Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz claimed that this is the best of all possible worlds. This view has been widely criticized. Much of the criticism focuses on the fact that it is simply counter-intuitive because of the presence of evil. This paper is intended to be a defense of Leibniz's view against those who would suggest that the presence of evil implies that there could be a better world. After defining terms, the first section of this paper will examine Leibniz's arguments for this being the best of all possible worlds. The idea of "best" will also be examined. Leibniz's conception of best will be examined in Leibniz's writings, and an alternative view of best will be suggested to strengthen Leibniz's arguments. Then, the paper will tum to examine the problem of evil and the attack that it is on Leibniz's view. I will suggest that the problem of evil is not a problem for this belief because the world better accomplishes its purpose with evil than it would without evil.

The evident existence of evil does not appear to be compatible with the traditional theistic view of Divine Justice. On the one hand, in the course of our daily lives we observe that the innocent suffer undeservedly and the wicked prosper abundantly / and on the other we have the religious principle assuring us that God is just. This contradiction which is known as the problem of evil constitutes one of the greatest challenges to theistic religions. Moses Maimonides, the foremost Jewish philosopher of the Middle Ages offers a solution to this problem through his theory of providence. In this thesis, I argue that for Maimonides providence comes in stages and his theodicy is formed by the first two stages of his theory of providence that I take to be comprising of essentially three stages. Given the two seemingly antagonistic positions that comprise the problem of evil, how he reconciles them through the first two stages of his theory of providence by synthesizing creatively the religious and philosophical principles is the subject of this thesis. In this context, I will also consider how he further strengthens his philosophical position through the analysis of a biblical parable, i.e. the Book of Job.

abstract: In this thesis, I discuss the philosophical problem of evil and, as a response, John Hick's soul making theodicy. First, I discuss the transformation of the problem. I examine how the problem has shifted from logical to evidential in recent history. Next, I offer a faithful rendition of Hick's position - one which states the existence of evil does not provide evidence against the existence of God. After reconstructing his argument, I go on to exposes its logical faults. I present four main contentions to Hick's theodicy. First, I analyze the psychology of dehumanization to question whether we have any evidence that soul making is happening in response to the suffering in the world. Second, I argue that Hick's theodicy is self-defeating if accepted because it undermines the central point on which his argument depends. Third, I claim that Hick's theodicy is self-defeating given his eschatological views. Finally, I discuss how Hick's theodicy does not account for the animal suffering that widely exists in the world now, and that exists in our evolutionary history. My hope is to show that Hick's theodicy fails to solve the problem of evil. I claim that the amount of gratuitous suffering in the world does provide evidence against the existence of God. / Dissertation/Thesis / Masters Thesis Philosophy 2018

Consagrado pela doutrina de que o nosso mundo é o melhor dos mundos possíveise por seu otimismo em relação à humanidade, o filósofo alemão G. W. Leibniz (1646-1716) não poderia deixar de tecer considerações sobre o problema da felicidade humana.Mas, em face das inúmeras mazelas que afligem a humanidade, e sendoo leibnizianismo um otimismo teísta, fundado naconvicçãoa respeitodo governo soberanode um Deusbom, segundo oqual se admite a existência de uma ordem moral e divina no Universo, apresentam-se para o pensador algumas dificuldades no que tange àdefesa da tese do melhor dos mundos, se quisermos admitir que este melhor consiste de um plano divino que diz respeito de alguma forma à humanidade e a seu bem estar, demandando-se, assim, a justificaçãodesua posiçãoà luz da experiência humana observável e dos aspectos metafísicos, teológicos e moraisde seu pensamento. O presente trabalho visa, assim, tratardo problema da felicidade humana no melhor dos mundos possíveis, partindo-se da exploração da concepção leibniziana de felicidade, elucidando-se o sentido da tese do melhor dos mundos possíveis, e culminando com a defesa da tese de que, a despeito das aparências em sentido contrário, neste melhor mundo, a felicidade dos espíritos é o principal embora não o único desígnio de Deus, considerando-se também o papel de uma solução escatológicae levando-se em contaque a felicidade, para o autor, não é um atributo estáticodo mundo, mas parte de um progresso perpétuo em perfeição e na direção de novos prazeres. / Establishedby his doctrine that our world is the best of the possible worldsand by his optimism about humanity, the german philosopher G. W. Leibniz (1646-1716) could not depart himself from considering the problem of human happiness. But, in face of the numerous ills that afflict humanity, and since leibnizianism is a theisticoptimism, founded on the conviction aboutthe sovereigngovernment of a goodGod, according to which the existence of a moral and divine order in the universe is admitted, some difficulties arise for the thinker in defending the thesis of the best of the possible worlds, if we want to admit that this \"best\" consists of a divine plan that somehow concerns humanity and its welfare, demandingthe justificationof his position in the light of observable human experience and the metaphysical, theological, and moral aspects of his thought. The present work, therefore, proposesdealing with the problem of human happiness in the best of possible worlds, starting from the exploration of the leibnizian conception of happiness, elucidating the meaning of the thesis of the best of possible worlds, culminating in the defense of the thesis that, in spite of appearances incontrary, in this \"best world\" the happiness of the spirits is the principal -though not the only of God\'s designs,andalso considering the role of an eschatological solution,and taking into account that happiness, for the author, is not a staticattribute of the world, but part of a perpetual progress in perfection and in the direction of new pleasures.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-27T17:27:09Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Claudiomiro Bispo.pdf: 267777 bytes, checksum: a69d97f8dafde914121b0221393d239f (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-10-23 / This dissertation aims to study obstacles to happy life as presented in the dialogue On the Happy Life (De Beata Vita) by the philosopher Augustine of Hippo (13 November 354 28 August 430). First, Augustine s fundamental elements of life and formation are presented, especially his conception of human being created by God, whom departs from him, but for his fulfillment must return to God. However, this return, metaphorically presented by Augustine as navigation, has challenges to be faced, obstacles to be overcome because of the evil in human life. The Happy Life stands out to improper nutrition for the soul, inadequate wishes, live subject to fears, skepticism (represented by academics), the soul s impurities, the soul apart from God and pride / Esta dissertação tem por objetivo tratar dos obstáculos à vida feliz conforme apresentado no diálogo A vida feliz (De Beata Vita) do filósofo Agostinho de Hipona. (13 de novembro de 354 28 de Agosto de 430). Primeiramente são apresentados elementos fundamentais da vida e da formação de Agostinho, especialmente sua concepção do homem enquanto ser criado por Deus, que se afasta dele, mas que, para sua realização, deve voltar a ele. Entretanto, essa volta, apresentada metaforicamente por Agostinho como uma navegação, possui desafios a ser enfrentados, obstáculos a serem transpostos por causa do mal na vida humana. Em A Vida Feliz destacam-se a alimentação inadequada para a alma, desejar de modo impróprio, viver sujeitos a receios, ceticismo (representado pelos acadêmicos), as impurezas da alma, a distância da alma de Deus e o orgulho

Evil poses a particular problem to early modern thinkers. Late scholasticism, while itself variegated, provided a number of resources for dispelling concerns about the justice of God raised by the existence of evil. With much of the metaphysics of the scholastics rejected, the new philosophers needed either to find inventive ways to make the old solutions fit into their new systems, to come up with new resources for dispelling the difficulties, or to accept the difficulties as insurmountable, likely via fideism or atheism. Leibniz, I claim, provides a provocative mixture of the first two approaches. Many readers think Leibniz's solution to the problem of evil can be summed up in as little as a page, perhaps even a compound sentence, that sentence being, "God created the best possible world, and so He cannot be blamed for the existence of evil." My primary purpose is to show that this conception is false. Not only does Leibniz offer a complex response to the problem of evil which involves a unique combination and reinterpretation of components from the history of philosophical thinking about evil, but his solution changes a number of times throughout his career. And how could it not? It is nearly uncontested that Leibniz's metaphysics underwent important changes between the early 1670s and the mid 1680s. The thesis that Leibniz's metaphysics changed significantly at least once between the mid 1680s and the end of his life is becoming more and more accepted among scholars. Given the importance of theology to Leibniz's metaphysical thinking and the importance of metaphysics to Leibniz's theological thinking, it could hardly be the case that Leibniz's thought on the problem of evil could remain unchanged throughout these changes. What follows is structured as three developmental stories each revolving around the role of one conceptual tool used by Leibniz as a part of a solution to the problems posed by evil--these conceptual tools being the doctrine that God created the best possible world, the distinction between willing and permitting (in particular as it relates to God's relationship to evil), and the doctrine that sin is a privation. Each chapter highlights the way Leibniz's conception and use of the particular tool changed throughout his life and the differing ways these concepts interact with each other. I begin by examining the doctrine that this is the best possible world. Early in his career (in particular in the Letter to Magnus Wedderkopf of 1671) Leibniz thought that this doctrine was sufficient for explaining the goodness of God in spite of the evils in the world. In that letter he explicitly denied that divine permission was possible, and within a few years explicitly denied that the doctrine that sin is a privation was of any use in securing the goodness of God. The doctrine that God created the best possible world itself went through a few changes as Leibniz's thought developed. Of most significance is the change from seeing God's creation of this world as necessary to holding that it is a contingent fact that God created the best possible world. Shortly after this change occurs and, I argue, partly because this change occurs, Leibniz begins to see the problem of evil split in such a way that it is no longer sufficient for procuring divine goodness to point out that God has a good reason for bringing evils about. It must now be argued that God brings evils about for a good reason and remains morally upright in doing so. Regarding the other two doctrines--divine permission and the privative nature of sin--Leibniz's thought undergoes radical change. Once Leibniz feels the need to go beyond giving a reason why God choose to create a world that contains evil, he reverses his opinion about whether God can be said to permit anything. Regarding privations, Leibniz's thought undergoes a number of changes. Around 1678, He reverses his opinion about whether there is any value to holding that sins are privations. Further, the phrase `sins are privations' takes on different meanings as Leibniz develops. In 1686, he takes the phrase to mean that sins are the result of the limitation of the creature. By the time of the Theodicy(1710), however, he thinks of sins both as the result of limitations of creatures and as having a privative aspect (i.e., there is a defect in the action itself, and thus a double-role of the concept of privation). These changes require changes in Leibniz's metaphysics and in particular a change in the way Leibniz thinks of the causal interactions between God and human actions, and substances and human actions. This lends support to the still controversial but increasingly accepted view that Leibniz's metaphysics undergoes a significant change between the Discourse on Metaphysics and the Monadology.

Consagrado pela doutrina de que o nosso mundo é o melhor dos mundos possíveise por seu otimismo em relação à humanidade, o filósofo alemão G. W. Leibniz (1646-1716) não poderia deixar de tecer considerações sobre o problema da felicidade humana.Mas, em face das inúmeras mazelas que afligem a humanidade, e sendoo leibnizianismo um otimismo teísta, fundado naconvicçãoa respeitodo governo soberanode um Deusbom, segundo oqual se admite a existência de uma ordem moral e divina no Universo, apresentam-se para o pensador algumas dificuldades no que tange àdefesa da tese do melhor dos mundos, se quisermos admitir que este melhor consiste de um plano divino que diz respeito de alguma forma à humanidade e a seu bem estar, demandando-se, assim, a justificaçãodesua posiçãoà luz da experiência humana observável e dos aspectos metafísicos, teológicos e moraisde seu pensamento. O presente trabalho visa, assim, tratardo problema da felicidade humana no melhor dos mundos possíveis, partindo-se da exploração da concepção leibniziana de felicidade, elucidando-se o sentido da tese do melhor dos mundos possíveis, e culminando com a defesa da tese de que, a despeito das aparências em sentido contrário, neste melhor mundo, a felicidade dos espíritos é o principal embora não o único desígnio de Deus, considerando-se também o papel de uma solução escatológicae levando-se em contaque a felicidade, para o autor, não é um atributo estáticodo mundo, mas parte de um progresso perpétuo em perfeição e na direção de novos prazeres. / Establishedby his doctrine that our world is the best of the possible worldsand by his optimism about humanity, the german philosopher G. W. Leibniz (1646-1716) could not depart himself from considering the problem of human happiness. But, in face of the numerous ills that afflict humanity, and since leibnizianism is a theisticoptimism, founded on the conviction aboutthe sovereigngovernment of a goodGod, according to which the existence of a moral and divine order in the universe is admitted, some difficulties arise for the thinker in defending the thesis of the best of the possible worlds, if we want to admit that this \"best\" consists of a divine plan that somehow concerns humanity and its welfare, demandingthe justificationof his position in the light of observable human experience and the metaphysical, theological, and moral aspects of his thought. The present work, therefore, proposesdealing with the problem of human happiness in the best of possible worlds, starting from the exploration of the leibnizian conception of happiness, elucidating the meaning of the thesis of the best of possible worlds, culminating in the defense of the thesis that, in spite of appearances incontrary, in this \"best world\" the happiness of the spirits is the principal -though not the only of God\'s designs,andalso considering the role of an eschatological solution,and taking into account that happiness, for the author, is not a staticattribute of the world, but part of a perpetual progress in perfection and in the direction of new pleasures.

Im Jahr 1806 verfasste Heinrich von Kleist die Kurzgeschichte Das Erdbeben in Chili, in der nach einem Erdbeben in Santiago de Chile ein junges Paar aus religiösen Gründen gelyncht wird. Das Problem des Leidens wird im Text deutlich thematisiert. In diesem Aufsatz wird versucht, durch eine chronologische Textanalyse auszulegen, ob Kleist in der Novelle das logische oder induktive Problem des Leidens oder beides thematisiere. Es wird argumentiert, dass das große Gewicht des unnötigen Leidens in der Geschichte und die fehlende Rolle Gottes als moralischer Agent von der Perspektive des Erzählers eine Thematisierung des induktiven Problems des Leidens andeuten.

<p>Skeptical theism is an important position (or set of positions) that—if true—has significant implications in the philosophy of religion regarding the epistemic status of theism and atheism. Broadly speaking, skeptical theists are theists who are skeptical about the ability of humans to discern, by certain methods, the probability of God permitting certain states of affairs. In this dissertation, I argue in favor of two types of skeptical theism and consider their implications. In Chapter 1, I explain two types of skeptical theism—Axiological Skeptical Theism and Deontological Skeptical Theism—and argue in favor of each position. I consider numerous objections to these views, arguing that they all fail. This, however, only matters if these positions have a significant upshot. Accordingly, in Chapter 2, I argue that Axiological and Deontological Skeptical Theism undermine both axiological and deontological ‘noseeum’ arguments from evil, the equiprobability argument from evil, and both axiological and deontological Humean arguments from evil. So, the upshot of Axiological and Deontological Skeptical Theism is significant. Chapter 3 considers whether Axiological and Deontological Skeptical Theism result in too much skepticism: I consider whether these views provide a defeater for our commonsense beliefs. In doing so, I consider numerous types of defeaters, arguing that neither Axiological nor Deontological Skeptical Theism provide such defeaters. In Chapter 4, I consider whether one can consistently accept both Axiological and Deontological Skeptical Theism while making predictions about how God would act—a crucial aspect of theodicy and natural theology. I argue that there are two ways that one can do so: one way involving intuition and another way involving metaethics. The way involving intuition is, I argue, narrowsince it will have a limited scope. By contrast, the way involving metaethics, I argue, has a broad scope. Finally, Chapter 5 considers the so-called commonsense problem of evil. Some philosophers have argued that the commonsense problem of evil is untouched by all types of skeptical theism. I argue that the traditional commonsense problem of evil fails, but that a revamped version of it poses more of a threat. However, I claim that the revamped argument ultimately fails as well</p>

Within Judeo-Christianity there is a belief in an all perfect God who is omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent. However, in this world evil and suffering exists, so how is it possible that an all perfect God can exist? This is called the problem of evil. This thesis examines the problem of evil and how philosophers like Alvin Plantinga, John Hick, and Richard Swinburne attempt to solve the problem of evil through different theodicies. In this paper I argue that all three philosophers and their theodicies fail to solve the problem of evil. I then turn to the writings of Herman Melville, specifically Mardi: and a Voyage Thither and Moby-Dick; or, The Whale, and consider how he, as an author, struggled with the problem of evil and religion. While Melville may have struggled I argue that within his works we can find part of the solution to the problem of evil. Through these two novels Melville demonstrates that God is not good. My final chapter considers this fact that God is not good and also considers how God is not evil. In the end I argue that God is neither good nor evil which allows us to no longer have to face the problem of evil.