In contrast to his rationalist predecessors, Kant insists that feeling has a pos- itive role to play in moral life. But the exact nature of this role is far from clear. As much as Kant insists that moral action must proceed from a feeling of respect, he maintains with equal insistence that the objective basis of acting from duty must come from practical reason alone, and that when we act from duty we must exclude sensibility from the determining grounds of choice. In what way, then, is respect for the law a feeling? And what place does this feeling have—if any—in Kant’s ethics? The aim of my dissertation is to answer these questions, in part through a close engagement with Kant’s second Critique. I provide a close reading of his claim that our recognition of the moral law must effect both painful and pleasurable feelings in us, and I argue that these feelings, for Kant, are meant to explain how the moral law can figure into the basis of a maxim. By showing why our recognition of the law must be painful from the perspective of self-love, but pleasurable from the perspective of practical reason, Kant is able to show how our desires can acquire normative direction. On my reading, then, the theory of moral sensibility we find in the second Critique addresses a rather troubling form of skepticism: skepticism about moral motivation.In the course of defending this claim, I provide an alternative reading of the development of Kant’s project of moral justification from Groundwork III to the second Critique. Against a wide-spread view in the literature, I suggest that what changes between these texts is not a direction of argument (from freedom to morality, or morality to freedom), but a methodological shift toward the concept of human sensibility. In the later work, I argue, Kant develops a novel approach to moral feeling from the perspective of the deliberating agent; and this in turn clears room in Kant’s ethics for a new kind of a priori knowledge—namely, knowledge of what the activity of practical reason must feel like. The broader aim of my dissertation is thus to put Kant’s work on meta-ethics and moral psychology in closer proximity.

In a famous argument at the beginning of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle argues that the function and good of the human being is the "actuality of the soul in accordance with virtue". Presenting a view critical of the widespread intellectualist reading of Aristotle's Ethics, in this thesis I argue that the characteristic function of the human being is constitutive of a distinctly human life as a dynamic formal cause teleologically operative in human awareness. I argue for the validity of my own view in a preliminary way in the introduction by way of Aristotle's critique of the Platonic forms. In the second chapter, I argue that the processes of the non-rational part of the soul are acquired and actively operate once acquired independently of singular dictates of active reason within the individual. By this I mean that the virtues do not obey reason in the sense that they receive individual commands from discursive reason to desire or feel in certain ways. Rather, although the moral virtues are formed gradually by repeated acts of choice, as affective states, they are activated by being affected from without by external stimuli. These external stimuli produce impulses in the soul which are conducive to virtuous action, including a cognitive element: primarily, non-rational and non-discursive evaluative judgments of phantasia, which supply a human agent immediately with the ends of his action and the beginning-points of deliberation. These judgments are the awareness of sensible particulars as pleasant. In the third chapter, I turn to the De Anima in order to illuminate the cognitive conditions of human praxis. Following on the arguments contained in the second chapter, I argue that there are two primary cognitive moments which are necessary conditions of action. While the ends of desire are immediate objects of awareness and move humans as unmoved movers, motivational desires, which move as efficient causes, are initiated by a distinct cognitive power: proclamations to pursue or avoid.

<p>There are various theories in the philosophy of mind/cognitive science of what kinds of knowledge, or information carrying mental states, constitute our mental concepts. Such knowledge is used in higher acts of cognition such as in categorization, induction, deduction, and analogical reasoning when we think or reason about the extension of the concept. While most concept theories have primarily focused on concrete concepts such as `chair,' `table,' and `dog,' I take such modern theories and apply them to abstract moral concepts such as `virtue,' `right action,' and `just.' I argue for a new overall pluralistic theory of moral concepts, combining several theories of concepts. This pluralistic view differs from, for example, Ayer's non-cognitivist theory that contends that our moral concepts are constituted by or just are emotions and desires. Finally, I draw further philosophical implications my conclusion may have for applied ethics, normative ethical theory, political philosophy and meta-ethics.</p> / Dissertation

This thesis argues that Kant has a viable, intellectualist account of moral character that is much richer and more interesting than has often been thought. This account is consistent with his broader practical philosophy, in particular, his account of moral worth. Chapter one establishes that Kant has a theory of education on which a child's inclinations are to be trained in preparation for her to grasp the moral law and acquire full moral agency. It argues that his account of habit is complex, recognizing a kind of moral value that is broader than his definition of moral worth. Chapter two argues that sympathy is, for Kant, a primarily cognitive disposition of special importance; this is because it provides knowledge of how the moral law applies in particular circumstances, therefore enabling an agent to fulfill her duties toward others. This chapter also resolves a puzzle concerning Kant's dual concept of character (as both intelligible and empirical) by drawing an analogy with one account of weakness of will. Chapter three develops an account of moral worth that incorporates these more palatable elements of Kant's account of moral character with the seemingly more austere elements familiar from the Groundwork. This theory allows for positive, participating inclinations alongside ascriptions of moral worth. Further, it introduces a distinction between full and mitigated moral worth, to account for agents who, for example, act rightly but for confused reasons as in the case of Twain's Huckleberry Finn. Chapter four responds to two objections to Kant on the basis of moral demandingness, one concerning psychological integration and personal relationships, the other concerning the value of non-moral goods more broadly. It then responds to some objections to his account of the highest good, or the idea of a world in which happiness is distributed in proportion to virtue.

Made available in DSpace on 2015-05-07T15:08:29Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 arquivototal.pdf: 1330093 bytes, checksum: e08fb3235cb04f6a00e0352b5d225b26 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011-08-29 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior - CAPES / Situations of bullying at school have become one of the largest concerns of educators and other professionals involved in education, due to reaching the student body in various ages and in high proportions, coming to be identified as the greatest manifestation of school violence in Brazil. Explaining the understandings of teachers about the causes, features and actions to combat this problem is an important passage to discuss the role of teachers in bullying, since they are the most responsible ones for interventions and overcoming this issue. Accordingly, this research presents its main objective as understanding and discussing the moral judgments of teachers (from a private school in the Metropolitan region of Recife) on school bullying. In order to do so, 17 active educators of basic education were chosen from a voluntary participation in a meeting on continuing education on school bullying. Data were analyzed qualitatively, based on the enunciation analysis according to Bardin (1979), taking the theoretical assumptions of moral psychology and Cultural Studies of Education into account. Research results point out that a creed for teachers exists that the problem is the sole responsibility of the family, what leads to a difficulty in defining ways to overcome this violence, practices related to the installation of a cooperative environment in classrooms. This can best be understood due to have found a necessary understanding about bullying behaviour among teachers, who equate the behaviour of school violence to a lack of domestic education (which leads to possible thinking about an intervention as exclusively being the family´s responsibility). Moreover, in case of targets of bullying, it can be argued that there is a responsibility of the individual who is victimized at school, and that´s why teachers consider themselves exempt from the responsibility to act in confronting the problem, as they blame the target for the process of victimization. This way of thinking, quite heteronymous, helps spreading the belief that violence can be justified. / Situações de bullying em âmbito escolar têm se tornado uma das maiores preocupações de educadores (as) e profissionais ligados à educação, em função de atingirem o alunado em variadas idades e em altas proporções, chegando a ser apontadas como a maior manifestação de violência escolar no Brasil. Explicar as compreensões de docentes acerca das causas, características e ações de enfrentamento dessa problemática é um caminho importante para problematizar a atuação de professores (as) diante do bullying, visto que são eles os maiores responsáveis pelas intervenções e possível superação da questão. Nesse sentido, esta investigação tem como principal objetivo conhecer e problematizar as concepções e os julgamentos morais de docentes (de uma escola particular da região metropolitana do Recife) sobre bullying escolar. Para isso, contou com 17 educadores atuantes na Educação Básica, escolhidos a partir da disponibilização voluntária para a participação de um encontro de formação continuada sobre bullying escolar. Os dados foram analisados qualitativamente, a partir da análise da enunciação proposta por Bardin (1979), levando em consideração os pressupostos teóricos da Psicologia Moral e dos Estudos Culturais da Educação. Os resultados de pesquisa apontam para o fato de que há, por parte dos educadores, uma crença de que o problema seja de responsabilidade exclusiva das famílias, o que leva os docentes a uma dificuldade em definir formas de superação dessa violência ligadas às praticas de instalação de um ambiente cooperativo em sala de aula. Tal fato pode ser compreendido em função de encontrar-se uma compreensão determinista sobre os comportamentos de bullying entre os educadores, visto que eles equacionam os comportamentos de violência na escola à falta de educação doméstica (o que os leva a pensar que cabe exclusivamente a família a responsabilidade da intervenção). Além disso, em caso de alvos-provocadores de bullying, foi constatado que há uma responsabilização do sujeito que é vitimizado na escola, de modo que os professores se isentam da responsabilidade de atuar no enfrentamento do problema, à medida que culpam o próprio alvo por seu processo de vitimação. Tal forma de pensar, bastante heterônoma, ajuda a difundir a crença de que a violência pode ser justificada.

Este estudo qualitativo de caráter exploratório está pautado em preceitos convergentes da Educação e da Psicologia tendo por objetivo identificar referências pessoais que influenciem os valores ético-morais adotados pelo público adolescente. A investigação teórico empírica perpassou pressupostos da educação em valores consonantes a prerrogativas da psicologia moral visando elencar características admiráveis apontadas pelos jovens participantes; o presente trabalho foi emoldurado por variáveis do escopo educativo assumindo-o como um campo privilegiado de interação entre as distintas gerações que venham a favorecer uma construção reflexiva de valores ético-morais a partir de princípios louváveis. Em função destas prerrogativas uma questão central norteou nossa pesquisa: que influências perpassam a constituição de referências éticas e morais da atual geração de adolescentes? Alunos do terceiro ano do Ensino Médio da rede pública estadual paulista atendidos por um programa socioeducativo de formação complementar participaram desta pesquisa; estes dezenove adolescentes de dezessete anos por ocasião da pesquisa revelaram especificidades de seu raciocínio moral respondendo a um questionário de oito questões compostas. A organização e a composição dos resultados demonstrou a singularidade e a complexidade de sua leitura de mundo impregnada pelo contexto e pelo momento histórico vivenciado: moradores do entorno do grande ABC paulista composto pelos municípios de Santo André, São Bernardo do Campo e São Caetano região considerada referência do movimento sindical brasileiro por ocasião do início das mobilizações de rua convocadas pelas redes sociais em Junho de dois mil e treze. A sistematização dos dados foi organizada por categorias de influências e significados resultantes da lógica singular a cada um dos participantes, doze do sexo masculino e sete do sexo feminino; tal disposição demonstrou que a confiança dedicada a outrem é um dos valores centrais à constituição dos princípios ético-morais entre estes jovens. Os resultados obtidos evidenciam a relevância do afeto bem como, e especialmente, da afetividade constituída a partir das relações pessoais próximas e significativas demonstrando a indubitabilidade da influência daqueles com quem são estabelecidos os laços humanos mais genuínos instaurando vínculos potencialmente constituintes das personalidades éticas. / This exploratory qualitative study is based on Educational and Psychological convergent precepts. Our central aim was to identify personal references that could influence moral and ethical values adopted by teenagers. An empirical such as theoretical investigation sought values education in the domain of Moral Psychology looking for a kind of inventory demonstrating admirable characteristics pointed out by nineteen adolescents in the age of seventeen residents of the great São Paulo ABC (reference of the Brazilian trade union movement). The scope was framed by educational influences looking for a kind of privileged ground of interaction between different generations that will hold a reflexive construction of ethical and moral values from about praiseworthy principles. In view of these prerogatives, a central question has guided our research: what kind of influences pass through the constitution of ethical and moral references of the present generation of adolescents? These youngsters third-year high school students by the São Paulo State Public School, twelve males and seven females, were also attended by a socio-educational program of complementary preparation. Composition and organization of them answers to a survey of eight compound questions revealed specificities about moral reasoning of these adolescents demonstrating the uniqueness and complexity way they assume their influences specially considering recent political marches. This data analysis was organized by categories analyzing influences and meanings which results from the singular moral judgment of each of these nineteen participants. Our central results demonstrated that trust committed to proximal others is one of the core values for the constitution of ethical-moral principles among these young people. Therefore out coming evidences confirmed affection relevance as well as, and especially, affectivity constituted from about close and significant personal relationships demonstrating the influence of those with whom the most genuine human bonds are established constituting potentially roots of ethical personalities.

Understanding Kant’s account of desire is vital to the project of evaluating his views about moral psychology, as well as his account of freedom qua autonomy. In Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, Kant claims that “Desire (appetitio) is the self-determination of a subject's power through the representation of something in the future as an effect of this representation” (7:251). My goal is to clarify which of the subject’s specific capacities Kant means by the “subject's power,” and what role this capacity plays in desire. I argue that the subject's power cannot be her capacity to act. Rather, the subject's power is best understood as her capacity to generate the psychological states that cause action. I call these motivational states 'activation signals'. Desire consists in the self-determination of the subject’s capacity to generate activation signals by her representation of the object of desire together with an accompanying incentive.

What values, if any, is moral psychology based on with regard to what humans should be like? While the value-free ideal of science requires at least the bracketing of values in regards to the conducting of research and influence on its results, this investigation takes seriously the concerns of leading social psychologists that biases may influence the subdiscipline. Textual analyses of moral psychology's literature involving content analysis of codes and cultural discourse analysis of value themes illuminate values involving moral problems and moral goods that may inherently influence research at various levels. It is proposed that values are impossible to eliminate from moral psychological research and that a simple epistemic/nonepistemic value distinction is inadequate for deciding which values are appropriate. A norm of value disclosure to replace the norm of the value-free ideal is recommended.

This essay explores the phenomenological features of the passional response to evil that Aquinas calls 'hatred of sin' in Summa Thelogiae II-II Q34 A3 and I-II Q23 A1, among other places. Social justice concerns and philosophical objections, however, challenge the notion that one can feel hatred toward an agent's vice or sin without it being the agent who is hated. I argue that a careful, contextual reading of these texts shows that Aquinas cannot be read as commending 'hate' in any form. The texts under consideration offer no comfort to those who appeal to hatred of sin or vice to legitimate sentiments or actions that can be reasonably taken to express hatred of persons.

This essay explores the phenomenological features of the passional response to evil that Aquinas calls 'hatred of sin' in Summa Thelogiae II-II Q34 A3 and I-II Q23 A1, among other places. Social justice concerns and philosophical objections, however, challenge the notion that one can feel hatred toward an agent's vice or sin without it being the agent who is hated. I argue that a careful, contextual reading of these texts shows that Aquinas cannot be read as commending 'hate' in any form. The texts under consideration offer no comfort to those who appeal to hatred of sin or vice to legitimate sentiments or actions that can be reasonably taken to express hatred of persons.