deux études de cas. / This Ph.D. dissertation analyzes the factors that influence armed forces’ decisions to tolerate or suppress opposition movements demanding political reforms which could lead to regime change. This dissertation helps to fill a large gap in the literature as only a few scholars have attempted to explain military behaviour during regime crisis. It does so through an analysis of how anti-coup policies and opposition forces’ characteristics lead to the formation of marginalized military cliques and their potential support for regime change. It theorizes that the head of state’s survival strategy, specifically coup-proofing measures, influences military factions’ willingness to preserve the status quo. Reliance on loyalists leads to armed forces with a powerful core loyal to the incumbent regime and willing to use repression, while the strategy of counterbalancing leads to armed forces largely unattached to the maintenance of the regime. Under these circumstances, opposition forces can foster regime defection when they offer a viable alternative to the incumbent government, if the opposition can unify around a moderate platform that provides realist demands vis-à-vis regime forces. The main argument, on the influence of divergent coup-proofing policies on military actions, is assessed through a comparison of Benin and Togo. In each state, authoritarian regimes responded to the challenge of opposition mobilization by initiating negotiation processes. Divergences in coup-prevention techniques and credible commitment capacity of the opposition explain why the opposition campaign in the beginning of the 1990s was successful in Benin but failed in Togo. This research is based on two methods: process-tracing and the comparative method.