Conflicting viewpoints are evidenced in the literature regarding the adjustment of tuberculous patients. Many writers maintain that it is peculiar to the tuberculous, others that the same can be found in any chronically ill sample, still others that the adjustment of the tuberculous is no different from that manifested by individuals in the general population. This study attempts to clarify the above conflicting viewpoints by comparing a hospitalized sample with matched groups of chronically ill, general population, and arrested tuberculous. All previous studies reviewd by the writer in which a tuberculous sample was compared to a non-tuberculous group lacked either sufficient controls or adequate sampling. In this study, a hospitalized tuberculous sample of 100 cases was matched for age, sex, educational level and socio-economic status with 100 chronically ill, 100 non-tuberculous individuals from the general population, and 100 arrested tuberculous. The necessary information was derived from a Personal Data Sheet compiled by the writer. The hospitalized tuberculous, chronically ill and arrested tuberculous samples were drawn from the Vancouver General Hospital. A comparison of length of time in hospital for the hospitalized tuberculous and chronically ill was made. The Bernreuter Personality Inventory was employed, and its values and limitations were discussed. An abbreviated method of scoring was used that correlates highly with the original standardized method. The Personal Data sheets and Inventory were administered by two physicians in the case of the hospitalized tuberculous and arrested tuberculous. The head nurse of each ward administered them to the chronically ill sample. No means of identification were used in the study. Mean scores were computed for the experimental and three control groups of each of the size measures of the Inventory. A comparison between groups was made for each of the size measures and the significance of the differences determined. The comparison of the hospitalized tuberculous with the sample from the general population yielded a “highly significant” difference, for four of the measures and for the remaining two a “significant” difference, and the conclusion drawn was that the tuberculous sample was more maladjusted than the sample from the general population. “Highly significant” differences were obtained for four of the measures in the comparison between hospitalized tuberculous and hospitalized chronically ill samples. Again the hospitalized tuberculous sample was the more maladjusted. The differences found in the other two measures, namely of self-sufficiency and sociability were “not significant”, and it was suggested that scores on these two measures tend to be affected by the state of being hospitalized with its attendant difficulties. When hospitalized tuberculous sample was compared with the arrested tuberculous, “highly significant” differences were found for neurotic tendency, introversion-extroversion and confidence, and “probably significant” differences for dominance and sociability. The trend indicated that again the hospitalized tuberculous were the more maladjusted. With respect to self-sufficiency, there was no significant difference. The various clinical statuses pertaining to the arrested state of tuberculous impose certain limitations on the activity of the individuals, as a consequence, a lack of self-sufficiency might be expected. / Arts, Faculty of / Psychology, Department of / Graduate

No description available.

Research in the field of mind/body/spirit/mental connection is extensive. However very few studies have focused on the persons who have survived a life-threatening critical illness and the way in which they redefine beliefs, values and their world view. Recognition of the transformation that occurs following such a crisis is an important contribution toward understanding all facets of the connectedness that exists between our mind, our body, our spirit, our mental/’emotional state and healing. This study will consider the question “What kind of transformation occurs for some who experience critical Illness?” Transformation means starting with one thing and ending up with another. This study reveals the inner world of eight participants (co-searchers) who experienced a medical crisis and found their inner world transformed. A clear view of the road taken by the participants is elucidated following a heuristic path requiring the researcher to interview to the point of saturation. The criterion for a heuristic study has been met. Relevant literature pertaining to the changing worldview of professionals working within the area of wellness from Grecian times to the present is considered. Some qualitative methods available to researchers are explored. This study can contribute to modification and/or expansion of existing health care programs to include the person in the situation. Credible evidence is presented to support the importance of acknowledging the positive aspects within illnesses that can be offered within a variety of health related disciplines: psychology, counseling, nursing, and religious studies, social work and health care providers. The nature of heuristic research is to merge the participants and the investigator. The co-searchers and the investigator reveal their understanding of those things that existed only in an innate dimension prior to illness. As a result of their experience, the researcher and the co-searchers present a rich plethora of changed perspectives they identify as transformative revealing the power illness offers us to reevaluate our personal actions impacting those around us as our worldview expands. This study is not meant to query who lives and who dies, for death ultimately claims us all. / Graduate

[Typewritten] Includes bibliography.

1 v. (various pagings) / Title page, contents and abstract only. The complete thesis in print form is available from the University Library. / Thesis (D.Litt.) from the Dept. of Philosophy, University of Adelaide, 1972

Thesis (M.S.)--University of North Carolina at Greensboro, 2006. / Title from PDF title page screen. Advisor: Jennifer Etnier; submitted to the School of Health and Human Performance. Includes bibliographical references (p. 37-43).

Thesis (M.A.)--Denver Seminary, 2000. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 67-70).

Academisch proefschrift--Amsterdam. / Summaries in French and German. "Literatuur": p. [321]-328.

The intent of this thesis is to present James W. Cornman and Keith Lehrer's critical review of the classical body-mind problem and to present a persona defense of the theory known as dualistic interactionism. In establishing dualistic interactionism between a person's body and mind, evidence can be given to demonstrate an overarching relationship between the mental and physical. Furthermore, in establishing such a theory it is possible to show that a person can learn to exert voluntary control over biological states. And in establishing voluntary control over bodily events and states, volition, a cognitive process, clearly can be seen to be a control dimension in human behavior and of the human psyche.

The main objective of this thesis is to indicate an approach through which ontological dualism of mind and body may be collapsed - to show that (and how) the intuitive resistance to ontological monism is confused. A minor objective, much less extensively argued for, is to indicate that once we can accept that there is no logical obstacle to the view that we are purely physical, then human mentality poses no logical obstacle to the scientific accommodation of human beings - to physicalism. It is argued that we already have, in Wittgenstein's Private Language Argument, a very powerful argument suggesting that ontological dualism is logically unsound. The assessment of Wittgenstein's impact on ontological dualism occupies the first major section of the thesis (Part 2). But it is found that the logical force of Wittgenstein's argument, though successfully applicable against ontological dualism, does not prescribe the sort of monistic account we should adopt. For there are two alternatives which satisfy Wittgenstein's argument, which is essentially an argument banishing necessarily "private" mental events. One alternative involves abandoning the view that we can be introspectively aware of mental events (essentially a behaviourist approach). The other alternative is to retain the possibility of introspective awareness of mental events, while maintaining that the latter are only contingently "private" (an approach with which the mind-brain identity theory may be aligned). The first alternative is summarily rejected as being too counter-intuitive; and the remainder of the thesis explores the viability of the second alternative. But the latter alternative is also counter-intuitive: the dualist and the unconvinced materialist resist the suggestion that the mental events of which we may be introspectively aware could be neural events occurring in the brain or central nervous system. In Part 5 the mind-brain identity theory is discussed. The strategy underlying this approach, as generally conceived, is found not only to be unstable and ambivalent - straddling two rather different views - but also to be marked by a reluctance to engage sympathetically with the dualist's resistance. In Part 4 an attempt is made to examine and undermine this resistance. It is found that this resistance is set in a context involving a confused form of realism; and the confusion is traced to a familiarly mistaken notion of perception, in which mental perceptual events are taken to mediate between a "mental subject" and the "external world". The attempt to expose the confusions involved here, and to present a more satisfactory realism in a monistic setting, is supported by a formallinguistic treatment of the relevant aspects of perception. In this formal account, which requires some elementary set-theoretical notions (in particular the notion of isomorphism), a designatory role is defined for perceptual events taken as syntactic entities in a certain sort of formal language. Through this formal treatment it is shown that for a rich enough (purely) physical structure there would be a "subjective dualism": essentially a symptom of the fact that for a physical structure to "perceive" a physical event, there would have to occur in it an unperceived (physical) event. And it is suggested that the dualist's resistance is based on a confusion in which what he takes to be a justification for ontological dualism can only be taken as a justification for "subjective dualism". As a result of these considerations a modified form of the mind-brain identity theory is advocated, in which mental events for whose occurrence we can have introspective evidence are construed as unperceived (but not imperceptible) physical events which (it is hypothesised in the case of human beings) have neurophysiological descriptions. In Part 5 this view is considered in a more general context. Also in this section there is an argument for a view hinted at earlier in the thesis, maintaining that the peculiarities of "mental discourse" pose no serious problem for physicalism. Finally, two problems connected with the notions of the "unity" and "simplicity" of mind are briefly mentioned, and an indication is given as to how they may be handled by the present account.