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There are many channels that the Fed uses to transmit monetary policy, bank lending channel being one of them. The lending view focuses on the potential fluctuations in loan supplied by banks have on aggregate activity due to a fall in Fed Reserves. This thesis investigates the significance of the bank lending channel because of its important effect on investment (and consequently, aggregate output). In addition, Institutional Memory, deteriorating memory in loan officers causing more loans to be processed at the top of the business cycle (Berger and Udell, 2002) is tested on Core loans using 4 lags (1 year) to find out if bank lending behavior exists. Using Core loans (Commercial and Industrial, Real Estate, and Consumer loans) of commercial banks for the United States over a nineteen year period (1985-2004) results find significant evidence in the bank lending channel through Commercial & Industrial, and Real Estate loans. Firstly, through a correlation computation, it was found that Core loans were procyclical with aggregate output (GDP). Analyzing the [ cyclical] movements of Core loans around their trends with respect to Business cycle peaks, troughs, and GDP, it was found that Commercial & Industrial, and Real Estate loans provided supporting evidence on procyclical movements with the economy, implying the connection of the Federal Reserve and the economy through the bank lending channel is more effective through the aforementioned loans. Finally, four periods (1 year) in lags were used in autocorrelations to test for Institutional Memory. The computations find that Real Estate loans have a one year memory. This means that, for instance, if a recession were occurred today, Real Estate loans will not be affected until one year from today.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, San Diego, 2003. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 292-310).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, San Diego, 1998. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 298-321).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Dallas, 2001. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves [165]-173).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Harvard University, 1994. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 173-182).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Missouri-Columbia, 2000. / Typescript. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 110-114). Also available on the Internet.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Missouri-Columbia, 2000. / Typescript. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 110-114). Also available on the Internet.

Why was it so difficult for European Union countries to establish the European Central Bank? In the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, EU governments committed themselves to an independent, stability-oriented ECB, and to ensuring low inflation rates and low budget deficits. Between 1992 and 1998, they fought over the terms of membership and whether European economic policy should promote growth more than stability. Political parties transmit voter preferences over growth and stability into national policy on the basic priorities of monetary union, while the arrangement of economic institutions reinforces or frustrates the ambitions of a governing coalition. This not only leads to governments with clear priorities that conflict at the European level. Governing coalitions frustrated by economic institutions that thwart their economic policies can promote monetary union in order to force changes domestically. Therefore, conflict arose among stability-oriented governments over whether low budget deficits and inflation were to be achieved before EMU was launched. This reflected the conflict between France and Germany. The dissertation examines the links between the politics of economic policy in France, Germany and Spain, and their policies toward Economic and Monetary Union.