This dissertation examines the effects of the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program or SNAP, formally known as the Food Stamp Program, on adult weight outcomes. The focus of this work is to uncover the causal effects of the program by applying rigorous identification methods as well as techniques that address data limitations. By understanding the true impact of SNAP on adult obesity, policymakers can pursue appropriate reform measures to avoid unintended consequences of the program while promoting healthy weight outcomes for low-income Americans. The first essay expands on previous work examining the effects of SNAP participation on adult obesity. Previous research provides some evidence that SNAP participation may have a small positive effect on weight gain for women and no significant effect on men. However, additional research has found that misreporting of SNAP participation in surveys is prevalent and that analysis of program effects when participation is misclassified (misreported) can produce estimates that are biased and misleading. Until now, nearly all studies examining the effects of SNAP on adult obesity have ignored the issue of respondent misreporting. This chapter uses state-level policy variables regarding SNAP administration to instrument for SNAP participation for NLSY79 respondents. To address respondent misreporting I adopt an approach based on parametric methods for misclassified binary dependent variables that produces consistent estimates when using instrumental variables. This study is the first to document the considerable rates of SNAP participation under-reporting in the NLSY79 dataset. In addition, this study finds that, although SNAP participation increases adult BMI and the likelihood of being obese, without correcting for misreporting bias the estimates are overstated by nearly 100 percent. The second essay uses the same data but applies a different identification strategy to investigate the intensive margin effects of SNAP on adult obesity. To mitigate the severity of endogenous participation and misreporting biases, I employ a strategy that examines only individuals who report participating in SNAP. I utilize a quasi-experimental variation in SNAP amount per adult due to the timing of school eligibility for children. The identification examines the proportion of school-age children in SNAP households who automatically qualify for in-school nutrition assistance programs. A greater proportion of school-age children eligible for free in-school meals proxies for an exogenous increase in the amount of SNAP benefits available per adult. This study finds that increases in SNAP benefits, as proxied by increases in the proportion of school-age children, reduce BMI and the probability of being severely obese for SNAP adults. Taken together, the results of this dissertation present an intriguing depiction of the effects of SNAP on adult obesity that serves to inform both policymakers and future researchers. On the one hand, the findings indicate that participating in SNAP (extensive margin) leads to weight gain and higher rates of obesity. Yet, on the other hand, increases in the amount of benefits for those who report participating in SNAP (intensive margin) actually leads to reductions in weight and the likelihood of being severely obese.

The first chapter analyzes the impact of gender quota regulation on women's participation in politics. Gender quotas are the main policy tools used to encourage participation in politics. A natural experiment in Spanish municipal elections is exploited to study the success of such reforms. Gender quotas are found to improve the number of women candidates, but due to strategic reaction from political parties, much fewer women are being elected. Political parties disproportionately allocate women to the lowest possible position while still complying with the law. Parties have a propensity to assign women candidates to positions where they have relatively low chance of being elected. There is also no shift in public policy toward spending preferred by women. The second chapter presents empirical evidence in support of the Leviathan model of government. In Spain, the number of politicians chosen in local elections depends on the population of the municipality. Using a data set that covers over two decades of municipal elections, I present two main results. First, there is an unusual concentration of municipalities (bunching) with reported populations just above the threshold that increases the number of local representatives. I present compelling evidence that elected officials manipulate population figures in advance of upcoming elections in order to maximize the size of the council. Second, I use machine learning techniques to construct an unbiased measure of population based on luminosity data and census population figures, and study which municipalities are more likely to misreport based on the quality of the democratic institutions. Based on those measures, I conclude that misreporting is more likely to happen in municipalities with higher turnout and less parties in their council. The final chapter studies the impact that World War II fatalities had on political preferences during the twentieth century in the United States. We document enlistment and fatalities at the county level and use this variation to study the hypothesis that fatalities permanently shifted U.S. political preferences. In particular, we test whether the proximate casualties theory, which states that voters punish incumbents in the short run after a war, affected United States counties after World War II. We conclude that there is not enough evidence in our analysis to determine that fatalities during World War II significantly impacted long term political preferences.

Background: Canada is the only developed country with universal healthcare but no universal prescription drug coverage. Prescription drug coverage in Canada is often described as a “patchwork” system; eligibility for coverage varies by province and influenced by circumstance. Subsets of the population are eligible for partial or full provincial coverage for their prescription medications through public and/or private coverage. Methods: The extent and factors associated with misreporting of drug insurance and cost-related non-adherence (CRNA) to prescribed medicines were investigated in three study populations: Ontario seniors 65 and over, Quebec seniors 65 and over, and Quebec adults 25-64 using pooled data from the 2015/2016 Canadian Community Health Survey (CCHS). The rationale for these study cohorts was that the vast majority had partial or full coverage for prescription medications from a public and/or private source. The factors associated with CRNA to prescribed medicines were also explored in these three subgroups. Results: There is a degree of misreporting of drug insurance among Ontario seniors (17%), Quebec seniors (18%) and Quebec adults (9%). Quebec adults who declared CRNA to prescribed drugs had twice the odds of misreporting prescription drug coverage (OR 2.1 95% CI 1.3-3.4). Lower-income earners among Ontario seniors (OR 1.8, 95% CI 1.3-2.6), Quebec seniors (OR 1.7 95% CI 1.2-2.6), and Quebec adults (OR 3.4, 95% CI 2.3-5.1) were more likely to misreport coverage. Quebec seniors were more likely to misreport if they had less than a secondary school education (OR 1.4, 95% CI 1.1-1.8). Ontario seniors who were immigrants were more likely to misreport coverage (OR 1.5, 95% CI 1.2-1.8), as were Quebec seniors who were immigrants (OR 2.2, 95% CI 1.4-3.5). Ontario seniors who had a flu shot in the past 12 months (OR 0.7, 95% CI 0.5-9.9) and Quebec adults who had visited a GP in the past 12 months (OR 0.6, 95% CI 0.45,0.77) were less likely to misreport coverage. CRNA to prescribed drugs was reported by Ontario seniors (3.3%), Quebec seniors (2.5%), and Quebec adults (5.3%). Low-income Ontario seniors (OR 2.9, 95% CI 1.5-5.7) and Quebec adults (2.5, 95% CI 1.6-3.8) were more likely to report CRNA to prescribed medicines. Quebec adults with chronic conditions (OR 1.7, 95% CI 1.2-2.4) and those in self-reported poor health (OR 2.4, 95% CI 1.3-4.4) were also more likely to report CRNA to prescribed drugs. Conclusions: There appears to be a socio-economic gradient in misreporting and CRNA among Ontario seniors, Quebec seniors, and Quebec adults. Given most of these subgroups will have coverage, we hypothesize a degree of measurement error among responses. More specifically, respondents who report CRNA to prescribed medicines may reflect measurement error. / Thesis / Master of Science (MSc) / Canada is a country that prides itself on universal healthcare yet lacks an important component - universal prescription drug coverage. Hence, it is often described as a “patchwork system” whereby Canadians must rely on a combination of public and private drugs plans depending upon circumstance. As a result, a proportion of Canadians lack prescription drug coverage and may be unable to afford prescription medications. This study aimed to investigate self-reported knowledge of prescription drug insurance in three populations: Ontario seniors 65 years and over, Quebec seniors 65 years and older, and Quebec adults 25-64 years old. The determinants of misreporting of drug insurance among these study populations was the primary objective of this analysis. The association between cost-related nonadherence (CRNA) to prescribed drugs and misreporting was a key variable in the analysis. Although only a small proportion of respondents reported CRNA to prescribed drugs, Quebec adults 25-64 were more likely to misreport drug coverage if they also reported CRNA. This study has provided some clarity on the factors that influence misreporting of drug insurance by Ontario seniors, Quebec seniors, and Quebec adults. Given health policy decisions are often guided by studies based on this data, researchers may consider a degree of misreporting in responses. Policy should aim to reduce misunderstandings about their drug coverage.

Using organizational theory, this research study examines whether a firm's business strategy influences the ethical culture and climate within the organization, and thus explains why a firm's business strategy may ultimately contribute toward an increased risk of financial misreporting. This study develops from recent research which finds that companies following an innovative, risk-oriented Prospector business strategy are significantly more likely to experience financial reporting irregularities, despite increased audit effort levels. To examine the research question, both survey and archival methods are employed. Using a large-scale research survey, I find two subset groups of Prospector firms where a smaller (larger) group is significantly associated with a less (more) ethical culture and climate, which offer insights into why companies following a Prospector business strategy continue to experience irregularities despite auditors' efforts. Results suggest auditors may not be able to distinguish between the two sets of Prospectors and thus may direct higher audit efforts too generally at Prospector firms rather than at the smaller set of firms with less ethical cultures and climates?i.e., firms more prone to rationalizing less ethical behavior. I also find that firms pursing a second type of strategy, a transitory Reactor strategy, are consistently associated with a negative ethical culture and climate. For a subset of public companies which can be linked to archival data, I find evidence to suggest that companies with less (more) ethical climates are associated with an increased (reduced) risk of financial misreporting while controlling for incentive and opportunity factors. I continue to find evidence that companies following a Prospector business strategy are associated with greater risks of misreporting, confirming prior research. Altogether, my findings suggest several antecedents for firms experiencing greater risk of financial statement misreporting and provide evidence regarding the third leg of the auditing fraud triangle (rationalization).

No description available.

Research on college student use of caffeine combined with alcohol (CAC) and public health concern over such use has been hampered by the absence of psychometrically sound measures of caffeine and CAC use. The present study examined agreement between survey (CAS) and interview (TLFB) methods for collecting data on caffeine, alcohol and CAC use. Participants were N=50 college students randomized to complete CAS followed by TLFB or the reverse. Qualitative follow-up interviews with N=15 participants were used to identify factors contributing to CAS-TLFB discrepancies. Responses varied by method of administration, with largest discrepancy magnitudes found for CAC, followed by caffeine, then alcohol use. Rates of reporting use by only one method were highest for CAC (65.5%). Lack of knowledge about caffeine was common, with over half (56%) having at least one caffeine misreport. Largest discrepancies were found for CAC use, an area of public health concern, particularly among college students.

We introduce an electoral pollster in a two-candidate costly voting model to study the incentives that pollsters have regarding the release of poll results. In our model, the pollster has private knowledge about the distribution of citizens\' preferences, but it may report false information to the public. If this happens, we say the pollster is misreporting the poll. An often heard criticism about pollsters is that they might manipulate in order to benefit some candidate. We show that they have incentives to misreport even in the absence of ideological motives. Moreover, misreported polls are welfare-improving relative to truthful polls. / Introduz-se um instituto de pesquisa eleitoral em um modelo de voto custoso a fim de estudar quais incentivos os institutos possuem ao divulgarem suas pesquisas. No nosso modelo, o instituto possui informação privada a respeito da distribuição de preferências da sociedade sobre os candidatos, mas pode escolher reportar incorretamente essa informação ao público. Se isso acontece, diremos que o instituto manipulou a pesquisa eleitoral. Uma preocupação comum das pessoas em relação aos institutos de pesquisa é a possibilidade de eles manipularem uma pesquisa eleitoral com o objetivo direto de beneficiar um determinado candidato. Nós mostramos que eles possuem incentivos para manipular a pesquisa mesmo na ausência de motivações partidárias. Ainda, essa manipulação aumenta o bem-estar da sociedade, em comparação com pesquisas verdadeiras.

We introduce an electoral pollster in a two-candidate costly voting model to study the incentives that pollsters have regarding the release of poll results. In our model, the pollster has private knowledge about the distribution of citizens\' preferences, but it may report false information to the public. If this happens, we say the pollster is misreporting the poll. An often heard criticism about pollsters is that they might manipulate in order to benefit some candidate. We show that they have incentives to misreport even in the absence of ideological motives. Moreover, misreported polls are welfare-improving relative to truthful polls. / Introduz-se um instituto de pesquisa eleitoral em um modelo de voto custoso a fim de estudar quais incentivos os institutos possuem ao divulgarem suas pesquisas. No nosso modelo, o instituto possui informação privada a respeito da distribuição de preferências da sociedade sobre os candidatos, mas pode escolher reportar incorretamente essa informação ao público. Se isso acontece, diremos que o instituto manipulou a pesquisa eleitoral. Uma preocupação comum das pessoas em relação aos institutos de pesquisa é a possibilidade de eles manipularem uma pesquisa eleitoral com o objetivo direto de beneficiar um determinado candidato. Nós mostramos que eles possuem incentivos para manipular a pesquisa mesmo na ausência de motivações partidárias. Ainda, essa manipulação aumenta o bem-estar da sociedade, em comparação com pesquisas verdadeiras.

This dissertation studies the economics of strategic misreporting and the effect of different anti-misreporting approaches based on theoretical, experimental, and quasi-experimental evidence. In Essay 1, I propose a theoretical model to study the efficacy of absolute and relative inspection standards in reducing misreporting when agents are heterogeneous in their reporting cost. I extend from previous theoretical studies by examining explicitly the performance of competitive endogenous audit rule (i.e., tournament audit) compared to the random audit as a function of agent’s heterogeneity parameter. I find that a tournament audit reduces average misreporting and the dispersion of misreporting relative to a random audit, and that the magnitude of the reduction is independent of the degree of heterogeneity among agents. A larger number of audits (presumably delivered by a softer budget constraint), a higher degree of imperfect monitoring, and larger risk aversion among agents reduce the effectiveness of the tournament audit in lowering misreporting. However, the magnitude of the reduction remains independent of heterogeneity in those cases.<div><br></div><div>Theoretical predictions from the first essay are built on a strategic equilibrium concept that relies on rather sophisticated assumptions. Testing these predictions in a controlled environment is thus of empirical importance. In Essay 2, I study misreporting decisions in laboratory experiments, and I test predictions from the first essay. The game played by subjects carefully recreates the environment used to generate theoretical predictions. The experiments have two sources of exogenous variation. The first varies the audit scheme, while the second varies heterogeneity in the cost of reporting. This allows me to test the key predictions from Essay 1 by comparing outcomes across different combinations of treatments. The experimental results largely support the theoretical predictions that a tournament audit reduces misreporting, both with homogeneous and heterogeneous agents. It also supports the prediction that the magnitude of the reduction in misreporting under a tournament audit relative to the random audit is largely independent of the degree of heterogeneity. However, the misreporting reduction is smaller than predicted, as subjects in the experiment tend to misreport less in the random audit baseline. This result is consistent with subjects being risk averse as characterized in Essay 1. Similarly, efficiency gains associated with lower misreporting are smaller than predicted.<br></div><div><br></div><div>In the third essay, I study a reform that conferred Chinese provincial authorities more monitoring power over air pollution performance by cities in those provinces. I use quasi-experimental methods to quantify the effects of this reform on misreporting by local authorities. Implemented in 2016, the reform gave the provincial authorities direct access to local (municipal) pollution monitoring stations, thereby making it harder for local authorities to misreport after the reform. The reform was introduced only in some provinces, many treated and untreated provinces have similar pollution trends before the reform and significant overlap on observable characteristics. These features aid me in establishing a causal effect of the reform on misreporting. The estimation involves two steps. First, I quantify different types of misreporting following recently proposed methodologies. Second, I regress estimated misreporting on the reform indicator using a difference in difference estimator. I found that the reform reduces hard misreporting, which takes place when local authorities interfere with the pollution monitoring facility, both during regular days and during heavily polluted days. The reform does not appear to reduce soft misreporting, which takes place when local authorities tamper with the pollution data. The results are robust to a number of robustness tests, and suggest that through proper institutional reform, the upper-level government can prevent certain types of misreporting at the local level. <br></div><div><br></div><div>This dissertation delivers a characterization of strategic misreporting by heterogeneous agents and studies the impact of different anti-misreporting schemes based on theoretical, experimental, and observational evidence. Results from this dissertation provide evidence that regulators can use mechanisms that: 1) curb misreporting without enhancing monitoring (tournament audits), or 2) that enhance monitoring to ultimately curb misreporting (adoption of monitoring technologies), or 3) a combination of both. This is important given the pervasiveness of misreporting among regulated agents, and substantial heterogeneity among those agents. <br></div>

Cette thèse porte sur la recrudescence notable depuis une décennie de certains phénomènes singuliers de mystification mettant en jeu des dispositifs communicationnels assez élaborés, connus sous l’appellation de canulars médiatiques. Apparu au XVIIIe siècle et en filiation étroite avec certaines pratiques populaires plus anciennes, l’acte canularesque associé à l’usage des médias engage la mise en œuvre de procédés audacieux qui, au fil du temps et de l’émergence de nouveaux moyens de communication, n’ont cessé de se sophistiquer.L'analyse d'un corpus de neuf canulars ayant recueilli d'un fort retentissement médiatique au cours de la période 2004-2008 souligne l’importance du jeu des interactions qui s’établissent entre l’auteur, sa cible et le public exposé.Elle témoigne également de la forte incidence du contexte sur la réussite de l’acte. Les transformations profondes qui traversent actuellement la société à l’échelle internationale, ainsi que les importants bouleversements qui modifient et parfois fragilisent le monde de l’information, représentent à l’évidence un terrain propice à la multiplication des canulars médiatiques. Entre la précarisation des conditions d’exercice du journalisme, la concurrence effrénée qui affecte les médias, l’attrait grandissant pour les fictions se donnant pour vraies et la recherche permanente de l’inédit et du spectaculaire, les fausses nouvelles et autres mystifications malicieuses trouvent toute raison de proliférer.La tournure très transgressive prise par les canulars médiatiques au cours de ces dernières années a conduit récemment à la mise en place de législations plus coercitives et entraîné de la part de leurs victimes des mesures de rétorsion qui nous amènent, en dernière partie de cette thèse, à nous interroger sur le devenir incertain de l’objet et de sa pratique. / This thesis deals with the issue of a decade-long rise in the number of particular phenomena of mystification that use very elaborate communication mechanisms : the media hoaxes. Appeared in the 18th century and closely linked to ancient and popular practices, the elaborate hoax, associate with media and new technologies, implements audacious processes that became increasingly sophisticated. The analysis of nine hoaxes cases that have benefited from a wide media echoe during the period 2004 to 2008 emphasizes the significance of interaction between the author, his target and the audience. It also testifies the context's high impact upon the success of the action. The profound transformations that go through worldwide societies and the upheavals that modify and often weaken the information world obviously represent a favourable ground for a multiplication of media hoaxes. From the erosion of conditions in journalism practices, the fiercecompetition which affects various media, the growing attraction for fictions as true, to the constant search for novelty and the spectacular, false information and other mischievous mystifications find every reason to proliferate.As the transgressive course taken by media hoaxes in recent years has led to a stringent legislation and the victims' retaliations, we question the uncertain future of this research topic as a practice in the final part of the thesis.