Morally worthy actions are morally exemplary actions. They are the result of an agent manifesting his virtue. However, the details are controversial. What should the morally exemplary agent care about and what does it mean to be morally aware? In this paper, I examine these questions and present a novel account of morally worthy action.

The concept of 'ageism' has often been thought to be of limited moral concern, especially in comparison to other forms of discrimination such as racism and sexism. Nevertheless, there are also those who believe that ageism is morally significant, and there are diametrically opposed views within liberal and egalitarian theory as to whether age discrimination is or is not just. This thesis has two objectives. Firstly, it seeks to overcome the apparent vagueness of the concept that has given rise to such diametrically opposed views concerning ageism by examining exactly what the phenomenon involves. It defines the wrongfulness of much age discrimination as originating in either the nature of the reasons for which people discriminate against the old or the nature of the consequences for the individuals affected. In the course of the thesis I make several important distinctions, the most important of which are between the social and moral worth of a person, and between the synchronic and diachronic interests of a person. These distinctions allow us to distinguish between a culturally oppressive ageism and ageism that is justified by reasons of equality and efficiency. The former is intrinsically morally wrong, the latter extrinsically wrong. The second aim of the thesis is to develop an anti-ageist ethical principle capable of challenging both forms of ageism in a comprehensive way, and which is consistent with a broader liberal egalitarian political theory. This is achieved by drawing on the distinction between the irreducible nature of each person's synchronic and diachronic interests. I have identified the principle that we should protect the synchronic interests of older persons with a democratic social egalitarianism that seeks to equalise the social relations between citizens rather than concentrating upon an equality of distribution. It is in this way that I also connect the debate about the morality (or otherwise) of age discrimination with debates within contemporary liberal egalitarian philosophy.

This thesis argues that Kant has a viable, intellectualist account of moral character that is much richer and more interesting than has often been thought. This account is consistent with his broader practical philosophy, in particular, his account of moral worth. Chapter one establishes that Kant has a theory of education on which a child's inclinations are to be trained in preparation for her to grasp the moral law and acquire full moral agency. It argues that his account of habit is complex, recognizing a kind of moral value that is broader than his definition of moral worth. Chapter two argues that sympathy is, for Kant, a primarily cognitive disposition of special importance; this is because it provides knowledge of how the moral law applies in particular circumstances, therefore enabling an agent to fulfill her duties toward others. This chapter also resolves a puzzle concerning Kant's dual concept of character (as both intelligible and empirical) by drawing an analogy with one account of weakness of will. Chapter three develops an account of moral worth that incorporates these more palatable elements of Kant's account of moral character with the seemingly more austere elements familiar from the Groundwork. This theory allows for positive, participating inclinations alongside ascriptions of moral worth. Further, it introduces a distinction between full and mitigated moral worth, to account for agents who, for example, act rightly but for confused reasons as in the case of Twain's Huckleberry Finn. Chapter four responds to two objections to Kant on the basis of moral demandingness, one concerning psychological integration and personal relationships, the other concerning the value of non-moral goods more broadly. It then responds to some objections to his account of the highest good, or the idea of a world in which happiness is distributed in proportion to virtue.

Yes / While moral concern for animals has become increasingly important for both consumer food choice and food policy makers, previous research demonstrated that meat eaters attribute lower moral status and mental capacities to animals raised for meat compared to non-food animals. The current research investigated whether this strategic flexibility in moral concern and mind perceptions also occurs when considering aquatic food animals and animals used for dairy and egg products, and the degree to which these concerns and perceptions are evident in pescatarians and vegetarians. We compared perceptions (mind attributions and moral concern) of land food animals versus aquatic food animals, and of animals in the meat versus dairy and egg industry between omnivores (n = 122), pescatarians (n = 118), vegetarians (n = 138), vegans (n = 120), and flexitarians (n = 60). Pescatarians scored lower than other dietary groups on moral concern and mind attribution for aquatic animals relative to farmed land animals. Unlike the other dietary groups, pescatarians and vegetarians scored lower on moral concern and mind attribution for dairy than beef cows and for layer chickens than broiler chickens. These findings demonstrate that pescatarians and vegetarians were flexible in their moral thinking about different types of food animals in ways that suited their consumption habits, even when the same animal was evaluated (e.g., dairy vs beef cows). This research highlights the psychological barriers that might prevent people from reducing animal product consumption and may need to be addressed in interventions to encourage transitioning towards more plant-based diets. / The full-text of this article will be released for public view at the end of the publisher embargo on 14 June 2025.