The study of perfection, progress and evolution is a central theme in the history of ideas. This thesis explores this theme seen and understood as part of a discourse in the new fields of anthropology, sociology and psychology in the nineteenth century. A particular focus is on the stance taken by philosophers, scientists and writers in the discussion of theories of human physical and mental evolution, as well as on their views concerning the nature of social progress and historical change. The wisdom and feasibility of improving the human species is discussed alongside an analysis of new methods of investigating and measuring physical and mental attributes of the human organism. The instruments used to assess the development of mind, body and society are described, and are viewed as part of an increased emphasis on the use of technology as an integral part of modern life, and as a means toward the ordered gathering of information in social-scientific practice. An international perspective is taken by observing the way in which ideas about the physical and mental development of humankind was discussed in light and consequence of English and European scientific exploration in the Southern Hemisphere. Further, an evaluation is made of the manner of the spread of new thought in the social sciences from the intellectual and cultural �centre� of England and Europe to the Anglo-European community located at the �periphery� in Australia in the late nineteenth century. In particular the educative role played by the non-professional enthusiast as a pivotal conduit for the dissemination of these ideas is highlighted and linked back to a significant tradition of amateur scholarship as a central phenomenon in the study of the history of ideas.

The study of perfection, progress and evolution is a central theme in the history of ideas. This thesis explores this theme seen and understood as part of a discourse in the new fields of anthropology, sociology and psychology in the nineteenth century. A particular focus is on the stance taken by philosophers, scientists and writers in the discussion of theories of human physical and mental evolution, as well as on their views concerning the nature of social progress and historical change. The wisdom and feasibility of improving the human species is discussed alongside an analysis of new methods of investigating and measuring physical and mental attributes of the human organism. The instruments used to assess the development of mind, body and society are described, and are viewed as part of an increased emphasis on the use of technology as an integral part of modern life, and as a means toward the ordered gathering of information in social-scientific practice. An international perspective is taken by observing the way in which ideas about the physical and mental development of humankind was discussed in light and consequence of English and European scientific exploration in the Southern Hemisphere. Further, an evaluation is made of the manner of the spread of new thought in the social sciences from the intellectual and cultural �centre� of England and Europe to the Anglo-European community located at the �periphery� in Australia in the late nineteenth century. In particular the educative role played by the non-professional enthusiast as a pivotal conduit for the dissemination of these ideas is highlighted and linked back to a significant tradition of amateur scholarship as a central phenomenon in the study of the history of ideas.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Notre Dame, 2004. / Thesis directed by Stephen Watson for the Department of Philosophy. "July 2004." Includes bibliographical references (leaves 359-369).

Nosso estudo tem como objetivo dimensionar o alcance da pergunta que é uma coisa? na filosofia de Martin Heidegger na década de 30. Num primeiro momento, a análise da pergunta que é uma coisa? mostra as implicações conceituais envolvidas no processo histórico de elaboração de teorias acerca da coisa. Num segundo momento, trata-se de compreender o papel decisivo da modernidade filosófica e científica na construção da determinação dominante da coisa que impera até os dias atuais. Num terceiro momento, pretende-se esclarecer o caráter de decisão da época moderna em sua totalidade. Por fim, uma reflexão final aponta para os caminhos abertos por Heidegger em sua aproximação a uma resposta para a pergunta que é uma coisa?. / Our study aims at analyzing the reach of the question what is a thing? in the philosophy of Martin Heidegger during the 30s. At first, the analysis of the question what is a thing? shows the conceptual implications intertwined in the historical process of the elaboration of theories regarding the thing. Secondly, it shows the necessity of understanding the decisive role of modernity both philosophical and scientific in the construction of the up to nowadays dominant determination of the thing. Thirdly, we intend to clarify the character of decision of the modern epoch in its entirety. As a conclusion, a reflection points out to the paths opened up by Heidegger in his approximation of an answer to the question what is a thing?.

O papel da razão (logos) em meio às ações (praxis) ainda vigora como um grande problema filosófico. Procura-se aqui tratá-lo a partir da filosofia de G. W. Leibniz. O ponto de partida é o próprio paradigma racional, deus. Delineia-se um panorama sobre as principais ideias envolvidas na escolha divina do melhor dos mundos, as quais servem para mostrar como podem ser pensados os atos humanos. Leibniz costuma desenvolver sua filosofia com o apoio de outros pensadores; dentre eles, Aristóteles tem lugar especial. Assim, busca-se mostrar parcialmente como Leibniz tira proveito de teses aristotélicas quando o filósofo moderno reflete sobre as ações humanas. Para isso, com relação a Aristóteles, monta-se um quadro geral de alguns dos principais conceitos da sua teoria da ação, como as noções de voluntário, de deliberação, de escolha deliberada, dentre outros que permitam esboçar sua noção de razão prática. Em seguida, é desenvolvida a ideia de ação humana desde os seus fundamentos segundo o pensamento leibniziano. Nessa perspectiva, para se chegar ao conhecimento do ato denominado racional, parte-se da ação das substâncias e mostra-se gradualmente como a razão passa a fazer parte das faculdades de certo grupo de seres, os quais a usam quando se movem. Por meio de todos esses passos, finalmente tenta-se chegar às especificidades do pensamento leibniziano quando ele trata do movimento humano e se ele teria o direito de invocar o pensamento aristotélico ao refletir sobre a ação racional. / The role of reason (logos) among the actions (praxis) still stands as a great question of philosophy. This work intends to explore it from G. W. Leibniz philosophical point of view. The starting line is the rational paradigm itself, god. Outlining an overview of the key elements involved in the divine choice of the best of worlds that serve to show how we can understand the human acts. Leibniz tends to develop his philosophy with the support of other thinkers, among them, Aristotle has a special place. Therefore we try to show partially how Leibniz takes advantage of Aristotelian theses when the modern philosopher reflects about human acts. To do this, regarding to Aristotle, a general framework about some of the main concepts of his theory of action is shown, such as the notions of voluntary, deliberation, deliberative choice, among others that allows sketching his notion of practical reason. Thereafter we develop the idea of human action from its basis according to Leibniz thought. From this perspective, to get to the knowledge of the act named as rational, we start with the action of the substances and shows up gradually as the reason becomes part of the faculties of a certain group of beings, which use it when they move. Through all these steps, we attempt to reach the details of Leibnizian thought when he comes to human movement and if he would be entitled to invoke the Aristotelian thought to reflect on rational action.

The conception of René Descartes as the arch-rationalist has been sufficiently exploded in recent literature; however, there is still a large lacuna in our understanding of how empirical research and experimentation fits within his philosophy. My dissertation is directed at addressing just this problem. I contend that Descartes’ famed method is not a singular monolith but instead two interdependent methods: one directed at metaphysical and epistemological truth, while the other directed at empirical questions and contingent facts of the world. I claim there is evidence for this position not only in his actual scientific practice, but also in the rhetorical structure of the Discourse on Method and the Principles of Philosophy. In exploring the empirical side of Descartes’ method, I show how his unusual system produces a system of experiment designed to serve both as a discovery and verification tool at the same time. As a further application of my interpretation, I argue that the Passions of the Soul and Descartes’ ethical theory expressed in his correspondence must also be seen as part of his two-fold methodology. Instead of attempting to cast Descartes as a virtue ethicist or deontologist, as is normally done, I emphasize that Descartes’ ethics is centered on the mind-body union, and therefore, includes an empirical element as well. The end result is an ethics that requires a detailed study of mechanics, anatomy, physics, as well as medicine. Lastly, I show how this methodology can help us understand the works of some of his early followers: Claude Gadroys and Jacques Rohault. Both of these philosophers not only serve to ground my interpretation, but also to highlight aspects of Cartesian that have often been passed over. I show how the experimentalism of Jacques Rohault goes beyond the epistemological boundaries set up by Descartes, as signifies a new direction that will ultimately eclipse the Cartesian school of thought. In the case of Claude Gadroys, I present a concrete example of the exploitation of the over generality of Cartesian principles. In so doing, I show that while Descartes’ experimentalism was intended to rule out the possibility of occult causes, he in fact created a system that allowed for them, only under a different guise.

The purpose of this study is three-fold: 1. To make a study of modern philosophy and modern psychology of education. 2. To show by comparison how well the Gainesville elementary schools comply in a modern philosophy and a modern psychology of education. 3. To make recommendations for changes that could be made for the improvement of the Gainesville elementary school system.

Thesis (MPhil)--University of Stellenbosch, 2000. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: This study is concerned with the possibility and characterisation of poststructural ethics and the ethics of general theories. It contains a review of selected readings on Modernity and provides a "snapshot" of an ethical system that is essentially rule based and privileges rationality. Some of the problems with such a system, such as inflexibility, tolerance based on superiority and force and the privileging of male gender is explored. It proceeds by perusing some literature on postmodernity as an open ethical system in which values are free floating and lists of rules are constantly produced and disregarded in a dizzying ethical free for all in which "anything goes". No value is considered more worthwhile than personal survival. As a starting point for reading Modernity and postmodernity together, Levinas introduces a radical perspective on ethics that can be read as a condemnation of postmodern morality. He relates an ethics in which the survival of the "other" is more important than the survival of the self. However, he does not ground the metaphysics of such a privilege in rationality or knowledge and hence does not turn it into an ethical rule, but rather, subtly shifts the responsibility for the other person to an ultimate responsibility for the Other as God. This radical responsibility is rejected by deconstruction which does not reject either postmodernity or Modernity but is an attempt to think through the limits of rule-orientated rationality, free-play and mystical metaphysics to produce an ethical awareness that has a sensitivity for the complexity of context. Through the notion of "writing", the peculiarities it displays and the objections it attracts, Derrida seeks to establish a uniquely ethical writing that is both a stable manifestation of ethics and a dynamic engagement with those subject to it. With these readings in the background the thesis attempts to provide a framework for poststructural ethics. It is an ethics based in the notion of friendship but does not ground itself in any guarantees. It re-evaluates rationality in terms of a sublime struggle for meaning and truth. This sublime struggle offers a unique perspective on political debates that strive towards responsible development for multicultural societies and also on a sociological approach to law and the ability to dispense justice without undue prejudice. The main contention of the thesis is that although poststructuralism does not suppose a grounding metaphysics in either rationality or responsibility towards God it cannot be satisfied with the self-indulgent nihilism of an "anything goes" postmodernism. Thus, it depends on the notion of a "complex system" that "self-organises" and produces limits through spontaneous connections. Through the working of deconstruction complex systems can take on a more human manifestation as friendships flourish and decay through the interaction of faces. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Hierdie studie is gemoeid met die moontlikheid en karakterisering van poststrukturele etiek en die etiek van algemene teorië. Dit bevat In geselekteerde oorsig van Moderniteit en verskaf In "kiekie" van In etiese sisteem wat essentieël op reëls gebasseer is en rationaliteit privilegieer. Sommige probleme met so In sisteem, soos byvoorbeeld onbuigsaamheid, verdraagsaamheid gegrond in superioriteit, geweld en die privilegieering van manlikheid, word ondersoek. Die studie sit voort deur sommige literatuur oor postmoderniteit as In oop etiese sisteem onder oë te neem. So In sisteem veronderstel vryvloeiende waardes en lyste van reëls wat gedurig geproduseer en geabandoneer word in In duisligwekkende etiese vryspel wat beskryf kan word as "anything goes". Geen waarde word hoër geag as persoonlike oorlewing nie. As die beginpunt van In lesing wat Moderniteit en postmoderniteit met mekaar in verband bring verskaf Levinas In radikale perspektief op etiek wat verdoemend staan teenoor die moraliteit van postmoderniteit. Hy beskryf In etiek waarin die oorlewing van die "ander" meer belangrik geag word as die oorlewing van die self. Hy grond egter nie die metafisieka van so In voorreg in rationaliteit of kennis nie, en lê dit dus nie neer as In etiese reël nie, maar verskuif eerder op subtitle wyse verantwoordelikheid vir die ander persoon na In uiteindelike verantwoordelikheid vir die Ander as God. Laasgenoemde radikale verantwoordelikheid word deur dekonstruksie verwerp in In poging om postmoderniteit en Moderniteit saam te snoer en die limiete van reël-georiënteerde rationaliteit, vry-spel en mistiese metafisieka deur te dink. Hierdeur word 'n etiese gewaarwording geproduseer wat sensitiviteit vir die kompleksiteite van konteks vertoon. Deur die nosie van "skryf', die eienaardighede en teenkanting daaraan verbonde, is Derrida op soek na die neerlegging van In unike etiese skryf wat beide In stabille manifestasie van etiek is en 'n dinamiese betrokkenheid by die wat daaraan onderhewig staan. Met hierdie leeswerk in die agtergrond poog die tesis om 'n raamwerk vir poststrukturele etiek daar te stel. Dit is In etiek wat as basis die nosie van vriendskap aanvaar sonder om enige waarborge uit te deel. Rationaliteit word gere-evalueer in terme van In sublime stryd vir betekenis en waarheid. Hierdie sublime stryd bring 'n unieke perspektief na politieke debatte wat volhoubare ontwikkeling in multikulturele samelewings ten doel het en vir In sosiologiese benadering tot die reg en regsvaardigheid. Alhoewel poststrukturele etiek nie In metanarratief veronderstel, soos die etiek van Moderniteit, nie kan dit egter ook nie tevrede wees met die destabiliserende nihilisme van 'n "anything goes" postmodernisme nie. Poststrukturele etiek steun dus swaar op die idee van 'n "komplekse sisteem" wat self-organiseer en llrniette stel deur middel van spontane konneksievorming. Deur die werking van dekonstruksie kan so In komplekse sisteem ook in meer menslike terme verwoord word as vriendskappe wat groei en vergaan in die interaksie tussen "gesigte".

Consagrado pela doutrina de que o nosso mundo é o melhor dos mundos possíveise por seu otimismo em relação à humanidade, o filósofo alemão G. W. Leibniz (1646-1716) não poderia deixar de tecer considerações sobre o problema da felicidade humana.Mas, em face das inúmeras mazelas que afligem a humanidade, e sendoo leibnizianismo um otimismo teísta, fundado naconvicçãoa respeitodo governo soberanode um Deusbom, segundo oqual se admite a existência de uma ordem moral e divina no Universo, apresentam-se para o pensador algumas dificuldades no que tange àdefesa da tese do melhor dos mundos, se quisermos admitir que este melhor consiste de um plano divino que diz respeito de alguma forma à humanidade e a seu bem estar, demandando-se, assim, a justificaçãodesua posiçãoà luz da experiência humana observável e dos aspectos metafísicos, teológicos e moraisde seu pensamento. O presente trabalho visa, assim, tratardo problema da felicidade humana no melhor dos mundos possíveis, partindo-se da exploração da concepção leibniziana de felicidade, elucidando-se o sentido da tese do melhor dos mundos possíveis, e culminando com a defesa da tese de que, a despeito das aparências em sentido contrário, neste melhor mundo, a felicidade dos espíritos é o principal embora não o único desígnio de Deus, considerando-se também o papel de uma solução escatológicae levando-se em contaque a felicidade, para o autor, não é um atributo estáticodo mundo, mas parte de um progresso perpétuo em perfeição e na direção de novos prazeres. / Establishedby his doctrine that our world is the best of the possible worldsand by his optimism about humanity, the german philosopher G. W. Leibniz (1646-1716) could not depart himself from considering the problem of human happiness. But, in face of the numerous ills that afflict humanity, and since leibnizianism is a theisticoptimism, founded on the conviction aboutthe sovereigngovernment of a goodGod, according to which the existence of a moral and divine order in the universe is admitted, some difficulties arise for the thinker in defending the thesis of the best of the possible worlds, if we want to admit that this \"best\" consists of a divine plan that somehow concerns humanity and its welfare, demandingthe justificationof his position in the light of observable human experience and the metaphysical, theological, and moral aspects of his thought. The present work, therefore, proposesdealing with the problem of human happiness in the best of possible worlds, starting from the exploration of the leibnizian conception of happiness, elucidating the meaning of the thesis of the best of possible worlds, culminating in the defense of the thesis that, in spite of appearances incontrary, in this \"best world\" the happiness of the spirits is the principal -though not the only of God\'s designs,andalso considering the role of an eschatological solution,and taking into account that happiness, for the author, is not a staticattribute of the world, but part of a perpetual progress in perfection and in the direction of new pleasures.

Desde sua primeira obra, David Hume anuncia ao leitor o projeto de constituição de uma ciência da natureza humana. O principal objetivo deste trabalho consiste em examinar os argumentos utilizados por Hume para construir as condições de possibilidade desse saber. / Since his first work David Hume announces his intentions to constitute a science of human nature. The main target of this thesis is to examine the arguments used by Hume to build the conditions of possibility of this field of knowledge.