Thesis (Ph.D.)--Cleveland State University, 2009. / Abstract. Title from PDF t.p. (viewed on Dec. 18, 2009). Includes bibliographical references (p. 128-134). Available online via the OhioLINK ETD Center and also available in print.

Thesis (M.A.)--Marshall University, 2008. / Title from document title page. Includes abstract. Document formatted into pages: contains 53 p. Includes bibliographical references (p. 52-53)

Industrial policy in the form of direct and indirect government subsidy provision to firms in specific sectors of the economy is a common sight in many countries. Some of the most often quoted examples are East Asian economies such as japan and Taiwan. While industrial policy is touted as a possible engine to generate economic growth, empirical validations on the benefits from subsidy provisions have been mixed. It is often argued that a policy of non-intervention by the government may appear to be the optimal policy to pursue. However, this contrasts with the historical observations of regular government subsidy provisions to firms in many countries. This thesis constructs a two-sector non-monetary macroeconomic model with monopolistic competition to examine welfare and other related effects of a subsidy provision in the form of lump sum transfers or as some proportion of a variable cost component while firms in the perfectly competitive sector do not. This analysis is first carried out in an economy where labour supply is assumed to be exogenous and perfectly inelastic. This serves to provide a simple and clear exposition on the effects of a subsidy provision and to serve as a benchmark analysis to build upon. This is subsequently extended by allowing for labour supply to be endogenously determined to examine labour market effects of subsidy policies. The implications of subsidy provisions in the presence of international trade are studied by constructing a small open economy model where the effects of any policy implementation do not affect world prices or income. The principle findings we obtain are that when monopolistically competitive firms receive a cost-reducing subsidy, welfare improvements are always possible regardless of which cost variable the government subsidises. Furthermore, there is always a positive optimal subsidy which raises social welfare. When the supply of labour is endogenous, the corresponding tax imposed on income will always induce an increase in labour supply. Trade is shown not to affect the principle findings: there remains an optimal level of subsidy which is Pareto-improving. A further implication in the open economy context is that the subsidy acts as a form of import-substitution and export-promotion instrument which potentially alters the domestic economy's trade patterns.

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Japan has experienced a prolonged stagnation since bursting the asset market bubble early in the 1990's. It is very important to understand the underlying problems in order to find a remedy to escape this stagnation. This thesis aims to theoretically analyse the current Japanese economy, especially from the viewpoint of multiple equilibria. According to this view, the same fundamentals can yield a multiple outcome depending on history or expectations. This thesis argues that Japan's situation can be regarded as a bad equilibrium which has been provoked by wide-spread pessimism and a bubble collapse. Three chapters independently attempt to construct theoretical models describing the current Japanese situation. Chapter 2 demonstrates that demand externalities yield multiple equilibria. In a bad equilibrium, firms dare not participate in trade, which causes aggregate demand and welfare to decrease. A global games approach then illustrates how equilibrium is selected. Chapter 3, with the objective of seeing if Japan's depression was provoked by the misconduct of monetary policy, investigates the relation between indeterminacy and a monetary policy rule using a sticky price and firm-specific investment model. The standard Taylor principle is shown to be almost sufficient to eliminate indeterminacy, which suggests that the Bank of Japan did not exacerbate the economy while interest rate rules functioned, that is, until 1999. Chapter 4 focuses on a zero nominal interest rate bound, which has been observed since 1999. The ineffectiveness of the monetary policy yields a bad short-run outcome where real economic activity and asset prices become lower. There are long-run multiple equilibria in this story, and that is our explanation for the problem. Within this model, however, our .analysis does not justify a claim that a zero bound for the interest rate causes a long-run equilibrium to be a bad one.

Master of Science / Department of Agricultural Economics / John M. Crespi / The objective of this analysis is to derive several econometric estimates of the Panzar-Rosse statistic of industry structure in order to determine whether the dried plums market resembles that of a firm collusion (monopoly or tightly structured oligopoly), a hybrid of monopolistic and competitive tendencies (monopolistically competitive), or perfectly competitive. The result of the Panzar-Rosse test is the H-Statistic: the sum of all elasticities of a firm’s total revenue with respect to factor prices focusing on the long run equilibrium. This study looks at data from a previous study conducted by Alston et al (1998) that includes firm level data for three of the participating firms in the dried plums industry from September 6, 1992 through July 7, 1996 and data provided from Sunsweet Cooperative encompassing firm level data from six firm participants from July 20, 2008 through June 13, 2010. Ordinary least squares regression equations were estimated to determine the elasticities of firm level input costs and other exogenous variables. A total of four regression equations per data set were tested in order to compile the necessary information for the formulation of the Panzar-Rosse H-Statistic. Adjusting for econometric concerns, overall the results show an H-Statistic commensurate with that of an industry that is operating as monopolistically competitive. In examining the evolution of firm-level changes from the time period of the first data set to that of the second, the results suggest the industry, while remaining monopolistically competitive, has also become more competitive; a finding consistent with the decreased concentration noted in the industry over time.

Modern macroeconomic models with a Keynesian flavour usually involve nominal rigidities in wages and goods prices. A typical model is static and combines wage bargaining in the labour markets and monopolistic competition in the goods markets. As central policy implication it follows that deregulating labour and/or goods markets increases equilibrium employment. We reassess the consequences of deregulation in a dynamic model. It still increases employment at the fixed point, which corresponds to the static equilibrium solution. However, deregulation may also lead to stability loss and endogenous fluctuations. / Series: Working Papers Series "Growth and Employment in Europe: Sustainability and Competitiveness"

Po-yan Chiu. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1998. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 83-86). / Abstract also in Chinese. / Abstract --- p.i / Acknowledgements --- p.iv / List of Figures --- p.vi / Chapter Chapter 1. --- Introduction --- p.1 / Chapter Chapter 2. --- Literature Review --- p.7 / Chapter 2.1 --- Monopolistic Competition and Policy Intervention --- p.7 / Chapter 2.2 --- Policy Interventions in Monetary Economies --- p.17 / Chapter Chapter 3. --- The Model --- p.19 / Chapter 3.1 --- Commodities --- p.19 / Chapter 3.2 --- Demands --- p.20 / Chapter 3.3 --- Equilibrium --- p.21 / Chapter 3.4 --- Open Economy --- p.24 / Chapter Chapter 4. --- Optimal Production Taxation --- p.28 / Chapter Chapter 5. --- Welfare Effect of Trade and the Optimal Tariff --- p.34 / Chapter 5.1 --- Welfare Effect of Trade --- p.34 / Chapter 5.2 --- Optimal Import Tariff --- p.38 / Chapter Chapter 6. --- Consumption Tax --- p.52 / Chapter 6.1 --- Closed Economy --- p.53 / Chapter 6.2 --- Open Economy --- p.55 / Chapter 6.3 --- Welfare Effects of Trade under Different Policies --- p.56 / Chapter Chapter 7. --- Concluding Remarks --- p.62 / Appendix --- p.65 / References --- p.83

The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the competition structure in the market for crossing Øresund and which price setting techniques are used. The results show that the market for crossing Øresund Bridge is monopolistically competitive market. While Øresund Bridge can in some cases be seen as a monopoly. Furthermore the results show how the firms that are operating in the market offer their consumers various pricing schedules to self-select from. The results based upon the information collected found that Øresund Bridge uses price discriminatory pricing schedules such as two-part tariff, quantity discount and peak-load pricing. According to the theory of price discrimination the firm needs to have market power in order to price discriminate and it is found that Øresund Bridge have a market share of 76%. The negative consequences of price discrimination in the particular market can mostly be seen in the ferry market where the two largest firms have to start collaborating in order to sustain as a part of the market. The positive consequences is found to be that a wider range of consumer groups are able to travel over Øresund due to the extensive range of different prices offered by the market operators.