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Moral Worth, Moral Awareness, and Virtuous Motives / Moraliskt Värde, Moralisk Medvetenhet, och Dygdiga MotivLorentzon, Fabian January 2022 (has links)
Morally worthy actions are morally exemplary actions. They are the result of an agent manifesting his virtue. However, the details are controversial. What should the morally exemplary agent care about and what does it mean to be morally aware? In this paper, I examine these questions and present a novel account of morally worthy action.
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Age, equality, and cultural oppression : an argument against ageismWagland, Richard January 2004 (has links)
The concept of 'ageism' has often been thought to be of limited moral concern, especially in comparison to other forms of discrimination such as racism and sexism. Nevertheless, there are also those who believe that ageism is morally significant, and there are diametrically opposed views within liberal and egalitarian theory as to whether age discrimination is or is not just. This thesis has two objectives. Firstly, it seeks to overcome the apparent vagueness of the concept that has given rise to such diametrically opposed views concerning ageism by examining exactly what the phenomenon involves. It defines the wrongfulness of much age discrimination as originating in either the nature of the reasons for which people discriminate against the old or the nature of the consequences for the individuals affected. In the course of the thesis I make several important distinctions, the most important of which are between the social and moral worth of a person, and between the synchronic and diachronic interests of a person. These distinctions allow us to distinguish between a culturally oppressive ageism and ageism that is justified by reasons of equality and efficiency. The former is intrinsically morally wrong, the latter extrinsically wrong. The second aim of the thesis is to develop an anti-ageist ethical principle capable of challenging both forms of ageism in a comprehensive way, and which is consistent with a broader liberal egalitarian political theory. This is achieved by drawing on the distinction between the irreducible nature of each person's synchronic and diachronic interests. I have identified the principle that we should protect the synchronic interests of older persons with a democratic social egalitarianism that seeks to equalise the social relations between citizens rather than concentrating upon an equality of distribution. It is in this way that I also connect the debate about the morality (or otherwise) of age discrimination with debates within contemporary liberal egalitarian philosophy.
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Kant & moral characterHildebrand, Carl January 2017 (has links)
This thesis argues that Kant has a viable, intellectualist account of moral character that is much richer and more interesting than has often been thought. This account is consistent with his broader practical philosophy, in particular, his account of moral worth. Chapter one establishes that Kant has a theory of education on which a child's inclinations are to be trained in preparation for her to grasp the moral law and acquire full moral agency. It argues that his account of habit is complex, recognizing a kind of moral value that is broader than his definition of moral worth. Chapter two argues that sympathy is, for Kant, a primarily cognitive disposition of special importance; this is because it provides knowledge of how the moral law applies in particular circumstances, therefore enabling an agent to fulfill her duties toward others. This chapter also resolves a puzzle concerning Kant's dual concept of character (as both intelligible and empirical) by drawing an analogy with one account of weakness of will. Chapter three develops an account of moral worth that incorporates these more palatable elements of Kant's account of moral character with the seemingly more austere elements familiar from the Groundwork. This theory allows for positive, participating inclinations alongside ascriptions of moral worth. Further, it introduces a distinction between full and mitigated moral worth, to account for agents who, for example, act rightly but for confused reasons as in the case of Twain's Huckleberry Finn. Chapter four responds to two objections to Kant on the basis of moral demandingness, one concerning psychological integration and personal relationships, the other concerning the value of non-moral goods more broadly. It then responds to some objections to his account of the highest good, or the idea of a world in which happiness is distributed in proportion to virtue.
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