It is argued that physical (and not inherently psychical) properties are insufficient to constitute all else. Specifically they cannot constitute an instance (K1) of our knowledge that the number of existing things is at least one. This employs a new version of entry by entailment: Every fact as to the presence of a constituted trope is entailed by facts about the presence of the ontologically basic, where a property is ontologically basic if and only if the fact of its presence is not entailed (even allowing exhaustive definitions of all tropes in terms of their ultimate constituents) by facts about the presence of things non-identical to it. Existence is a mind-independent presence. Things can be present (to mind) as opposed to existing but must be accompanied by the presence of all of their parts and of anything else that their presence might entail. This includes some existing thing in the case that knowledge that something exists is present, since it is analytic that knowledge cannot be of what is not the case. Purely dynamical properties cannot exist apart from instances of some other property kind (on pain of regress as to what moves). Material properties can make a difference to cognitive states only in virtue of differences they can make to dynamical properties. Thus, any cognitive state present in some dynamical and material scenario must be present in an equivalent purely dynamical scenario, which cannot exist. Hence: 1) There can be no knowledge of existence, or thus trope K1, in a purely dynamical scenario. 2) There can thus neither be a trope K1 if only dynamical and material properties (and what they constitute) are present. So because there is a trope K1, there are one or more ontologically basic properties which are not dynamical or material. It is further argued that nothing ontologically basic is per se (directly and non-obscurely) conceivable except as psychicality or a categorical basis of a disposition to change or constancy (respectively, dynamism and materiality). Thus at least one ontologically basic property is either psychical or not per se conceivable. The latter proposition has less merit.

It is proposed that there exist unmistakable resonances of the Hermetic world-view in much of the science of the modern period. Hermes Recidivus examines key figurations operating within both the imaginaries of Hermeticism and modern(ist) science with a view to developing a postmodern critical position in regard to the discourse of the modernist scientific project. It is proposed that a re-examination of the notions surrounding these key figurations may provide new hermeneutical tools, and that the imaginary of Hermeticism represents a potentially rich resource from which to develop alternative modes of critical enquiry. It is furthermore proposed that the mechanism by which these Hermetic resonances are perpetuated within the discourse of modernist science takes the form of a logic of the imaginary associated with key figurations within Hermeticism. Certain figural elements associated with the Hermetic imaginary seem to possess a constancy that travels across temporal and disciplinary barriers, encouraging the assumption that these figures are central organising principles within both Hermeticism and modern science. Specifically these figurations are those of the anima mundi and the Gnostic 'alien light' or spintheros. It is proposed that these figurations take the form of 'ideal objects' within both the discourses of Hermeticism and modernist science. The individual chapters respectively examine the relevance of the Hermetic imaginary to Artificial Intelligence research and cybernetic theory; occidental and oriental traditions of the 'subtle body' and their relevance to developing a postmodern perspective on the question of mind-body dualism; the 'metaphysical geometry' of key figures within the Hermetic and Kabbalistic traditions and their resonances within mathematical 'catastrophe theory' as developed by Rene Thom; the Hermetic alchemy of Robbert Fludd as revealed in his text Truth's Golden Harrow, and its relevance in regard to the subject-object split of modern(ist) scientific consciousness and, finally, the influence of Kabbalistic and Hermetic figuration on the development of Leibniz's monadological philosophy and on the notion of the 'field' in contemporary physical theory / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

Theory of mind has been described in philosophical and psychological literature as "folk psychology", and is the tacit understanding that our behaviour is driven by our thoughts, desires and beliefs (Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001). Children are widely considered to have attained theory of mind understanding when they are able to pass the test of false belief understanding devised by Wimmer and Perner (1983), at around 4 years of age. There are many theories as to how a child comes to hold a folk psychology, including innate modularism (Leslie, 1987, 1988, 1994), theory change (Gopnik & Wellman 1992), developing representational understanding (Perner, 1991, 1995, 2000), and experiential understanding developed in a socio-linguisitic context (Nelson, 1996). In addition, theory of mind has been linked to the development of symbolic understanding (Deloache & Smith, 1999; Perner, 1991), pretend play (Leslie, 1987; Taylor & Carlson, 1997; Youngblade & Dunn, 1993), language (Astington & Jenkins, 1999; Nelson, 1996; Olson, 1988) and executive function (e.g. Hughes, 1998a; Kochanska et al., 1996; Reed et al., 1984). The present study sought to bring together these diverse findings and to attempt to provide an integrated account of the emergence of theory of mind understanding during the preschool years. Sixty-four New Zealand children were assessed on their mental state understanding, deceptive abilities, symbolic functioning, language, and executive skills, when they were aged 30, 36, 42 and 48 months of age. There were a number of key findings in the present study. Language was a powerful predictor of false belief performance both within and across time, and was also related to many of the other variables included in the study. Performance on the scale model test of symbolic functioning was related across time to children�s concurrent and later false belief understanding. Scale model performance was also intertwined in a bidirectional relationship with language, and language appeared to play an increasingly important role in mediating the relationship with false belief understanding across time. False belief understanding and scale model performance were also related within and across time to executive function. There was evidence to suggest that the importance of working memory was due to its role in conflict inhibition. Although deception has sometimes been posited to be a precocious manifestation of theory of mind (Chandler, Fritz, & Hala, 1989), in the present study deceptive ability lagged false belief understanding. Furthermore, false belief understanding was related to children�s subsequent (but not earlier) responses to a protagonist�s intention. This supports the hypothesis that false belief understanding allows a qualitative change in the execution of deception, whereby children can move from simple physical strategies to more sophisticated mentalist strategies. Overall, the present study provides some evidence to suggest that symbolic functioning, language, and later theory of mind may form part of a single developing skill set of symbolic representation. In dynamic interaction with social understanding, and supported by cognitive abilities such as executive function, and the socio-linguistic context, it is argued that understanding of one�s own and other minds emerges. Children�s ability to solve the false belief problem at 4 years of age is presented as a milestone on a developmental continuum of social understanding.

Thesis (M.A.)--Western Conservative Baptist Seminary, 1988. / Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 87-95).

When considering the nature of the human being, Descartes holds two main claims: he believes that the human being is a genuine unity and he also holds that it is comprised of two distinct substances, mind and body. These claims appear to be at odds with one another; it is not clear how the human being can be simultaneously two things and one thing. The details of Descartes' metaphysics of substance exacerbates this problem. Because of various theological and epistemological commitments, Descartes frames his metaphysics of substance in a way that ensures mind and body's real distinction from one another. Articulated from this perspective, the problem becomes one wherein it is not clear that two completely separate substances can come together to form one entity. The aim of this thesis is to show how Descartes can hold real distinction and true union without contradiction. To this end, I will first detail the problem and outline a variety of solutions that have already been presented. Then I will outline important concepts relating to Descartes' metaphysics of substance and attributes. This not only reveals the depth of the problem but also lays the groundwork for my proposed solution. I argue that the key to understanding how these two claims are consistent and in accord with Descartes' philosophy is through a comment Descartes makes to his contemporary Henricus Regius where he urges that the union of mind and body is achieved through a "mode of union." I substantiate this claim by arguing for the intelligibility of understanding union as a modal attribute within Descartes' framework. Finally, I show how Descartes can hold real distinction and true union with consistency. When union is understood as a mode, mind and body are able to exist apart from one another, ensuring real distinction. Moreover, union construed as a mode does not allow the complete separability of mind and body. Thus, when united, mind and body achieve the kind of unity Descartes desires for the human being.

Stroke rehabilitation is to train the motor function of a patients limb. In this process, functional assessment is of importance, and it is primarily based on a patients task performance. The context of the rehabilitation discussed in this thesis is such that functional assessment is conducted through a computer system and the Internet. In particular, a patient performs the task at home in a haptic virtual environment, and the task performance is transmitted to the therapist over the Internet. One problem with this approach to functional assessment is that a patients mind state is little known to the therapist. This immediately leads to one question, that is, whether an elevated mind state will have some significant effect on the patients task performance? If so, this approach can result in a considerable error. The overall objective of this thesis study was to generate an answer to the aforementioned question. The study focused on a patients elevated fatigue state. The specific objectives of the study include: (i) developing a haptic virtual environment prototype system for functional assessment, (ii) developing a physiological-based inference system for fatigue state, and (iii) performing an experiment to generate knowledge regarding the fatigue effect on task performance. With a limited resource in recruiting patients in the experiment, the study conducted few experiments on patients but mostly on healthy subjects. The study has concluded: (1) the proposed haptic virtual environment system is effective for the wrist coordination task and is likely promising to other tasks, (2) the accuracy of proposed fatigue inference system achieves 89.54%, for two levels of fatigue state, which is promising, (3) the elevated fatigue state significantly affects task performance in the context of wrist coordination task, and (4) the accuracy of the individual-based inference approach is significantly higher than that of the group-based inference approach. The main contributions of the thesis are (1) generation of the new knowledge regarding the fatigue effect on task performance in the context of home-based rehabilitation, (2) provision of the new fatigue inference system with the highest accuracy in comparison with the existing approaches in literature, and (3) generation of the new knowledge regarding the difference between the individual-based inference and group-based inference approaches.

The philosophical discussion of conceptual content and linguistic meaning in the 20th century has been dominated by two contrasting approaches - the descriptive-internalist approach, and the causal-externalist approach. Recent semantic models, for example the two-dimensional semantics of Jackson and Chalmers, attempt to integrate these two approaches. In this dissertation I explore a series of puzzles that highlight points at which the resources of these two approaches combined fall short. Particularly, the dissertation is an argument for the claim that facts about a linguistic community can affect the conceptual and linguistic content of individual members of that community, developing insights of theorists such as Quine, Wittgenstein, Kripke, Lewis and Davidson. The study proceeds along two lines simultaneously, as an investigation into puzzles concerning conceptual content on the one hand, and concerning linguistic meaning on the other. The centerpiece of the investigation into linguistic meaning is a proposal for an irreducibly social aspect of linguistic meaning, which I call the ‘public content’ of linguistic terms. This proposal is motivated by the identification of some points at which neither individualist models of linguistic meaning nor the ‘social’ models of meaning currently available give convincing accounts. Drawing on recent developments in social epistemology, I argue that this aspect of meaning is determined by what speakers engaged in discourse would agree on under an ideal process of collective reasoning as the meaning of the terms they use. In the last chapter I attempt to reconcile this model of meaning with the two-dimensional semantic model, arguing for a three-dimensional model of meaning that includes internal, external, and public dimensions. Alongside the discussion of linguistic meaning I explore a series of related puzzles that arise for conceptual content, particularly a new puzzle of referential indeterminacy, and the problem of conceptual error or normativity. I propose and defend solutions to these puzzles that lean heavily on the rational resources of individuals, focusing on the ‘personal level’ contents of thought to resolve puzzles in this domain, and rejecting models that lean on ‘sub-personal’ states such as neuronal, historical, or dispositional states of thinkers.

This paper addresses the question of whether Artificial Intelligence can have intentionality. This question is part of a larger discussion of whether or not Artificial Intelligence can ever be 'conscious'. Ultimately, I come to the conclusion that while we can see how intentionality can be transferred, it has yet to be shown that intentionality can be created within Artificial Intelligence. To begin, I define intentionality. I then discuss the Turing Test (Alan Turing, "Computing Machinery and Intelligence" and the Chinese Room (John R. Searle, "Minds, Brains, and Programs"). I conclude by expressing my own opinions and where I believe Artificial Intelligence will be in the near future.

For nearly 30 years, researchers have been proposing and testing theories of the cognitive mechanisms that underlie children’s abilities to comprehend the mental states of others and to predict behavior on the basis of those abilities. One such theory, the “theory theory,” contends that children evaluate their own understanding of others’ minds, developing a theory and expanding it when they encounter situations incongruent with their predictions. Wellman and Liu (2004) present a scale of the changes that children’s understanding of mental state representations commonly undergo as children develop a mature theory of mind. The present study aims to clarify how children pass from one stage of understanding to the next, employing a training study paradigm to examine the possible role of verbal scaffolding on children’s progression in this sequence. Specifically, the present study hypothesizes that verbally emphasizing the connection between one’s knowledge and thoughts will advance children’s performance on false belief tasks. This hypothesis was not supported. Even though children may appear to be at the same developmental level on Wellman and Liu’s (2004) scale, the variation in their performances after training may indicate more nuanced underlying processes than are currently expressed by Wellman and Liu’s (2004) scale.

The philosophical discussion of conceptual content and linguistic meaning in the 20th century has been dominated by two contrasting approaches - the descriptive-internalist approach, and the causal-externalist approach. Recent semantic models, for example the two-dimensional semantics of Jackson and Chalmers, attempt to integrate these two approaches. In this dissertation I explore a series of puzzles that highlight points at which the resources of these two approaches combined fall short. Particularly, the dissertation is an argument for the claim that facts about a linguistic community can affect the conceptual and linguistic content of individual members of that community, developing insights of theorists such as Quine, Wittgenstein, Kripke, Lewis and Davidson. The study proceeds along two lines simultaneously, as an investigation into puzzles concerning conceptual content on the one hand, and concerning linguistic meaning on the other. The centerpiece of the investigation into linguistic meaning is a proposal for an irreducibly social aspect of linguistic meaning, which I call the ‘public content’ of linguistic terms. This proposal is motivated by the identification of some points at which neither individualist models of linguistic meaning nor the ‘social’ models of meaning currently available give convincing accounts. Drawing on recent developments in social epistemology, I argue that this aspect of meaning is determined by what speakers engaged in discourse would agree on under an ideal process of collective reasoning as the meaning of the terms they use. In the last chapter I attempt to reconcile this model of meaning with the two-dimensional semantic model, arguing for a three-dimensional model of meaning that includes internal, external, and public dimensions. Alongside the discussion of linguistic meaning I explore a series of related puzzles that arise for conceptual content, particularly a new puzzle of referential indeterminacy, and the problem of conceptual error or normativity. I propose and defend solutions to these puzzles that lean heavily on the rational resources of individuals, focusing on the ‘personal level’ contents of thought to resolve puzzles in this domain, and rejecting models that lean on ‘sub-personal’ states such as neuronal, historical, or dispositional states of thinkers.