In this thesis, I identify and engage an orthodox view in Aristotelian scholarship. Many scholars maintain that Aristotle, in the third book of his Nicomachean Ethics, claims that we should always blame people who act badly with ignorance of what is moral. This view, which I label the “common view” is widespread and unquestioned in the literature. I disagree with the orthodox view, and maintain that we can read Aristotle as not always holding people who act badly in ignorance of what is moral as blameworthy. There are three essential steps in my argument. First, I show that it is not certain that Aristotle commits himself to the common view in the passages usually cited as evidence for the view. I review the evidence in favor of the common view, and argue that other interpretations of Aristotle are equally compatible with his text. Second, I argue that there is textual evidence elsewhere in the Nicomachean Ethics which is contrary to the common view. Thirdly and finally, I suggest that an alternate reading – on which Aristotle allows for pardon in some cases where people act badly in ignorance of what is moral – chimes well with other portions of his ethics, and with scholarly literature: I take two such cases, moral education and ethical deliberation. Given the evidence against the common view, and the evidence in favor of an alternate reading, I suggest that the orthodox view should be abandoned by scholars. / Thesis / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) / In this thesis I identify and engage an orthodox view in Aristotelian scholarship. Many scholars maintain that Aristotle, in the third book of his Nicomachean Ethics, claims that we should always blame people who act badly with ignorance of what is moral. This view, which I label the “common view” is widespread and unquestioned by scholars. I disagree with this reading of Aristotle. I do not think that Aristotle commits himself to this view in his writings. Moreover, I argue that the common view is a bad fit with other passages from the Nicomachean Ethics. If the common view is false, as I claim, it is important for us to formulate an alternate reading of Aristotle’s comments. I proffer one such reading, a reading on which people are not always worthy of blame when they act badly in ignorance of what is moral.

In this paper, I call into question the thesis known as judgment internalism about moral motivation. Broadly construed, this thesis holds that there is a non-contingent relation between moral judgment and moral motivation. The difficulty for judgment internalism arises because of amoral agents: when an agent both knows the right and yet fails to be motivated to act on this knowledge. Specifically, I cite John Milton's Satan from Paradise Lost. This is a problem because it calls into question the non-contingent relation between moral judgment and moral motivation. I argue that in order for judgment internalism to be viable in reconciling judgment internalism and amoralism, it must provide plausible accounts of both (a) the relationship between judging and motivation, and (b) the conditions for defeasibility. While crude versions of the thesis fail to do this, I provide a revised thesis which I call Narrative Internalism, which assumes a narrative theory of the self. This thesis has the dual strength that it can account for both why one would typically be motivated to Φ upon judging that it is right to Φ and also the conditions that might obtain such that one would fail to be motivated. This account of moral psychology explains both (a) the relationship between judging and motivation, and (b) the conditions for defeasibility by giving an account of plausible defeasibility conditions. I conclude that unless there are more plausible accounts of judgment internalism in the offing, which doesn't seem apparent to me, we should adopt Narrative Internalism. / Master of Arts

When a business organization designs an ethics program, should it adopt a situationist conception of moral psychology or a virtue approach to character building? In this dissertation I argue that the answer is, both. The complement model is a recommendation for business ethics programs that blends the best aspects of these two theories in social psychology and philosophy. I start by giving a critique of the experimental literature surrounding situationism and argue that older adults have different prosocial competencies than the younger college-age subjects used in the situationist experiments. I give an explanation of virtue development, which concludes with the claim that older adults are an overlooked resource to be used in formal ethics mentoring programs. I also present the findings from a study I conducted with business ethics professionals, which provided information that I used to formulate the recommendations for the complement model.

Thesis advisor: Jeffrey Bloechl / The idea of moral action seems to contain a paradox. On the one hand, it seems that in performing such an act one is obligated, bound to the act by something external. On the other hand, it seems that such an act must be freely chosen in the sense that the act must be done for its own sake. The source of the moral act therefore seems to be located both within and without the self. I refer to this as the problem of moral motivation. This dissertation proposes to clarify the nature of moral motivation in the context of a phenomenological investigation of the feeling of guilt, one informed by various thinkers, but particularly by the work of Paul Ricoeur. The rationale behind this proposal can be grasped by observing the confrontation between Immanuel Kant and Friedrich Nietzsche. Kant’s moral philosophy answers the problem of moral motivation by identifying freedom with the determination of the will by the moral law. A crucial aspect of his argument for this identification is his appeal to the experience of respect for the moral law. This feeling, which Kant describes as the incentive of morality, is a feeling of humiliation before reason, but is at the same time the ennobling sense of one’s autonomy. Nietzsche places this liaison between morality and freedom under stern scrutiny, arguing that the two notions are antithetical to one another. In effect, Nietzsche’s attack implies that moral motivation is a chimera. Guilt does not signify the power of the good to motivate one to do right for its own sake. Moral action is better interpreted as the exertion of power: justice is the advantage of the stronger. Provoked by this confrontation, the dissertation argues that the phenomenology of guilt does not permit us to reduce it entirely to internalized aggression and self-deception. Rather, the self-deceptive and manipulative emotional phenomenon that Nietzsche calls bad conscience can be distinguished from guilt per se. The central task of the work is to explicate the distinctive structure of the latter for the sake of two purposes: 1) by distinguishing guilt from bad conscience, to defend the possibility of moral motivation, and 2) to clarify that possibility in terms of its apparently paradoxical relation to the structure of the self. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2016. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Philosophy.

Thesis advisor: Liane L. Young / Thesis advisor: Elizabeth A. Kensinger / Theory of mind refers to the process of representing others’ mental states. This process consistently elicits activity in a network of brain regions: the theory of mind network (ToMN). Typically, theory of mind has been understood in terms of content, i.e. representing the semantic content of someone’s beliefs. However, recent work has proposed that ToMN activity could be better understood in the context of social prediction; or, more specifically, prediction error—the difference between observed and predicted information. Social predictions can be represented in multiple forms—e.g. dispositional predictions about who a person is, prescriptive norms about what people should do, and descriptive norms about what people frequently do. Part 1 examined the relationship between social prediction error and ToMN activity, finding that the activity in the ToMN was related to both dispositional, and prescriptive predictions. Part 2 examined the semantic content represented by moral claims. Prior work has suggested that morals are generally represented and understood as objective, i.e. akin to facts. Instead, we found that moral claims are represented as far more social than prior work had anticipated, eliciting a great deal of activity across the ToMN. Part 3 examined the relationship between ToMN activity and metaethical status, i.e. the extent that morals were perceived as objective or subjective. Objective moral claims elicited less ToMN activity, whereas subjective moral claimed elicited more. We argue that this relationship is best understood in the context of prediction, where objective moral claims represent strong social priors about what most people will believe. Finally, I expand on this finding and argue that a theoretical approach incorporating social prediction has serious implications for morality, or more specifically, for the motivations underlying normative compliance. People may be compelled to observe moral rules because doing so maintains a predictable social environment. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2017. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Psychology.

Procuramos neste trabalho investigar um modelo de uma sociedade em que agentes aprendem de seu vizinhos sociais. Buscando inspiração no paradigma de redes neurais, construímos uma analogia entre o modelo e o julgamento moral. Usando dados de questionários on-line obtidos alhures, apresentamos uma análise estatística de dados de sujeitos humanos. A partir destes dados estudamos o modelo, encontrando uma transição de fase entre um estado ordenado e um desordenado, dependente de um parâmetro análogo ao inverso da temperatura beta que denominamos peer pressure e de um parâmetro de controle delta associado ao comportamento dos agentes. Ao compararmos histogramas obtidos do modelo com histogramas dos dados de questionários observamos uma semelhança surpreendente entre os dois. Para determinar o diagrama de fases do modelo, usamos métodos de Monte Carlo e uma aproximação de campo médio usando métodos de máxima entropia. Estudamos também a suscetibilidade do sistema a perturbações no ambiente de discussão e encontramos um decaimento exponencial da distância entre o estado perturbado e o de equilíbrio, com um mínimo no tempo característico de adaptação para um certo valor de delta. / In this work we seek to investigate a model of a society in which agents learn from their social neighbours. Seeking inspiration in the neural network paradigm, we build an analogy between the model and moral judgement. Using data from online questionaries obtained elsewhere, we present a statistical analysis of human data. Starting from these we study the model, finding a phase transition between an ordered and a disordered state, dependent on a parameter akin to the inverse temperature beta that we denominate peer pressure and a control parameter delta associated to the agents\' behavior. Comparing the histograms obtained with the model and histograms obtained from the data we observed a surprising simlarity between the two. To determine the phase diagram of the model we use Monte Carlo methods and a mean-field approximation using maximum entropy methods. We also study the susceptibility of the system to perturbations in the environment and find an exponential decay in the distance between the perturbated and equilibrium states, with a minimum of the characteristic time of adaptation for a given value of delta.

Against moral intuitionism, which holds that moral intuitions can be non-inferentially justified, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong argues that moral intuitions are unreliable and must be confirmed to be justified (i.e. must be justified inferentially) because they are subject to cognitive biases. However, I suggest this is merely a renewed version of the argument from disagreement against intuitionism. As such, I attempt to show that the renewed argument is subject to an analogous objection as the old one; many cognitive biases of moral intuitions result from biases of non-moral judgments. Thus, the unreliability of moral intuitions due to biases (and the reason inferential justification was required) can be removed by clearing up the non-moral biases. Accordingly, biases of moral intuitions do not threaten a slightly qualified version intuitionism which posits non-inferential justification of intuitions when non-moral biases are not present. I also present an empirical study that lends initial support to my argument.

This thesis is an exploration of the shame that inheres in not being able to self-admire. I call this incapacity to admire oneself ontological shame, and I argue that it is the source of the masquerades, concealments and negative emotions that surround the pursuit and defence of a self-esteem founded on an impoverished form of pride. I argue that there is a radical asymmetry between our admiration and esteem for others and how we evaluate our own sense of self-worth. Where admiration at its highest pitch is the wonderful agape experience of apprehending preciousness in others, our own sense of self-worth is limited to experiences of pride and other forms of self-affirmation; none of which allow us the joy of seeing ourselves as wonders in the world. Because we can admire and want to be admired, not being able to self-admire amounts to a limitation of a sort which carries with it a primordial resentment against life itself. It is largely how we respond to our ontological limitation and to our resentment that determines the positive or negative manner in which we interact with others, and whether or not we are likely to have an envious or humble disposition. In the first three chapters I lay the groundwork for the main argument of the thesis by highlighting the difficulties self-esteem theorists have in agreeing upon the value of ‘high’ self-esteem, introduce the relation between self-esteem and shame, argue for a distinction between self-esteem and public esteem, and provide an account of the gift-exchange nature of admiration which explains why we cannot self-admire. In the central chapters I focus on shame; on acts of concealment that can be either appropriate covering for, or deceitful denial of our ontological limitation; how self-worth is created through a reconciliation to shame, and why the ‘self-act dissociation’ theories of guilt fail to capture the shame attached to ‘being guilty’ of a wrongdoing. In Chapters Seven and Eight I examine envy, first in how it can be disguised as moral resentment; how it differs to admiration in its role in emulation, and finally how as a disposition it stands in stark contrast to humility. It is in humility that we grasp the benefits associated with our own incapacity to self-admire through our need to interact and exchange gifts with others.

In the past, experiments on human morality have predominantly utilised theoretical moral dilemmas to shed light on the nature of moral judgment. However, little attention has been given to determining how these judgments might translate into moral actions. In this thesis, I utilised novel and state-of-the-art Virtual Reality environments and combined approaches from social psychology, experimental philosophy, computer science, robotics, and speculative design. Over the course of six experiments with more than 200 participants, simulated moral actions made in Virtual Reality were found to be dissociated from moral judgments made in conventional paradigms. The results suggest that moral judgment and action may be driven by distinct mechanisms. The association between personality traits and moral judgments versus actions, was also investigated. In two experiments, psychopathic and associated traits predicted moral actions and the power with which these were simulated, but failed to predict moral judgments. With research suggesting a mediating role for empathy in this relationship, two further experiments examined empathic and affective processing in moral judgment versus action. In the first of these, alcohol consumption successfully lowered affective empathy and arousal in virtual dilemmas, but moral judgment and action remained unaffected. In the second, an investigation of professionally trained paramedics and fire service incident commanders, revealed distinct differences in empathic and related personality traits, reduced emotional arousal, and less regret following moral action. Taken together, this research suggests that novel virtual technologies can provide insights into self-referent actions, which sit in contrast to judgments motivated by social norms. Ethically, incorporating Virtual Reality in investigations of morality of harm offers a balanced approach; protecting participant wellbeing while increasing the ecological validity of moral investigations. The roles of personality traits and associated emotional processes in moral judgment and action remain multifaceted and as such, I outline the necessity of considering both the characteristics of the decision-maker and the context in which the decision is undertaken, within an interactionist model of morality.

Procuramos neste trabalho investigar um modelo de uma sociedade em que agentes aprendem de seu vizinhos sociais. Buscando inspiração no paradigma de redes neurais, construímos uma analogia entre o modelo e o julgamento moral. Usando dados de questionários on-line obtidos alhures, apresentamos uma análise estatística de dados de sujeitos humanos. A partir destes dados estudamos o modelo, encontrando uma transição de fase entre um estado ordenado e um desordenado, dependente de um parâmetro análogo ao inverso da temperatura beta que denominamos peer pressure e de um parâmetro de controle delta associado ao comportamento dos agentes. Ao compararmos histogramas obtidos do modelo com histogramas dos dados de questionários observamos uma semelhança surpreendente entre os dois. Para determinar o diagrama de fases do modelo, usamos métodos de Monte Carlo e uma aproximação de campo médio usando métodos de máxima entropia. Estudamos também a suscetibilidade do sistema a perturbações no ambiente de discussão e encontramos um decaimento exponencial da distância entre o estado perturbado e o de equilíbrio, com um mínimo no tempo característico de adaptação para um certo valor de delta. / In this work we seek to investigate a model of a society in which agents learn from their social neighbours. Seeking inspiration in the neural network paradigm, we build an analogy between the model and moral judgement. Using data from online questionaries obtained elsewhere, we present a statistical analysis of human data. Starting from these we study the model, finding a phase transition between an ordered and a disordered state, dependent on a parameter akin to the inverse temperature beta that we denominate peer pressure and a control parameter delta associated to the agents\' behavior. Comparing the histograms obtained with the model and histograms obtained from the data we observed a surprising simlarity between the two. To determine the phase diagram of the model we use Monte Carlo methods and a mean-field approximation using maximum entropy methods. We also study the susceptibility of the system to perturbations in the environment and find an exponential decay in the distance between the perturbated and equilibrium states, with a minimum of the characteristic time of adaptation for a given value of delta.