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Despite long-standing recognition that the constellation of ethical and political ideas developed by the seventeenth-century Natural Law School played an important part in the development of Enlightenment thought, the relationship between the two remains a fertile area of research in intellectual history. Filling a lacuna in existing scholarship, this thesis contends that central tenets of the ethical and political philosophies developed by the Natural Law School were appropriated by the more liberal and progressive contributors to the Encyclopédie ou Dictionnaire raisonné des Sciences, des Arts et des Métiers (1751-1772); which is frequently considered to be the summa of Enlightenment thought, and emblematic of the conflict between the new ‘philosophical spirit’ and the traditional hierarchies, institutions, and values of the ancien régime. It argues that by establishing the loi naturelle and natural rights of the individual as the foundation of both ethics and politics in many of its articles, the Encyclopédie questions the certainty and validity of Catholicism as the basis for both, and that it therefore played an important role in undermining the moral authority of the Church as well as the political authority of the State. In particular, it asserts that the more liberal and humanitarian contributors to the project put the central tenets of Natural Law thinking into practice, in order to tackle and propose reform of what they perceive to be some of the worst injustices in contemporary society, namely with regard to the related questions of slavery and luxury. For those encyclopédistes who believe in universal rights and the loi naturelle, both the slave trade and the attitude of their contemporaries to luxury seem to embody values very different to those they wanted to promote; in their eyes both are representative of a society in which self-interest and the satisfaction of individual passions are valued over and above any consideration for the needs, welfare, and rights of others.

This thesis explores the normative significance of making a rights-backed, authorized demand as a right holder. Rights, I argue, enable their holders to make a special kind of demand which comes with a special force. It is, in other words, one of rights' functions that they are demands-enabling. I single out what sort of demands I am interested in exploring. I also look at how these special demands are normatively significant. I call them rights-backed, authorized demands. They are normatively significant, first, because of the interesting role they play in other agents' practical-reasoning, and , second, because the very making of these demands, as a matter of rights, is empowering in an abstract way. I go on to contrast my view with other ‘demand theories' in existence and conclude that my view is substantively different. In particular, existing demand theories of rights all fail to sufficiently highlight the importance of actual demands, and instead focus on the ‘status' of ‘being in a position' to make demands. I argue that this focus is a fundamental mistake. I also consider how my view can contribute to some related literature on rights. First, I argue that my view highlights a new function which rights have: it has interesting implications on the shape of the long-standing debate between the will and interest theory of rights. Second, I argue that my view provides us with a new way to counter one of the most discussed criticisms of the existence of welfare human rights, which is the argument that rights must correlate with some specific duties as a necessary existence condition, and that human welfare rights fail on this mark. I conclude that if human rights indeed have a demand-related function as I argue, it weakens the intuitive appeal of this criticism.

Ce mémoire porte sur le problème de la légitimité de revendications émanant de multiples sources d’autorité (morales, politiques et légales). L’histoire conceptuelle du pluralisme montre que les significations qui lui sont attribuées sont à la fois contingentes et hétéroclites, leurs traductions en pratique étant loin d’être évidentes. Notre principal objectif est de remettre en question l’hypothèse selon laquelle l’approche de Charles Taylor est pluraliste. Si la reconnaissance d’une pluralité de biens joue un rôle fondamental dans la philosophie de Taylor, il est néanmoins nécessaire de montrer l’important clivage existant entre, d’une part, le fait d’accepter que nos conflits de valeurs soient souvent irréconciliables et, d’autre part, la volonté de trouver un moyen de mettre en harmonie des finalités concurrentes. Au terme de notre enquête, nous espérons mettre en lumière l’écart que nous constatons entre les questions reliées à la différence culturelle et les problèmes posés par des revendications d’autorité formulées par des associations formelles. / This dissertation explores the problem of the legitimacy of claims that emanate from multiple sources of authority (moral, political and legal). Often, in political philosophy, one encounters claims on behalf of pluralism, yet there is anything but a consensus over the meaning of this fundamental concept. Charles Taylor is a philosopher who is often referred to as a pluralist, but I shall argue that this is a mistake. By way of a foray into different domains of practical reason, this study suggests that the gap between issues concerning cultural difference and pluralist claims to authority is obscured and obliterated in Taylor’s work. One of the central goals of his philosophy is that of reconciling competing aims and ends and this is incompatible with pluralism.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-06-02T20:12:15Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 3051.pdf: 1992978 bytes, checksum: fb8b38e65171ce45ef572425d1cb2105 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2009-11-29 / This thesis analyzes and discusses the ideas of passion, reason, consenting, promise, and political obedience aiming to verify how they can found on a defense of morals and politics in David Hume s philosophy. From the rational view, Hobbes and Locke postulate that the institution and legitimating of political associations or of the State stem from people s liberty and interest in giving in to the other s power; from the making of agreements or deals related to the association or submission; and from the explicit promise of adhesion and obedience to the established government. From the human behavior observation and historical perspectives, Hume states that government s origin and legitimating don t rely on contracts and explicit promises of submission since political societies established through usurpation and conquering demand the same obedience and submission from people as other states do. Such a debate with contractualists reveals three problems in Hume s political philosophy: the passive and tacit character of political obedience to the usurped and conquered governs; the compatibility between the idea of spontaneity liberty or free action and the submission imposed by governments established through strength and violence; and the existence and operation of political and moral agents able to determine themselves in circumstances of social and political restraint. As a hypothesis of solution for such problems, one considers that morals and politics in Hume s philosophy can be established by taking human nature principles as the creative principle of all institutions and sciences. Therefore, one needs to verify the role reason and passions play in the determination of human behavior and constitution of the State; to distinguish the debate on the government origin from the debate on its legitimacy, so that to analyze the psychological principles which make people to accept being governed; to examine the general promise foundations, so that to note the motivations for the agreements fulfillment; and to investigate the obedience and legitimating principles in political societies. / Esta tese analisa e discute as idéias de paixão, razão, consentimento, promessa e obediência política, para verificar como podem fundamentar a defesa de uma teoria da agência moral e política na filosofia de David Hume. Do ponto de vista racional, Hobbes e Locke postulam que a instituição e legitimação de associações políticas ou do Estado derivam: da liberdade e do interesse dos indivíduos em se submeterem ao poder alheio; do estabelecimento de acordos ou contratos relativos à associação e submissão; e da promessa expressa de adesão e obediência ao governo estabelecido. Na perspectiva da observação do comportamento humano e da história, Hume concebe que a origem e legitimidade do governo não dependem de contratos e promessas expressas de submissão, pois as sociedades políticas fundadas mediante usurpação e conquista exigem das pessoas a mesma obediência e submissão que os outros Estados. Esse debate com os contratualistas deixa entrever três problemas na filosofia política de Hume: o caráter passivo ou tácito da obediência política aos governos usurpados e conquistados; a compatibilidade entre a idéia de liberdade de espontaneidade ou ação livre e a submissão imposta pelos governos estabelecidos pela força e violência; e a existência e atuação de agentes morais e políticos capazes de se determinarem nas circunstâncias de constrangimento social e político. Como hipótese de solução desses problemas, considera-se que a agência moral e política na filosofia de Hume pode se estabelecer com base na análise dos princípios da natureza humana como princípio criativo de todas as instituições e ciências. Assim, é preciso: verificar o papel da razão e das paixões na determinação do comportamento humano e na constituição do Estado; distinguir o debate acerca da origem do governo da discussão sobre sua legitimidade, analisando-se os princípios mentais que permitem as pessoas consentirem ser governadas; examinar os fundamentos da promessa em geral, observando-se as motivações para o cumprimento de acordos; e investigar os princípios da obediência política e legitimação das sociedades políticas.

The knowledge base of empirical psychology is more expansive than ever before. So too is the impulse to integrate this factual knowledge into political theory. But how should this psychological turn be undertaken? What would a political psychology for political theorists look like? How could psychology credibly tackle the questions that political theorists characteristically ask, especially regarding the nature and consequences of prescriptive political judgment? In this thesis, I explore this issue through the framework of recent debates between political moralists—specifically, John Rawls, G. A. Cohen, and Peter Singer—and political realists—largely Bernard Williams. Deploying the insights of political realists, I argue that moralists cannot quarantine the relevance of psychological facts through the ideal of a 'pure' normative judgment. To explore what this empirical engagement might look like, I contrast these moralist ideals of judgment with Jonathan Haidt’s social intuitionism, which proposes a more affectively laden and pluralistic model of judgment. I then redeploy the insights of political realism to critique social intuitionism, to uncover its weaknesses from the perspective of existing political theory. Finally, to stabilize this critique, I lay out the framework for a reflexive political psychology, which acknowledges the co-constitutive relationship between the discipline of psychology and its subject matter: human psychology. This reflexive political psychology offers an agenda by which we can investigate the political usefulness of psychological and political theories.

Ce travail appréhende le corpus des romans utopiques dits classiques (1676-1710), en articulant trois démarches souvent dissociées. La première concerne leur apport idéologique dans le contexte d'une période de crise profonde de la pensée et s'interroge sur la notion problématique de modernité. La seconde s'attache à la constitution spécifique d'un univers fictionnel qui confronte deux mondes, le monde européen et le monde utopique, en recourant à des conceptions contemporaines de la fiction comme « monde possible » et comme « version du monde ». La dernière réfléchit l'inscription paradoxale des romans, entre perpétuation et subversion, dans la tradition philosophique et morale classique, et notamment les formes intertextuelles de cette inscription. Des ces options, découle un choix thématique : l'analyse se penche plus spécifiquement sur la vision anthropologique à l'œuvre dans les textes. Les textes projettent en effet dans un monde alternatif une représentation de l'homme faite de schèmes conceptuels et figuratifs qui sont issus de leur univers culturel et philosophique, mais qui sont agencés, recontextualisés et transformés, de manière à participer de déplacements importants, qui seront consolidés par les Lumières triomphantes du second XVIIIe siècle. / The present work focuses on the corpus of so-called “classical” utopian novels (1676-1710), combining three approaches, which are often used separately. The first method deals with their ideological dimension, within the context of a deep crisis in thought, and questions the problematic notion of modernity. The second method tackles the specific constitution of a fictional world, confronting two worlds – the European world and the utopian world –, by resorting to contemporary notions of fiction as “possible world” and as “version of the world”. The third method reflects on the paradoxical inscription of the novels within the classical philosophical and moral tradition, which it perpetuates or subverts, and focuses notably on the intertextual forms of this inscription. These options result in a thematic choice: the analysis focuses more specifically on the anthropological vision at work in the texts. The texts project, in an alternative world, a representation of man composed of figurative and conceptual patterns, which originate from their cultural and philosophical backgrounds, but which are recontextualized, organized and transformed, so as to partake of important displacements, which will consolidate in the triumphant Enlightenment, in the second half o the 18th century. Although modernity stems from a self-creating movement of rupture, in order to postulate a better world, it remains dependent on the old world it attempts to do away with. Classical utopias provide an exemplary laboratory of modernity, by textually actualizing the operations which embody modernity's dynamics, as well as some of its tensions, notably regarding the use of the notion of nature.