The institution of marriage has historically functioned as the foundation of both the Iranian family and society. This study examines the significant changes that have occurred during the rule of the Islamic Republic that have delayed marriage formation. Based on ethnographic fieldwork conducted in Iran between 2017 and 2020 and in-depth interviews with more than one hundred university-educated young Iranians, this dissertation explores new patterns of youth intimacy, the evolution of young people’s perspectives on premarital relationships, and explores the reasons behind the widespread delay in marriage. Since the Revolution of 1979 that led to the fall of the Shah’s modernizing regime, Iranian society has experienced many changes in the realm of marriage and premarital intimacies despite the Islamic Republic’s imposition of conservative religious values designed to reinforce traditional marriage practices. These have included a decline in marriage rates and an increased rate of divorce, as well a rise in the ages of first marriages accompanied by alternative lifestyles that reject marriage as an institution. While economic difficulties, increases at the level of education, and the existence of discriminatory family laws in Iran have often been cited as reasons for these changes, this dissertation argues that it is a dialectical interaction among sociocultural, psychological, moral, and legal factors that better explains this change. Interviews revealed that conflicting attitudes of idealism, cynicism, and moral ambivalence play a significant role in marriage postponement. This was most apparent in the young peoples’ dissatisfaction with khāstegāri, a traditional method of marital partner-evaluation by a young person’s family, which was rejected because it conflicted with a more personal and intimate model of partner selection. That model, however, suffered from excessive idealism that set the standards for a suitable partner so high they could not be easily met. Classical Persian poetry, with its ideals of unconsummated love, reinforced such romantic idealism. In response, a growing number of educated middle-class young Iranians chose to enter into intimate relationships outside of marriage facilitated by the emergence of new social spaces that allowed these new intimacies to flourish in spite of government attempts to discourage them. The research concluded that as a result of marriage postponement and the rise of premarital and non-marriage practices and lifestyles such as dating and cohabitation, intimacy has been transformed in contemporary Iran and as a result, significant changes are recognizable in gender relations and family structure. Young women and men demand a more egalitarian relationship, mutual emotional support and intellectual compatibility, a satisfying sex life, and someone with whom they can share their interests. / 2026-03-25T00:00:00Z

This thesis addresses the conflict traditionally found within moral philosophy between deontological and utilitarian schools of thought. Using the example of the serious moral ambivalence experienced by individuals who are deciding whether to end or continue a difficult pregnancy, it is argued that this ambivalence is the result of both absolute principles (such as the intrinsic value of human life) and outcome based considerations (such as the desire to avoid causing pain and suffering) appearing to be morally reasonable, while also being fundamentally opposed: Each course of action is at once morally defensible on the basis of its own reasonableness, and, conversely, reprehensible due to the reasonableness of the other. This lived experience of moral ambivalence is directly reflected by the tension between deontology and utilitarianism as it occurs at the moral philosophic level, where the deontological emphasis on the unconditional rightness of certain principles is seen to be at irreconcilable odds with the utilitarian emphasis on the attainment of certain ends. The thesis’ central claim is that such ambivalence strongly indicates that human morality is neither exclusively one type or the other, and that both types of moral property are in fact reasonable, and thus have moral value. It is theorised that accounting for this dual reasonableness would lead to the most accurate and helpful representation of the human moral experience – but that the philosophic ‘divide’ between the two types of principle has led to an either/or situation, which has largely prevented this sort of understanding from being developed. The thesis argues that Victorian philosopher Henry Sidgwick developed a view in which neither deontological nor utilitarian principles can be fully realised without reference to the other, precisely on the basis that both can be found to be ultimately rational. This thesis aims to revitalise that theory – represented by the term ‘Rational Benevolence’ - to show that Sidgwick reconciled the divide between absolute and end based principles in such a way that the relationship between them becomes a ‘synthesis’. In this synthesis, deontological and utilitarian concepts are both seen as essential components of morality, that combine to form a dynamic whole in which the value of each principle is both indicated and naturally limited by the value of the other, on account of their respective rationalities. It is argued that this provides a more comprehensive understanding of the reality of the human moral experience, and better moral justification for either course of action in situations of complex and sensitive ethical decision making.